Payments for Ecosystem Services in Sustainable Mangrove Forest Management in Bangladesh

Abstract In the context of sustainable development, both developed and developing countries are implementing policies that encourage economic growth, environmental protection and social well-being in resource decisions. According to the 2012 Rio+20 Declaration, market-based instruments that complement regulations can offer an economically efficient push to sustainable growth. Market-based instruments, such as payments for ecosystem services (PES) and other market incentives, may play a crucial role in enhancing the livelihoods and wider well-being of poor people. However, for economic tools such as PES to prove valuable in managing natural resources, the decision-making and implementation processes must integrate adequate rights allocation and participatory mechanisms. This article examines forest ecosystem services in the context of the mangrove reserve forest of the Sundarbans in Bangladesh. It is a UNESCO World Heritage site and one of the largest remaining areas of mangroves in the world with an exceptional level of biodiversity. The article argues for a more realistic and equitable approach to PES projects in Bangladesh. It underscores the need for effective participatory tools, third-party monitoring and multi-service PES schemes to improve multiple mangrove ecosystem services in the Sundarbans.


introduction
The Stockholm Declaration, adopted at the 1972 United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment, stated: Man's capability to transform his surroundings, if used wisely, can bring all peoples the benefits of development. … Wrongly or heedlessly applied, the same power can do incalculable harm to human beings and the human environment. 1 The intention to transform the surroundings was the key to promoting the concept of sustainable development. 2 The opportunities as well as challenges for the wise use of natural resources provide an essential impetus for both individuals and the community through a balanced approach between development and conservation. 3 While inherently a dynamic, indefinite and contested concept, outcomes of sustainable development are dependent on the pathways and operations of each country. The UN Conference on Sustainable Development 2012 (Rio+20 Conference) outcome document, 'The Future We Want' (Rio+20 Declaration), 4 acknowledges the disparities in policy and institutional frameworks, political circumstances, levels of development, and economic and environmental interdependencies in the global community. For the future implementation of sustainable development, the Rio+20 Conference launched a process to develop a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 5 which build upon the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Indeed, countries face different challenges and it will not be an easy task for the SDGs to reflect the various national realities, capacities and development priorities. 6 Nevertheless, it is hoped that an integrated approach to sustainable development will assist collaboration across various fields, sectors and scales by drawing connections between social, economic and environmental spheres, facilitating appropriate policy frameworks at the national level, and recognizing the need to engage local communities. 7 The Rio+20 Declaration highlights that while sustainable development remains the highest priority of the international and national development agenda, moving towards a green economy is expected to enable economic growth while increasing environmental quality and social inclusiveness. 8 Preference is given to market-based instruments such as taxes, permits or payment schemes (e.g., forest certification, payments for forest ecosystem services). Payments for ecosystem services (PES) is gaining recognition worldwide as a promising approach to achieve sustainable development as PES schemes offer economic incentives to individuals and communities for the conservation of ecosystem services. 9 However, many argue that the green economy as well as market-based instruments will advance corporate interests as they promote markets and businesses as a solution to environmental and economic problems. 10 Failure to ensure that environmental imperatives are factored into economic incentives can result in long-term constraints on future economic opportunities and will have a detrimental effect on social concerns such as poverty alleviation, and food and energy security. 11 Critics notwithstanding, the importance of the ecosystem approach and the relevance of ecosystem services 12 in forest management are acknowledged in the Rio+20 Declaration. Forests are an example of an ecosystem that attracts internal claims as well as external actors with respect to its management, and highlights the competing parties that need forests for survival. Forests have a public-good dimension because they produce transnational externalities as a result of their exploitation. They are an important source of wood for fuel, and food and shelter for local communities; yet, they also serve as carbon sinks and biodiversity reserves for the world at large. Their management is subject to competing claims from environmentalists, the timber industry, and local communities that depend on forest products for their survival. SDG 15 emphasizes the social, economic and environmental benefits of forests to people 13 and affirms that 'the wide range of products and services that forests provide creates opportunities to address many of the most pressing sustainable development challenges', and that there is a need to integrate 'sustainable forest management objectives and practices into the mainstream of economic policy and decision-making'. 14 It notes: … the importance of ongoing initiatives such as reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. The challenge is to find a balance between socio-economic development and ecosystem services. This article assesses the sustainability of PES in managing the Sundarbans 16 mangrove forest in Bangladesh. Globally, mangrove forests are one of the most threatened ecosystems, shrinking by 0.7% every year. 17 The Sundarbans is the largest single-tract mangrove forest in the world with a total area of 6,017 square kilometres (km 2 ) in which 61% is covered by land and 39% by water. 18 The mangroves of the Sundarbans, spanning India and Bangladesh, are recognized as an internationally important site under the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention). 19 It is one of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage sites as it 'supports an exceptional level of biodiversity in both the terrestrial and marine environments, including significant populations of globally endangered cat species, such as the Royal Bengal Tiger'. 20 A large amount of forest resourcesincluding fuel wood, palm leaves for roofs of local houses, reeds for making local mats, wood for paper, matchbox and hardboardis collected annually from the Sundarbans. It is also the largest national source of honey. More than 300,000 people directly, and more than one million people indirectly, depend on the Sundarbans for their life and livelihoods. For them, the Sundarbans is a source of life and a safeguard from natural disasters. Along with providing fishing for the livelihoods of people, the Sundarbans provides essential ecosystem services. They protect the coastline from erosion, buffer communities and habitats against storms, produce timber, and work as a carbon sink to combat climate change. 21 This mangrove forest is a reserve forest and plays a significant role in supporting a wide range of ecosystem services that sustain the livelihoods of local poor communities. In spite of a ban on logging and forest encroachment, there are growing concerns that illegal activities combined with storms and increased salinity are degrading the mangrove ecosystems. 22 It is thus vital that beneficiaries of mangrove services are integrally involved in mangrove management and restoration planning. In Bangladesh, market instruments such as PES in forest management have been striving to integrate these competing local and global actors, claims and concerns. PES schemes have the potential to provide benefits for local poor communities and governments, as well as financial incentives for better management of natural resources. These schemes can offer incentives for mangrove management and encourage sustainable development in sensitive mangrove areas. Payments can be made to mangrove managers for carbon sequestration, storm and flood protection, and aquaculture support. However, market instruments can provide a useful tool in the management of forest resources and in the provision of ecosystem services only if they are integrated within institutional development and rights allocation.
