Atemporal essence and existential freedom in schelling

Alderwick, Charlotte

Abstract

© 2014 BSHP. Although it is clear in Schelling's Freiheitsschrift that he takes an agent's atemporal choice between good and evil to be central to understanding human freedom, there is no consensus in the literature and no adequate account of how to understand this choice. Further, the literature fails to render intelligible how existential freedom is possible in the light of this atemporal choice. I demonstrate that, despite their differences, the dominant accounts in the literature are all guilty of these failings and argue that this is due to their misunderstanding of Schelling's conception of the relationship between essence and form. After outlining what I take Schelling's account of this relationship to be, I return to the Freiheitsschrift to demonstrate that with this account in mind we can make intelligible Schelling's claims about the agent's atemporal act, and the possibility of existential freedom on his account. 2014

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Oct 13, 2014
• Online Publication Date: Nov 11, 2014
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2015
• Deposit Date: Jun 21, 2016
• Journal: British Journal for the History of Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0960-8788
• Electronic ISSN: 1469-3526
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 23
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 115-137
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2014.977219
• Keywords: Schelling, Freiheitsschrift, freedom
• Public URL: https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/840577
• Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2014.977219
• Additional Information: Additional Information : his is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in British Journal for the History of Philosophy on 11 November 2014, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09608788.2014.977219
• Contract Date: Jun 21, 2016