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Il significato metafisico della teoria della conoscenza fenomenologica

Trizio, Emiliano

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Emiliano Trizio Emiliano.Trizio@uwe.ac.uk
Occasional Associate Lecturer - CHSS - HSS



Abstract

Recently, a number of publications (e.g. Tengelyi 2014, Zahavi 2017) have renewed the interest for the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics. This issue appears crucial both for understanding Husserl’s thought per se, and for a systematic appraisal of its relations with post-Husserlian phenomenology as well as with contemporary analytic debates about metaphysics. In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to what Zahavi and other have claimed, metaphysical interests played an essential role even before the Logical Investigations and that, by acknowledging it, we can better appreciate the metaphysical implications of Husserl’s later transcendental idealism. This conclusion will rest on 1) a careful investigation of Husserl’s own different notions of metaphysics and 2) an analysis of his views about the relations between
metaphysics and the theory of knowledge.

Citation

Trizio, E. (2018). Il significato metafisico della teoria della conoscenza fenomenologica. https://doi.org/10.6093/1593-7178/5914

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jun 1, 2018
Publication Date Dec 5, 2018
Deposit Date Dec 13, 2018
Publicly Available Date Dec 18, 2018
Journal Bollettino Filosofico
Print ISSN 1593-7178
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 33
Issue 1
Pages 160-174
DOI https://doi.org/10.6093/1593-7178/5914
Keywords Phenomenology, Metaphysics, Theory of Knowledge, Husserl, Transcendental
Idealism
Public URL https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/856206
Publisher URL http://dx.doi.org/10.6093/1593-7178/5914
Additional Information Additional Information : This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final published version is available here: http://dx.doi.org/10.6093/1593-7178/5914.

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