Introduction

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Opening remarks

Over the last two decades, there has been a strong revival of interest in the politics of recognition. Although it is sometimes conflated with other ideas, especially the politics of identity and difference, it can be argued that the politics of recognition offers a distinctive and valuable perspective on contemporary politics. This is because the idea of recognition has been deployed not only as a normative conception of justice, but also as a way of understanding a wide range of phenomena, from the formation of individual psyches, through the dynamics of political struggles, to the nature of moral progress. The idea of recognition also invites investigation of the complementary idea of misrecognition. This latter idea should not be understood simply as the opposite of a normative conception of recognition, and therefore as a synonym for injustice. Misrecognition has also been used as the basis for explanations of a variety of phenomena, including the malformation of individual psyches, and the dynamics of struggles for justice. For some thinkers, indeed, the idea of misrecognition has a certain

priority over that of recognition since, so they argue, it is the experience of such misrecognition which is the impetus behind struggles for recognition.

Our aim in this book is to place the spotlight on misrecognition. We would argue that, although debates about the politics of recognition have yielded significant theoretical insights into the nature of recognition, its logical and necessary counterpart, misrecognition, has been relatively neglected. While in debates about the politics of recognition, recurrent and almost ritualistic references are made to harms that misrecognition may do to individual and collective autonomy, individuals' and groups' self-conceptions, self-respect and self-esteem, the precise dynamics of misrecognition and their broader political significance have been for the most part only mentioned in passing. We intend this book to serve as an important corrective to this situation, bringing concerted attention to bear both on the idea of misrecognition and on the dynamics of the struggles which it inspires. In order to do so, this book brings together scholars writing about misrecognition in a number of different intellectual disciplines, including philosophy, political theory, sociology, psychoanalysis, history, moral economy and criminology. These authors explore the politics of misrecognition in relation to a wide array of types of social, political and personal experience, including those of class identity, disability, slavery, criminal victimization and domestic abuse. Through a mediation of theoretical and empirical insights, they offer the most systematic reflection to date on the importance of misrecognition for our understandings

of personal and political experience and, indeed, of the 'moral grammar of social conflicts' (Honneth 1995).

The rest of this introduction falls into three parts. We begin Section 2 by explaining the idea of a politics of recognition, and then trace the development of political theories of recognition up to the present day. We also give a brief account of the broad range of fields in which this idea is now being productively employed. In Section 3, we outline several important conceptions of recognition, and explicate their corresponding notions of misrecognition, and focusing in particular on the tensions between these conceptions. Finally, in Section 4, by providing a brief account of each of the chapters that follow, we explain the significance of the politics of misrecognition, and suggest the rich variety of ways in which this idea can be deployed. Here we seek both to highlight significant shared themes, and to draw attention to some important areas of disagreement between the authors included in this volume.

Political Struggles and Political Theories

It is important to understand that the phrase 'the politics of recognition' – and therefore 'the politics of misrecognition' – can be used in two distinct ways. First, it can describe a range of empirical phenomena, and, second, it can denote a certain sort of normative response to such phenomena. For reasons of clarity, we shall refer to the empirical

phenomena as 'the politics of recognition', and to the normative responses as 'political theories of recognition'. In this section, we provide a brief sketch of the politics of recognition, including comments on tensions between various aspects of such a politics, and then give an account of the history of the idea of recognition which leads up to a sketch of the state of current debates about the political theory of recognition. Here we focus in particular on the work of three prominent contemporary theorists: Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser.

With regard to the politics of recognition, it has been argued that it encompasses a broad range of political phenomena. Taylor – the renowned Canadian philosopher – mentions a number of cases, from the relations between Canada and Quebec, to the 'campus wars' which have sporadically broken out in North American universities (1995). Honneth – the leading representative of German critical theory today – suggests that 'a great many contemporary social movements can only be properly understood from a normative point of view if their motivating demands are interpreted along the lines of a "politics of identity" – a demand for the cultural recognition of their collective identity'. He gives the examples of 'feminism, ethnic minorities, gay and lesbian subcultures' (2003: 111). In a similar vein, Fraser – the American feminist and critical theorist – cites examples 'from battles around multiculturalism to struggles over gender and sexuality, from campaigns for national sovereignty and subnational autonomy to newly energized movements for international human rights' (2003: 88-89). Bringing these three accounts together, it is clear that the politics of recognition has been used to

describe a wide array of political movements and formations. Indeed, some have argued that the net has been cast too widely, and that as a consequence vital differences between different sorts of political struggles have been overlooked. Thus Jürgen Habermas contends that Taylor has squeezed too many different political phenomena into a single, overextended theoretical framework (Habermas 1994).

