Expressing properties of coalitional ability under resource bounds

Alechina, Natasha; Logan, Brian; Nga, Nguyen Hoang; Rakib, Abdur

Abstract

We introduce Coalition Logic for Resource Games (CLRG) which extends Coalition Logic by allowing explicit reasoning about resource endowments of coalitions of agents and resource bounds on strategies. We show how to express interesting properties of coalitional ability under resource bounds in this logic, including properties of Coalitional Resource Games introduced by Wooldridge and Dunne in [1]. We also give an efficient model-checking algorithm for CLRG which makes it possible to verify the properties automatically. © Springer-Verlag 2009.

• Presentation Conference Type: Conference Paper (published)
• Publication Date: Dec 1, 2009
• Deposit Date: Jun 16, 2017
• Journal: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
• Print ISSN: 0302-9743
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 5834 LNAI
• Pages: 1-14
• Series Title: Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
• Series Number: 1
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04893-7_1
• Keywords: resource bounds, coalition logic
• Public URL: https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/991345
• Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04893-7_1
• Related Public URLs: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-04893-7_1
• Contract Date: Jun 16, 2017