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A novel contract theory-based incentive mechanism for cooperative task-offloading in electrical vehicular networks

Kazmi, S. M.Ahsan; Dang, Tri Nguyen; Yaqoob, Ibrar; Manzoor, Aunas; Hussain, Rasheed; Khan, Adil; Hong, Choong Seon; Salah, Khaled

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Authors

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Ahsan Kazmi Ahsan.Kazmi@uwe.ac.uk
Senior Lecturer in Computer Science

Tri Nguyen Dang

Ibrar Yaqoob

Aunas Manzoor

Rasheed Hussain

Adil Khan

Choong Seon Hong

Khaled Salah



Abstract

The proliferation of compute-intensive services in next-generation vehicular networks will impose an unprecedented computation demand to meet stringent latency and resource requirements. Vehicular edge or fog computing has been a widely adopted solution to enhance the computational capacity of vehicular networks; however, the computation requirements of these compute hungry applications will surpass the capabilities of such a solution. To address this challenge, the on-board resources of neighboring mobile vehicles can be utilized. However, such resource utilization requires an incentive mechanism to motivate privately owned neighboring vehicles to participate in sharing their resources. In this paper, we propose a contract theory-based incentive mechanism that maximizes the social welfare of the vehicular networks by motivating neighboring vehicles to participate in sharing their resources. The proposed approach enables the Road Side Units (RSUs) to provide appropriate rewards by offering a tailored contract to each resource sharing vehicle based on their contribution and unique characteristics. Moreover, we derive an optimal contract scheme for computational task offloading, taking into account the individual rationality and incentive-compatible constraints. Finally, we perform numerical evaluations to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme. The proposed scheme achieves up to 28% higher computing resource utilization, 17.2% lower energy consumption per computing resource utilization, and 17.1% lesser energy consumption per task completed when compared to the linear pricing incentive baseline.

Citation

Kazmi, S. M., Dang, T. N., Yaqoob, I., Manzoor, A., Hussain, R., Khan, A., …Salah, K. (2022). A novel contract theory-based incentive mechanism for cooperative task-offloading in electrical vehicular networks. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 23(7), 8380-8395. https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3078913

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 7, 2021
Online Publication Date May 25, 2021
Publication Date Jul 8, 2022
Deposit Date Aug 19, 2022
Publicly Available Date Aug 19, 2022
Journal IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Print ISSN 1524-9050
Electronic ISSN 1558-0016
Publisher Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 23
Issue 7
Pages 8380-8395
DOI https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3078913
Keywords Computer Science Applications, Mechanical Engineering, Automotive Engineering
Public URL https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/9722903
Publisher URL https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9440722
Related Public URLs https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/RecentIssue.jsp?punumber=6979

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Copyright Statement
This is the author’s accepted manuscript of their article 'A novel contract theory-based incentive mechanism for cooperative task-offloading in electrical vehicular networks' published in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems ( Volume: 23, Issue: 7, July 2022).

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