However, while acknowledging that there are a number of very important differences between the various political forms just mentioned, we would suggest that there are also a number of features that they have in common. Three in particular are worth highlighting. First, there is a focus on ideas of identity and difference. The conceptions of ethnicity, nationality, sexuality and gender invoked here are all markers of identity: they point to certain features which make some people different from others.[1] Second, there is a concern with inclusion and equality. Often the groups demanding recognition feel invisible and inaudible, and hence they demand to be seen and heard, to be included, to be regarded as each others' equals.[2] The example of Martin Luther King and the American civil rights movement would exemplify this aspect of the politics of recognition (Williams 1987). Third, there is also a concern – which can be in tension with the previous feature – with distinctiveness. A group seeking recognition may feel overlooked and unvalued. However, rather than wanting

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1   Other possible markers include 'race', culture, language and religion.

2   Honneth's focus on the idea of 'invisibility' as the key to understanding the epistemology of recognition is of particular importance in this regard (Honneth 2001).

to be treated the same as others, it may demand that its distinctive contribution be valued or its unique identity affirmed. Stokeley Carmichael (later Kwame Ture) and the black power movement would provide a good illustration of this aspect of the politics of recognition (Ogbar 2004).

It is worth emphasizing that these three features of the politics of recognition do not always co-exist in perfect harmony. In the first place, the identity of the group in question may be hotly contested, both by members of this group and by others outside of it. For example, in British politics the terms 'black' and 'Asian' have long been the subject of considerable dispute, as various parties disagree about the extension and intension of these terms. Different accounts of who should be included in the group, and of what properties they must possess in order to be included, will lead to different sorts of demands for recognition being made. Furthermore, as we have just suggested, there may also be a tension between these demands themselves. Some members of a group which is struggling for recognition may want to be treated no differently to other people. Indeed, they may believe that it is unfair that they are singled out for special attention. For example, Turkish Germans may demand the same rights of citizenship that 'ethnic' Germans already enjoy. Other members of a group may believe that it is in light of their unique identity that they deserve different treatment. Thus Rastafarians may demand exemption for a general law which make the smoking of marijuana illegal.

With these images of struggles of recognition in mind, we can now turn to the normative response to such struggles. The first – and still the most important – philosopher of recognition was G. W. F. Hegel. The short section in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), most often translated as 'the dialectic of master and slave', has been the locus classicus for a great many of the philosophers of recognition who have followed him. In this passage, Hegel seeks to demonstrate how a subject's acquisition of self-consciousness necessarily requires the presence of another subject who recognizes the first. Since Hegel's vignette depicts two subjects who are engaged in a struggle to the death, as each seeks to win recognition from another, it has not been difficult for later theorists to translate this account into more overtly political contexts. In the last century, the revival of interest in this aspect of Hegel's philosophy was sparked by the publication of Alexandre Kojève's *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, first published in French – as *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* – in 1947. His influence can be seen in Sartre's analysis of anti-Semitism (1947), in de Beauvoir's analysis of the 'second sex' (1949), and in Fanon's analysis of colonialism (1952; 1961). Although very different in many ways, all of these works depict struggles for recognition, whether these are between anti-Semite and Jew, men and women, or colonizers and the colonized.

It is possible to date the turn to recognition in contemporary political philosophy to the first half of the 1990s. In 1992, Taylor's extended essay 'The Politics of Recognition' (reprinted in Taylor 1995) was published in a volume which also included

comments by a number of critics. Arguably this essay remains the single most influential work on recognition in modern political theory. In the same year, Honneth published *Kampf um Anerkennung*, which was published in English as *The Struggle for Recognition* in 1995. (As we shall see, Honneth's theoretical framework provides the starting point for a number of the chapters in this volume.) Three years later, Fraser published her influential essay 'From Redistribution to Recognition?' in which she began to develop her own distinctive political theory of recognition. Since 1992, Taylor has not had much more to say directly about recognition, although his essays on democracy and inclusion have added considerably to our understanding of this important aspect of the political theory of recognition (Taylor 1998; 1999). In the meantime – although not simply by default we should add – Honneth and Fraser have become two of the most important contemporary theorists of recognition. Indeed, we would argue that between them, their rival accounts cover much of the intellectual field. The terms of their debate (aspects of which we shall summarize very briefly below) are laid out very clearly in their jointly authored book *Redistribution or Recognition?* (2003). Although their subsequent work of recognition has to some degree gone off in different directions, it is interesting to note that both thinkers are now attempting to apply their theories of recognition to issues of global justice (Fraser 2005; Honneth forthcoming).