This article therefore explores the role of PES in relation to forest resources (Section 2). It examines the allocation of forest rights (Section 3) and participatory rights available to forest communities (Section 4). The former argues that while states hold natural assets on behalf of their people for the benefit of present and future generations, these rights have to be effectively allocated among forest users. The latter requires the availability of necessary legal and institutional frameworks to protect victims from procedural weaknesses. Section 5 explores the application of PES in Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forests Degradation (REDD) schemes. The article argues for a more realistic and equitable approach to PES projects. As a market-based instrument, PES requires appropriate national laws, regulations and policies along with adequate economic settings and incentives (e.g., income generating opportunities such as sustainable prawn cultivation, marketing of mangrove products, ecotourism). However, it is feared that additional regulatory and compliance costs may hinder effective implementation of PES projects in the mangrove forest management and undermine the objective to balance competing interests. Section 6 (Prospects for Future Development) underscores the need for third-party monitoring and multi-service PES schemes to improve the multiple mangrove ecosystem services of the Sundarbans.
2. payments for ecosystem services in the context of forest management PES, originally intended as voluntary cash transfers, include all financial and nonfinancial rewards or compensation mechanisms between the service provider and the service receiver for the provision of an environmental service. 23 An important indicator of the growing ecological scarcity worldwide was provided by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report in 2005, which found that over 60% of the world's major ecosystem goods and services covered in the assessment were degraded or used unsustainably. 24 A concrete way to move towards sustainable development is to guarantee the good functioning and delivery to society of all types of ecosystem service. However, PES considers that the actions of nature (e.g., forest, water and carbon cycles) are commodities and they are subject to the law of the market. Indeed, pricing of forest ecosystem services presents serious dangers as it may 23  exclude poor people and not always reflect the damage caused to the environment. In addition, valuing ecosystem services is particularly difficult, especially valuation that takes into account the social costs of introducing market-based mechanisms for services that were previously free. 25 Therefore, for PES to work effectively within the forest regime, several elements need to be addressed and integrated into national laws and policies.
Firstly, the valuation of forest ecosystem services can include direct use value (drinking water, fish and hydropower) or indirect use value (river flows, flood control and water purification). 26 For instance, to build a case for investment in mangrove ecosystem management, there is a need to assess the value of various ecosystem services, identify the major stakeholders, and undertake analysis of the socio-economic characteristics and interests of stakeholders, to help ensure that payment schemes are appropriate for their needs. There must be planning of sustainable financing, the establishment of an enabling legal and institutional framework, and processes for building public awareness. 27 In this context, the concern is that this valuation will create a greater divide between the developed and developing countries as PES promotes trade in pollution credits, monoculture and speculative markets (such as forests, water and biodiversity). In some cases, the apparent lack of respect for land rights and intergenerational equity (i.e., protecting resources for future generations) makes PES unappealing for those aiming for environmental protection and social justice. 28 Although UN agencies and international financial institutions (such as the World Bank) offer full support for the valuation of natural capital for land-based communities and indigenous people, some label the process as a commodification of natural resources 29 and the enclosure of natural areas (e.g., forest, watersheds, wetlands). 30 Secondly, there are concerns about how payments will be made. Whatever payment scheme is available (private, public, permits, certification), the regulation and enforcement mechanisms, standards (certification standards, for example), and effective monitoring of financial services have to exist to support any payment scheme. 31 For instance, for mangrove ecosystem services, government agencies, people dependent upon forest resources (fish, timber, honey), small and medium-sized enterprises and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) need to be involved. Possible service providers include people collecting timber or honey, people involved in aquaculture, and local communities holding communal or common property 25  rights. Third parties or intermediaries in the development of markets for mangrove ecosystem services may include NGOs or financial institutions.
