On the circularity of democratic justice

Thompson, Simon

Abstract

In this article, I argue that justice and democracy stand in a circular relationship: just outcomes emerge from democratic deliberations, but only if such deliberations meet the standards of justice. I develop my argument by engaging in a critical dialogue with Nancy Fraser. Contending that she fails to deal with the danger that unfair deliberative procedures and inadequate norms of justice may reinforce one another, I show what a satisfactory account of democratic justice would look like. Going beyond Fraser's theory, I maintain that although justice and democracy do form a circular relationship, it is essential to give the former greater weight than the latter. I finesse my account by showing what this differential weighting would entail in practice. The result is an account of democratic justice that is significantly different from and a marked improvement on that of Fraser. © The Author(s), 2009.

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Nov 1, 2009
• Deposit Date: Aug 19, 2010
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 15, 2016
• Journal: Philosophy and Social Criticism
• Print ISSN: 0191-4537
• Electronic ISSN: 1461-734X
• Publisher: SAGE Publications
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 35
• Issue: 9
• Pages: 1079-1098
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453709343391
• Keywords: democracy, Nancy Fraser, good enough deliberation, justice, parity of participation
• Public URL: https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/991061
• Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453709343391
• Contract Date: Nov 15, 2016