It would, of course, be quite wrong to give the impression that Taylor, Honneth and Fraser are the only theorists who have anything worthwhile to say about the politics

of recognition today. In the rest of this section, then, we provide a very brief indication of the wide range of other work to be found in this rapidly developing field. For one thing, there are a number of other important philosophers who have given considerable attention to the idea of recognition. Let us mention just three. Robert Brandom, the American analytical philosopher, who is perhaps best known for his work on semantics, has also engaged very seriously with Hegel on recognition (Brandom 2002; 2007). Brandom seeks to rehabilitate Hegel from his detractors in both analytic and post-structuralist philosophy, recovering what he sees as the innate connections between rationality, freedom, and norm-based communities of mutual recognition. In Paul Ricoeur's last book, *The Course of Recognition* (2005), the French hermeneutical philosopher presents his account of a quest for mutual esteem which he believes is based on the unity of humanity. In 1995 James Tully, the Canadian political philosopher, published his *Strange Multiplicity*, which can be regarded as the first stage in the development of his own distinctive quasi-Nietzschean account of recognition.[3] By reworking the concept in this way, Tully seeks to resolve the problems faced by modern political constitutions in dealing with cultural difference and the demands and conflicts it generates.

In addition, the political theory of recognition is now a sufficiently developed academic field to have attracted a number of book-length critiques. Again we shall

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[3] For an overview of his current position, see his collected papers in Tully (2009).

mention just a few. Patchen Markell, drawing on the ideas of Hannah Arendt, argues that the practice of recognition, as it is conventionally understood, is always bound up with a deeper layer of misrecognition 'of one's own fundamental situation or circumstances' (2003: 5). He holds that recognition theory (with its desire for transparency, invulnerability and reconciliation) suppresses the innate fragility of human existence, the fact that it is inevitably conditioned by finitude and tragedy. It is for this reason that he proposes a 'politics of acknowledgement' as a distinct alternative to the politics of recognition (2003: 35-38). Kelly Oliver, in her 2001 book *Witnessing*, argues that the struggle for recognition, far from offering a resolution to the experience of oppression, actually reproduces and sustains the pathological dynamic of contestation and domination. She therefore seeks to go 'beyond recognition' in order to defend an account of ethical relations in which subjects are infinitely responsive to one another, a responsiveness based upon an openness to difference. Lois McNay is firmly 'against recognition' (2008). She deploys Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus in order to point out what she regards as the failings of contemporary accounts of recognition, and also to suggest a way beyond them. In particular, she holds that recognition-based perspectives are undermined by their reliance upon a reductive notion of power (viewed as, in essence, a dyadic relationship). For McNay, this crucially misses the ways in which abstract social structures mediate and condition human experience, and hence the ways in which inequality, suffering and disadvantage are shaped by forces residing outside the sphere in inter-subjective interaction.

Thus far we may have given the impression that debates about the politics of recognition have been conducted at a very rarefied theoretical level. If so, then it is important to end this part of our introduction by pointing out that the idea of such a politics has also been utilized to illuminate a wide range of economic, social and political phenomena. For instance, in the field of economics, there is now a rapidly growing literature on recognition and work. Emphasizing the importance of work for individuals' sense of self-worth, this literature provides as an important corrective to accounts of recognition which focus exclusively on cultural identity (Dejours 2007; Sayer 2005; Smith 2009; Voswinkel 2005). It also serves, *inter alia*, as a response to criticisms (such as those of McNay, noted above) that the theory of recognition fails to give adequate attention to the structural forces that situate and shape individual life experiences. In social studies, ideas of recognition have been used to explain aspects of the formation of identity in schools (Bingham 2001; Jenlink 2009). Bingham, for example, seeks to chart the ways in which various pedagogic practices can contribute to the fostering of recognition. Theorists of social movements have deployed the idea of struggles for recognition to illuminate important features of such movements. For example, Hobson (2003) aims to show how the dynamics of recognition struggles figure in the emergence of emancipatory social movements worldwide, ranging from those associated with the assertion of cultural identity and difference to those oriented by claims to economic justice in situations of extreme disadvantage. Other authors have placed the idea of recognition at the centre of their accounts of particular dimensions of contemporary multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Povinelli 2002). Finally, in the area of political studies, the idea of recognition has been used a wide range of

contexts, from Ireland to Cameroon (De Wispelaere, McBride and O'Neill 2008; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003).[4] Here, the concept has been mobilised so as to better grasp what is at stake in the emergence, and potential resolution, of specific political conflicts and processes.