Thirdly, it is important to ensure that property, access and use rights are well established. This relates to land tenure as well as rights for resource abstraction and use. 32 The public sector can create incentives (such as performance incentives and tax exemptions) and disincentives (such as taxes and permits). There may also be grants and donations from individuals for development projects to support conservation, climate adaptation and poverty alleviation. Investment by the private sector for specific forest ecosystem services (carbon credits, water and biodiversity, for example) may be available. It is also necessary to have legal rights for communities who manage the forest and other related critical ecosystems. These can cover access and use rights, control rights and transfer rights (public, private, communal or openly accessible). Property rights and user's rights vary significantly from country to country and communal management of forests occurs in many developing countries, including Bangladesh. 33 If the state decides to retain property rights, the government will control all potential benefits. In this case, communities (or other stakeholders) will have no additional motivation to protect forests unless their benefits are secured and guaranteed by a clear legal mandate. Without security and certainty of landholding (through title rights, as well as other rights, interests and remedies), it is difficult to achieve the levels of permanence required to demonstrate ecosystem service benefits.
Fourthly, PES is not a silver bullet and clearly will not work if governance is weak and unable to set favourable enabling conditions, if transaction costs are very high, if competing destructive resource usages are highly lucrative, or if tenure or land use rights are insufficiently defined or enforced, as may be the case for some mangroves, coral reefs, flood plains and forests without clear ownership. 34 However, under these circumstances, it is unlikely that governments will have alternative regulatory, procedural and remedial tools to effectively manage ecosystem services, as commandand-control regulations are also likely to fail. Many of the PES initiatives (such as carbon offsetting via reforestation) allow companies and governments to continue to pollute the environment (e.g., through monoculture for biofuel, or plantation of invasive species) in exchange for the ecosystem service provided by forests and agricultural soils in developing countries, which act as carbon sinks. For instance, a large number of the payments for watershed services 35 are located in North America and China and are funded by the private sector. 36  need to focus on forest communities and PES approaches need to complement existing conservation tools. Regulatory and governance tools (such as land-use rights for local and indigenous communities, transparency in the payment scheme, third party audits, adequate funding, access to information, prior informed consent, and the participation of local/indigenous communities in decision making) need to be strengthened to allow forest stewardship to flourish.

ecosystem services and forest rights allocation in bangladesh
The state of the Sundarbans mangrove reserve forest is difficult to assess as there are multiple drivers of change in ecosystem services ranging from climate change and new agricultural methods to specific infrastructural developments (such as the Farakka barrage), and local policy-driven actions (such as commercial shrimp farming). According to a recent study, 37 the management of ecosystems in the coastal zones of Bangladesh needs to capture the complex dynamics of social-ecological systems (including sea level rise, new land uses, modified river flows, urbanization, and new conservation measures). It highlighted that, in Bangladesh, while food and inland fish production is on the rise: [the] non-food ecosystem services such as water availability, water quality and land stability have deteriorated. Although the shrimp industry is contributing to GDP [gross domestic product], this is almost certainly a factor in increasing soil and surface water salinity in this region. 38 Hossain and co-authors add: [T]he calculations of the economic value of mangrove ecosystem services show that in the long run, the costs to the communities that rely on the mangroves, and society in general who benefit from mangroves carbon storing ability, often exceed the immediate economic gains. Yet despite their efforts the destruction continues as these values fail to make their way into the calculations that inform coastal development decision-making. This means that many existing policies still focus on short term gains which lead to mangrove destruction, such as providing tax breaks for shrimp aquaculture. 39 As biodiversity becomes increasingly rare and precious, protected areasthe ecosystems, species, genetic diversity and associated values that societies agree to conserveare becoming an ever more important focus of interest and concern. 40 The importance of protected areas is emphasized in international conventions, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 41  Convention), 42 and the Ramsar Convention. 43 Bangladesh has ratified these multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). 44 The significance of protected areas is confirmed also by international programmes such as the UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Programme. 45 The Sundarbans Reserve Forest is a protected area under the Bangladesh Wildlife Preservation Order (1973); it has three wildlife sanctuaries, which have been managed by the World Heritage Convention since 1997 through the Forest Department (under the Ministry of Environment and Forests). Several values 46 are attached to a protected area like the Sundarbans, ranging from supporting genetic and species diversity 47 to providingdirectly and indirectlywater, food, clothing, shelter and medicines to people. By conserving habitats, protected areas can increase the ecosystems' resilience to climate change, reduce the vulnerability of communities to natural disasters and provide them with livelihood resources to withstand and recover from crises. 48 At the same time, the economic value (in the form of water, fisheries and timber, for example) of such protected areas or reserve forests cannot be ignored as these areas offer opportunities for ecotourism and provide jobs and livelihoods. 49 The PES concept has the potential for better forest ecosystem management but it presents dangers and social costs unless carefully implemented and monitored inside an equitable and participatory system, inclusive of different types of actor. A clear set of rights for the assigning of responsibilities, duties and obligations, and for distributing benefits among the various actors involved (such as forest users, government agencies) is crucial. Effective forest rights allocation would benefit communities, reduce social conflict, and promote environmental protection and awareness. 50 Initiating PES schemes without first protecting and allocating land ownership, as well as access and use rights of forest-dependent communities, will almost certainly lead to rent-seeking behaviour regarding forests.
