Key recovery: Inert and public

Boyd, Colin; Boyen, Xavier; Carr, Christopher; Haines, Thomas

Abstract

We propose a public key infrastructure framework, inspired by modern distributed cryptocurrencies, that allows for tunable key escrow, where the availability of key escrow is only provided under strict conditions and enforced through cryptographic measures. We argue that any key escrow scheme designed for the global scale must be both inert—requiring considerable effort to recover a key—and public—everybody should be aware of all key recovery attempts. To this end, one of the contributions of this work is an abstract design of a proof-of-work scheme that demonstrates the ability to recover a private key for some generic public key scheme. Our framework represents a new direction for key escrow, seeking an acceptable compromise between the demands for control of cryptography on the Internet and the fundamental rights of privacy, which we seek to align by drawing parallels to the physical world.

Citation

Boyd, C., Boyen, X., Carr, C., & Haines, T. (2017). Key recovery: Inert and public. In Paradigms in Cryptology - Mycrypt 2016. Malicious and Exploratory Cryptology - Second International Conference, Mycrypt 2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December 1-2, 2016, Revised Selected Papers, (111-126). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61273-7_6

• Conference Name: International Conference on Cryptology
• Conference Location: Malaysia
• Start Date: Dec 1, 2016
• Acceptance Date: Sep 1, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Jul 14, 2017
• Publication Date: Jul 14, 2017
• Deposit Date: Feb 25, 2020
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Volume: 10311
• Pages: 111-126
• Series Title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• Book Title: Paradigms in Cryptology - Mycrypt 2016. Malicious and Exploratory Cryptology - Second International Conference, Mycrypt 2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December 1-2, 2016, Revised Selected Papers
• ISBN: 9783319612720
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61273-7_6
• Public URL: https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/5452616
• Publisher URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61273-7\_6