Embracing the "nation"

Cole, Phillip

Abstract

The idea of the "nation" has played only a small role in modern political philosophy because of its apparent irrationalism and amoralism. David Miller, however, sets out to show that these charges can be overcome: nationality is a rational element of one's cultural identity, and nations are genuinely ethical communities. In this paper I argue that his project fails. The defence against the charge of irrationalism fails because Miller works within a framework of ethical particularism which leads to a position of metaethical relativism. A consequence of this relativism is that a community's moral principles and boundaries of exclusion cannot be rationally justified to those constructed as "outsiders". The defence against the charge of amoralism fails because Miller does not so much provide an argument to show that nations are ethical communities as assume they are; we are therefore left without resources to discriminate between ethical and unethical nations. I apply these problems to Miller's treatment of the question of immigration, arguing that it shows that his version of "liberal" nationalism has a tendency to collapse towards a conservative position on such issues. This should not give us any great confidence that the nation, as Miller presents it, should be embraced by modern political philosophy. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2000
• Journal: Res Publica
• Print ISSN: 1356-4765
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 6
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 237-257
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A%3A1009699517536
• Keywords: communitarianism, immigration, liberalism, nationalism, particularism, universalism
• Public URL: https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/1095022
• Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009699517536