The majority of the poor live in rural areas in Bangladesh and depend for survival on forest-related biological resources. 51 Actions to increase income generation from biodiversity can provide incentives for conservation but can also lead to degradation without the appropriate enabling environment, which involves establishing appropriate rights to resources, access to information and stakeholder involvement. 52 Parts of the Sundarbans were declared a wildlife sanctuary, in the 1970s, to conserve animals and trees. A moratorium on felling of the dominant Sundari tree was enacted in 1989 and a 20 kilometre buffer area around the forest was declared an 'ecologically critical area' in 2006. Finally, following the devastation caused by Hurricane Aila in 2007, a prohibition on all timber extraction was put in place. The three wildlife sanctuaries of the Sundarbans are managed by the Forest Department, which allocates permits for nypa palm (golpata), honey, and fish. 53 However, illegal logging is rife in the Sundarbans and the Forest Department, with little manpower, is unable to control or monitor illegal activities. The level of corruption also is high, which is cited as the main reason for the massive destruction of timber and non-timber related forest products. 54 Prior to the Sundarbans being declared a reserve forest in 1977, a number of forestry conservation plans were adopted, which prioritized the need for wildlife conservation as well as revenue collection from timber. 55 The first National Forest Policy, in 1979, inadequately addressed issues such as sustainability, community participation and their livelihoods. 56 The government claims sole ownership of the reserve forest and has the ultimate authority in managing forest resource collection. 57 There are no recognized local rights within the reserve forest, and the population surrounding the Sundarbans has not yet been able to participate in the strategies and activities aimed at conserving the forest and using its resources sustainably. has stated that the constitutional 'right to life' 58 does include a right to a safe and healthy environment, thus offering an implied protection of forestry resources. Articles 31 and 32 of the Constitution of Bangladesh protect the right to life as a fundamental right. It encompasses within its ambit the protection and preservation of the environment, ecological balance free from pollution of air and water, and sanitation, without which life can hardly be enjoyed. Any act or omission contrary thereto will violate the said right to life. 59 The forest-related laws of Bangladesh adopt a command-and-control approach. They demonstrate a lack of coherent policies and institutions, and encourage socially and ecologically conflicting centralized management regimes. According to the Forest Act 1927 of Bangladesh: 60 28A. (1) On any land which is the property of the Government or over which the Government has proprietary rights, and on any other land assigned to the Government by voluntary written agreement of the owner for the purpose of afforestation, conservation or management through social forestry, the Government may establish a social forestry programme.
The Social Forestry Rules 2004 (Amendment 2010) recognize this provision of the Forest Act and ensure local community participation in afforestation activities in government-owned forest land. 61 The Rules are formulated to ensure the participation of local communities in the planning and management of social forestry programmes. The National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plan for Bangladesh 2004 describes co-management as 'the sharing of authority, responsibility and benefits between government and local communities in the management of natural resources'. 62 Policies supporting co-management approaches to natural resource management include the Bangladesh Forest Department's Nishorgo Vision 2010, which focuses on co-management and community partnerships as strategies for strengthening the management of protected areas. 63 This network, supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), calls for enhanced protected area management, including co-management, and urges the adoption of participatory mechanisms to promote biodiversity management, use, and benefit sharing with local communities and other partners. Other projects that focus on the Sundarbans include the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Community-based Adaptation to Climate Change through Coastal Forestation Project (CBACC-CF), which aims to promote coastal area works with tree plantation, fisheries and livestock rearing by expanding livelihood options for climate-vulnerable communities. 64 Another example is the USAID-funded Integrated Protected Area Co-management Project (IPAC), 65 managed by the Forest Department, which seeks to engage local stakeholders through a participatory co-management process, empowering them with decision-making rights and positive incentives, thus promoting their interest in, and commitment to, the protection of biodiversity resources. 66 IPAC has developed Project Design Documents for forestry voluntary carbon market projects, which include the Collaborative REDD+ Improved forest management Sundarbans Project (CRISP), 67 discussed in Section 5 below. So far, social forestry has had limited success in Bangladesh. 68 For the effective implementation of the projects, clear guidance is needed on land use and ownership. While social forestry is crucial for mangrove forest management, the central management of forestry fails to stop encroachment and settlement of forest land. In the case of the Sundarbans, forest ownership lies with the government, but there is an extreme shortage of trained forest officials. 69 The command-andcontrol approach in forest law does not encourage community participation and benefit sharing, nor does it promote alternative livelihoods for communities living at the edge of the forest to curb their dependency on the Sundarbans. 70 For instance, according to some critics, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has funded the Sundarbans Biodiversity Conservation Project (SBCP), 71 operated on the basis of a 'design framework [that] failed to recognize the profound interdependence among the forest, its wildlife and its human inhabitantsthe traditional resource users '. 72 This project was fundamentally flawed, as its primary effect was to destroy this interdependence by creating artificial, alien and short-term resource and livelihood systems for the local communities and indigenous people in the name of 'poverty reduction', and distance them from their ecosystem. 73 A recent incident in the Sundarbans highlights the ineffective nature of Bangladeshi forest law and legal remedies. In December 2014, an oil tanker accident in the Sundarbans of Bangladesh led to the release of approximately 358,000 litres of heavy fuel oil into the river and mangrove ecosystem. 