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On the assumption of self-reflective subjectivity

Bouzanis, Christoforos

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Authors

Christoforos Bouzanis



Abstract

Contemporary social theory has consistently emphasized habitual action, rule-following, and role-performing as key aspects of social life, yet the challenge remains of combining these aspects with the omnipresent phenomenon of self-reflective conduct. This article attempts to tackle this challenge by proposing useful distinctions that can facilitate further interdisciplinary research on self-reflection. To this end, I argue that we need a more sophisticated set of distinctions and categories in our understanding of habitual action. The analysis casts light on the idea that our contemporary social theories of self-reflection are not consistent with everyday notions of agential knowledgeability and accountability, and this conclusion indicates the need to reconceptualize discourse and subjectivity in non-eliminative terms. Ultimately, the assumption of self-reflective subjectivity turns out to be a theoretical necessity for the conceptualization of discursive participation and democratic choice.

Citation

Bouzanis, C. (2022). On the assumption of self-reflective subjectivity. History of the Human Sciences, 35(2), 167-193. https://doi.org/10.1177/09526951211032895

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jun 1, 2021
Online Publication Date Sep 1, 2021
Publication Date 2022-04
Deposit Date Sep 21, 2022
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal History of the Human Sciences
Print ISSN 0952-6951
Electronic ISSN 1461-720X
Publisher SAGE Publications
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 35
Issue 2
Pages 167-193
DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/09526951211032895
Keywords History and Philosophy of Science; History, human agency, intentionality, self-reflection, social theory, subjectivity
Public URL https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/9996230
Publisher URL https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09526951211032895

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