74 The response to the incident by the government ministry was excruciatingly slow. At the request of the Ministry of Environment and Forests of Bangladesh, a Joint UN/Government of Bangladesh Sundarbans Oil Spill Response mission was formed under the coordination of the UNDP. 75 The objective of the mission was to strengthen the government's efforts in containing and cleaning up the oil spillage, as well as to provide support for assessing the situation and developing an action plan for a phased response and recovery. The absence of a formal oil spill contingency plan, weak response management and response infrastructure, along with the absence of effective monitoring, impeded response and recovery efforts. As of March 2015, only 68,200 litres of oil had been recovered; 76 the rest continues to pollute the forest ecosystems (such as water, fisheries and wildlife) and affect human health and livelihoods. While some people have benefited economically from the oil recovery scheme, the report by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) emphasized the health and environmental risks and referred to the incident as a 'serious wake-up call' for Bangladesh. 77 Shipping oil through the forest poses a serious threat to the forest and forest-dependent communities and there are insufficient appropriate safeguards and mitigation measures in place. Within two months of imposing a ban on the shipping route, the government lifted the ban on cargo boats, although oil tankers remain prohibited. 78 72 J. Hossain

stewardship and participatory democracy
The government, as the land owner and steward, has a duty to the community to protect and preserve the mangrove forest. 79 In this sense, the government is the trustee to conserve the forest land for the benefit of present and future generations. The government owes a duty to the people to provide access to information and enable them to participate in decision-making processes in relation to the mangrove forest. At the same time, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local communities are also involved in forest stewardship managing and conserving the forest and related resources. However, the hierarchical approach to mangrove forest management in Bangladesh, as exemplified in its reliance on command-and-control regulation, limits a more participatory mode of governance. Participatory democracy requires the availability of necessary frameworks to protect victims from procedural inequity and increased participation involving a set of actors (such as government authorities, users, local community, NGOs, industries). 80 The participatory process needs to be fair, inclusive and open, and it is thought that public participation improves the outcomes of the process by enhancing their legitimacy. 81 Public participation is an area which could potentially enhance public trust in government decision making, and thus reduce litigation. 82 Public involvement in decision making and environmental information could help to arrive at a better decision in the first place and, in the long run, mitigate the need to resolve disputes by litigation. By integrating the people's voice in the decision-making process, supplying community groups with environmental information and opening access to environmental impact assessments, the government not only could achieve high quality natural resource management but could also contribute to reducing social and economic inequalities. 83 On the one hand, the forest laws of Bangladesh refer to the problems of over-consumption (for fuelwood or timber) and the unsustainable exploitation of resources (as a result of poverty, illegal logging and land grabbing). 84 On the other hand, participatory approaches are weakly incorporated into forest-related regulations (such as the lack of free prior informed consent of the forest community). The Forest Policy 1994 and the Social Forestry Rules (2004) incorporate participatory forestry and allow cooperation between state and non-state actors.
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2013 85 and the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2008 86 both explicitly emphasize the importance of participatory forest resource management. However, the forest regime of Bangladesh is centrally controlled by the Forest Department with little or no genuine involvement of the local people. 87 Forest management is focused more on generating revenues from timber production and it sidelines the contributions of non-wood forest products to local livelihoods and forest sustainability. 88 The social forestry rules in the National Forest Policy 1994 promote benefitsharing arrangements to alleviate poverty. The Policy states that 'the Government shall work jointly with NGOs and ensure people's participation'. 89 It further states that '[d]enuded and encroached Government forest lands will be identified and brought under afforestation program[s] with people's participation on [a] benefit sharing approach'. 90 While social forestry-related projects have led to a better quality of life for the participants, 91 some of these projects are dogged with criticisms regarding an absence of local stakeholder consultation in the planning and management of forest resources along with donor-driven agendas, weak local-level institutions and a top-down policy approach. 92 Some sectoral laws in Bangladesh require the participation of people in decision making and include provisions on environmental impact assessment (EIA). 93 However, participation is limited to the project initiation level. Consultation is often pro forma and does not promote an effective decision-making process. A study 94 of the EIA of a proposed coal-based thermal power plant highlights the problems associated with consultation processes in Bangladesh. The proposed power plant is to be situated 14 kilometres downstream from the Sundarbans in Rampal Upazila of Bagerhat, beside the Poshur river, and will generate 1,320 megawatts (MW) of electricity. In 2012, the Bangladesh government signed a joint venture agreement with India's state-run electricity generation company, National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (NTPC), under the name of Bangladesh-India Friendship Power Company Limited. 95 According to the agreement, the NTPC is responsible for planning, building and operating the plant. 96 Although the Department of Environment (Bangladesh) approved the project, it has imposed 59 conditions 97 and the no-objection certificate is yet to be granted. 98 According to the project's critics, the high level of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emitted from the power plant, and the contamination of groundwater by the huge volume of waste produced from burning the coal (which includes arsenic, mercury, cadmium, and chromium) will destroy the mangrove forest and its ecosystem services. 99 Another study of the EIA process of this coal-based power plant 100 found that the process lacked adequate engagement and consultation with stakeholders. According to the report, most consultees did not have a clear idea about the extent of the project, the project location or associated risks. There was a lack of transparency around issues of compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation. Moreover, no grievance mechanism was established to address and resolve the concerns of people harmed by the acquisition of land. A 2015 report by Transparency International Bangladesh 101 highlights that powerful political party leaders and administration officials threatened to file cases and take legal action against those who opposed the power plant. More recently, three French banks and two Norwegian pension funds have refused to invest in the Rampal project, citing environmental and social concerns. 102 Public protests against the project are ongoing. 103 At the forest project implementation level, people's concerns were rejected on several occasions. For instance, the ADB-funded SBCP ignored the perspective of the local community. 104 This US$77.3 million project aimed to establish a proper management system to protect biological diversity and secure the environmental and biological integrity of the Sundarbans. The project was undertaken with the objective of improving the declining biodiversity conditions of the Sundarbans through poverty reduction, participatory management and development. 105 The project was intended to take place between 1999 and 2006 but the ADB suspended the project in 2003, citing problems with project design, the implementation of some activities, and financial management. In 2005, the ADB formally and unilaterally cancelled its commitment, blaming Bangladesh's Forest Department for failing to take steps to revise the project. This project also failed to consult adequately with local communities; did not adhere to the ADB and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) guidelines on consultation and transparency (for example, local people had restricted access to project documentation); did not address how the proposed 'participatory forest management' and 'peoples' involvement' would be achieved within a national institutional and legal framework; failed to incorporate the traditional knowledge of the local communities and indigenous peoples; and did not provide any grievance mechanisms to victims. 106 Corruption in the monitoring agency (the Forest Department of Bangladesh) was a further reason for the ADB to terminate the project. According to critics, 'the SBCP prevented local people from entering the jungle for their livelihoods, and allowed outside encroachers to smuggle forest resources more freely'. 107 In sum, while the hierarchical approach may be effective in the event of an urgent or imminent threat (such as an oil spill or forest fire), a participatory approach is superior when policy makers aim to attain multiple, and sometimes conflicting, sectoral goals. In addition, deliberative participatory processes will be more effective when implementation is dependent on the cooperation of local actors. In Bangladesh, the law does not provide any guidance on the determination of what constitutes a significant impact in particular situations or on the role of public participation. Participation and information requirements are limited. On many occasions, the government agencies simply sideline impact assessment requirements. More importantly, for political reasons, it is not always possible to access courts to challenge a resource decision of the government. Unfortunately, there is no provision for quasi-judicial mechanisms to resolve conflicts in these circumstances. 5. redd+, pes and the forest: the north proposes, the south adapts REDD+ is defined as: reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. 108 REDD+ activities may include PES. 109 REDD+ payments made to forest users for reforestation to incentivize conservation or to tackle the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation are examples of PES transactions. 110 Government-financed PES programmes for forest management can be found in China, Costa Rica, and Mexico. 111 The funding for REDD+ activities may come from national and international, public and private sources. 112 PES schemes may play a larger role in REDD+ activities if they contribute to the livelihood and well-being of local communities. However, a lack of clear policies, experience and confidence in PES hinders its adoption in many developing countries. 113 Within forest governance, REDD+ offers a 'political and economic trade off' opportunity between developed and developing countries. 114 118 'As an initiative "to" the South, "from" the North', both developed and developing countries actively participated during REDD negotiations to make it part of the solution to climate change whereby developed countries can offset their emissions and promote sustainable development in developing countries. 119 While a large number of developing countries have readiness policies to reduce forest-based emissions, problems remain with REDD-related governance mechanisms, which need to be transparent and inclusive.
Can PES schemes help to implement REDD+ activities in Bangladesh? REDD is a developing theme in Bangladesh. 120 After joining the UN-REDD Programme in 2010, the Government of Bangladesh established a national REDD+ Steering Committee and a REDD Cell. During 2011 and 2012, the UN-REDD Programme supported these national bodies in the development of a National REDD+ Readiness Roadmap, including extensive national and sub-national consultations. The REDD+ Steering Committee of Bangladesh endorsed the Roadmap in December 2012. 121 With targeted support funds, UN-REDD now supports the implementation of some elements of the Roadmapnamely, the development of a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) Action Plan, capacity building for forest monitoring, an assessment of REDD+ corruption risks, and the development of nationally appropriate social safeguards. 122 Currently, UNDP and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO) are assisting the Government of Bangladesh to implement targeted support activities funded by the UN-REDD Programme on corruption risk assessment, social impact assessment and MRV. 123 Projects such as the REDD+ARR Protected Area Project promote carbon stock enhancement through afforestation, reforestation and revegetation (ARR). 124 Another example is the Collaborative REDD+ Improved Forest Management Sundarbans Project (CRISP), developed by the Forest Department of Bangladesh. 125 The main objectives of this project are to achieve carbon sequestration as well as improvements to livelihoods through community participation in forestry activities, and the conservation of flora and fauna species through measures that include habitat protection and improvement. The emissions reductions will be achieved by reducing deforestation and forest degradation. Here, REDD+ payments constitute a PES by offsetting opportunity costs. These projects can play an important role in facilitating participation by the poor and marginalized in PES schemes.
It is interesting to note that REDD+ schemes in Bangladesh are not only about climate financing mechanisms; they also aim to foster sustainable forest management 126 and halt the trends of deforestation and degradation as they are equally critical in protecting the livelihoods of millions of the country's extreme poor. 127 In a country like Bangladesh, any performance-based payments would require supportive legal and policy frameworks, as well as effective MRV. In addition, the REDD+ programme must promote wide participation of local communities and provide adequate protection to other ecosystems and services beyond carbon sequestration. Some fear that the mangrove forest is being monetized into carbon credits. The 'Sundarbans Forest Carbon Inventory 2009', conducted by the Forest Department of Bangladesh with assistance from USAID and other international donors, had already determined the economic value of the mangroves. 128 This economic valuation was criticized by local NGO platforms as this approach promotes commodification of forests and has the potential to sideline the interests of indigenous and local forest communities. 129 The REDD+ projects need to adopt a balanced approach and maximize synergies between poverty reduction, adaptation to climate change, and conservation of forest resources.
To promote social and environmental benefits and reduce risks from REDD+, the UN-REDD Programme has drafted Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria, which include several principles and criteria of relevance to biodiversity protection. 130 Biodiversity safeguards developed outside the UNFCCC context 131 seek to ensure that REDD+ does not adversely affect biodiversity. However, it remains uncertain how various international standards will be enforced at the national level. 132 In addition, the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility plays an important role in financing REDD+ activities and requires participating countries to carry out a Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment. These assessments may, in turn, help in preventing the negative impacts of REDD+ implementation. 133 The World Bank's own operational policies include further safeguards of relevance for biodiversity protection, such as World Bank Operational Policies 4.01 on environmental assessment and 4.36 on forests. 134 Using these assessments could help to identify and reduce adverse impacts at the planning stage. However, the problems associated with EIAs in Bangladesh (for example, the Rampal Thermal Power Plant project, discussed in Section 4) highlight that the EIA process is often weak and the outcome can be ignored by the decision makers. Moreover, Bangladesh already faces problems of high levels of corruptionexamples can be found in relation to the Climate Change fund 135 and the ADB-funded SBCP. 136 The fear also remains that the Forest Department, with its centrally controlled power, will introduce a new framework for forest bureaucracy over the Sundarbans which will allow the Department to manipulate forest-related data and access funds. Indeed, monitoring and reporting of the biodiversity impacts of REDD+ activities would help to clarify how REDD+ can best contribute to biodiversity conservation goals. However, monitoring in practice will require improved coordination between national-level actors responsible for REDD+ implementation and biodiversity protection. While safeguards provide an important means of ensuring that REDD+ does not undermine biodiversity objectives, 'the pursuit of biodiversity goals may involve tradeoffs with other goals ascribed to REDD+, including maximising emission reductions and cost-effectiveness'. 137 6. prospects for future development The extent to which a sovereign country provides an opportunity to protect forest resources depends upon the values the country attributes to these resources in the face of external economic pressure, and the effectiveness of the law and its remedies. It is clear that for a country like Bangladesh to preserve short-term economic gains, the long-term public benefit is often overlooked. Decision making in relation to sustainable forest management is driven by financial concerns and commercial interests, and rights to access fundamental public goods from nature are jeopardized by short-term economic interests. There is very little understanding why certain ecosystem services need to be prioritized over others and ecosystem-related concerns are not integrated within decision-making processes. Local communities are not efficiently involved in the decision-making process across the full range of ecosystem services. There is no independent monitoring or audit available, and the government agencies fail to play an effective oversight role in ensuring that actions conform to agreed standards.
PES schemes in Bangladesh can manage and deliver ecosystem services at the local level if the focus is on rewarding and encouraging positive behaviour, and making the polluter pay for poor environmental practices. Yet, any monetary valuation will have to be transparent about the underlying assumptions and weaknesses, and realistic in its claims and ambitions. At the same time, any payment needs to capture the longterm commitment to environmental ends. There are several ways in which this payment can be made: small financial contributions by the government (e.g., payment under the social forestry programme), local business directly or indirectly gaining financially from the improved ecosystem services, or visitors contributing to PES schemes (e.g., eco-tourism). However, the risk remains that the 'payment' will be lost as a result of corruption. It is also not clear what the 'payment' will be used for. Faced with a multitude of commitments under international agreements and pressure from UN agencies and northern donor agencies and financial institutions, Bangladesh seems increasingly ill-prepared to capitalize on the benefits arising from PES schemes.
In Bangladesh, multi-stakeholder partnerships 138 show some positive results. For instance, the Mangroves for the Future 139 and Ecosystem for Life 140 projects are creating a platform for long-term partnerships for biodiversity management at the national and transboundary (India-Bangladesh) level, involving civil society, government, and the private sector. The Sundarbans Environmental and Livelihoods Security (SEALS) Programme 2010-14, funded by the European Commission, aims to 'contribute towards the maintenance and improvement of 'ecosystem productivity' of the Sundarbans Reserve Forest (SRF) and induce 'environmental and social integrity' in the habitats around the Sundarbans. 141 One crucial aim of this programme is to develop alternative livelihoods for SRF-dependent communities. Another aim is to equip the Forest Department to protect and manage the Sundarbans. While it is too early to assess the impact on local communities, this project is showing some success. For instance, the Sundarbans Development and Alternative Resources Integration (SUNDARI) Project 2012-15, funded by the SEALS Programme, works closely with the extreme poor households of the Sundarbans and offers training on non-timber SRF products. 142 The German government-funded Sustainable Development and Biodiversity Conservation in Coastal Protection Forests 143 collaborates with a private shrimp-processing company on the greening of dikes. The company works with 3,500 small-scale farmers to produce certified organic shrimps that are sold in Germany and France. Communities are given training on the sustainable cultivation of the nypa palm as well as on alternative livelihood strategies, such as honey collection.
The challenges in Bangladesh are many. Firstly, multi-service PES schemes that value and seek to improve multiple ecosystem services within the mangrove forest have the potential to foster a synergy between the delivery of different ecosystem services. Such multi-service schemes may offer opportunities to combine multiple sources of funding from a range of beneficiaries. Partnership and co-management initiatives based on a modified form of social forestry may work in Bangladesh. However, such partnerships will need to be self-sustaining strategic partnerships involving a broad range of local organizations, businesses and local communities, with the credibility to influence other local strategic decision makers. The challenge here is to capture the multiple values (such as eco-tourism, water quality, and soil erosion) of the mangrove forest.
Secondly, top-down forestry regulations may not, on their own, be the best option to protect forest ecosystem services because of a lack of effective legal remedies, cost implications, and uncertainty surrounding liability. Formal regulations can cause delay, cost, uncertainty in prosecutions and, in many instances, they may be ineffective as methods of 'individual retribution' or 'general deterrence', 144 without generating any improvement in standards or performance levels. As a solution, some suggest the use of permits and licences, environmental assessments and self-regulation. 145 Market-based approaches such as tax incentives and subsidies can complement command-and-control mechanisms. However, market-based approaches may be limited in scope and unable to cope with complex forest ecosystem-related problems. 146 In contrast, a 'hands-off' approach that encourages voluntarism and self-regulation 147 (such as NGO standards) can cause a legitimacy deficiency.
Thirdly, policy frameworks need to support institutions and facilities. Along with strengthening forest institutions (e.g., the SEALS Project), the donor agencies (e.g., USAID, the European Commission) and international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank, ADB) need to apply their own policies and guidance on, for instance, EIA and community resettlement. However, the way in which some of these foreign financial institutions conduct their activities in Bangladesh has been criticized on the basis of failure to assess risks associated with projects 148 or funding in polluting projects. 149 Fourthly, embracing the uncertain realm of REDD+ without ascertaining its impact on forest ecosystem services is extremely ill-advised. Greater clarity on the future interplay between PES and REDD+ is required. Also, along with adherence to biodiversity safeguards, the various schemes and projects must ensure consistency and comparability of how emissions and offsets are measured, verified and reported. The emphasis on creating financial incentives may result in valuation conflicts between actors (state and non-state) engaged in forest issues at all levels. In addition, NGOs are not homogeneous: there is a divide between NGOs that embrace marketbased approaches and conservation NGOs. Forest NGOs with greater funding often have greater roles in policy decisions and implementation.

concluding comments
As in the forestry management of many developing countries, market values and short-term economic benefits are prioritized in the mangrove forest management in Bangladesh. Reflexive regulation, safeguards and monitoring for REDD+ in many mangrove forest countries are unachievable as a result of weak governance. This article highlighted the divergence between developed countries' enthusiasm for market-based regulation and safeguards, and the ability of developing countries to deliver such strategies effectively. Moreover, the increasing involvement of nonstate actors in forest governance, their accountability and legitimacy may be questioned.
In addition, the level of disappointment of the local people as a result of the lack of effective local engagement with relevant stakeholders underscores the need to have a credible monitoring of social outcomes and impacts. Through enabling policy and institutions, PES can be an effective tool to achieve environmental as well as social benefits in mangrove forest management. With the growth of REDD+ in Bangladesh, cooperation among state and non-state actors should not only be about prioritizing the various interests and clarifying legal obligations. Such cooperation should also accommodate community and environmental values of forest ecosystem services, initiate monitoring strategy to assess the impacts of PES projects, and promote effective participatory tools to empower forest-dependent communities.