Ideas of Recognition and Misrecognition

Given the quantity and diversity of the literature to which we have just referred, it would be very difficult to give anything like a comprehensive account of the variety of conceptions of recognition and misrecognition to be found there. In this case, we begin this section by focusing once again on Taylor, Honneth and Fraser. We do so for two closely related reasons. First, these three are arguably the most influential political theorists of recognition at work today, and, second, the authors in this volume refer to these three theorists more than any others. We start by analysing each thinker's conceptions of recognition, before drawing out the implications for their conceptions of misrecognition. We end this section by focusing on the significance of the differences between these accounts for theorists wanting to understand particular aspects of misrecognition.

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4   The website recognitionforum.com.au 'provides links to key references in the philosophy and politics of recognition'.

Beginning with Taylor, it is important to understand that he is deeply indebted to Hegel. This debt can be seen in the most frequently cited passage from his essay on the politics of recognition which concerns the psychic damage which individuals can suffer if they are the victims of misrecognition. As he says, failures of recognition or acts of misrecognition by others 'can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being' (1995: 225). It is important to note, however, that Taylor puts aside this sort of harm when discussing the politics of misrecognition. Making a distinction between the intimate and public spheres of society, he places psychic harms in the former sphere, and does not consider them when discussing the latter (1995: 233). In the case of the politics of recognition, Taylor's analysis is based on a contrast between what he calls the 'politics of universalism' and the 'politics of difference' (1995: 233). These, he argues, are two distinct interpretations of a politics of equal dignity. According to the first, we enjoy equal respect if our individual capacity for rational autonomy receives recognition. In the modern world, the usual mechanism for doing so is by instituting systems of individual rights. By contrast, according to the second way of understanding the politics of equal dignity, we enjoy such dignity if our capacity for creating distinctive identities is appropriately acknowledged. Today, this goal may be achieved in a variety of ways. On one popular reading of Taylor's essay, it is suggested that he endorses the idea of a right to cultural survival. On an alternative reading, his proposal is that people should have fair opportunities to defend their cultures.[5] Seeking a middle path between these rival

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[5] On these different interpretations, see Thompson 2006: sect. 4.2.

accounts of the politics of equal dignity, Taylor defends a system of recognition in which individuals' most fundamental rights are protected, but other rights that they may lay claim to can legitimately be overridden in the interests of cultural protection. It follows that, for Taylor, there are two principal forms of misrecognition which individuals may experience in the sphere of politics. First, if they are denied basic rights, then their capacity for rational autonomy is not appropriately acknowledged. Second, if they lack a reasonable opportunity to defend their cultures, then their capacity to cultivate distinctive collective identities is not adequately recognized.

Honneth also owes a large debt to Hegel, and his *Struggle for Recognition* opens with a detailed analysis of the idealist philosopher's Jena writings. Following Hegel, Honneth believes that humans need recognition in order to form integrated identities, and having such identities makes it possible for them to achieve self-realization. Hence he argues that justice is achieved to the extent to which the relations of recognition necessary for such self-realization are in place. It is important to understand that, for Honneth, recognition takes three distinct forms. First, love is a relationship of strong affective attachment between significant others, a relationship in which each is responsive to the other's unique needs. Second, respect is a relationship in which all others, since they are capable of acting autonomously, are treated as morally responsible for their actions. Third, esteem is a relationship in which particular others are valued for their achievements, and in particular for the contribution that they make to societal goals. In practice, these three forms of recognition are realized in distinctive ways: love

through relations of care between significant others, respect in the form of a system of individual rights, and esteem within the framework of a horizon of shared values. If suitable relations of care, the right sort of system of rights, and an appropriate value-horizon are all in place, then individuals may form integrated identities and hence be able to achieve self-realization. It follows from Honneth's account of recognition that there are also three distinctive forms of misrecognition. First, individuals' body-related self-confidence may be damaged by attacks on their physical integrity (Honneth 1992: 193; 1995: 132). We would broaden this analysis in order to argue that harm to individuals' self-confidence may also result from significant others' insensitivity to their expressions of need. Second, individuals are misrecognized if they do not enjoy rights equal to those of their fellow citizens. As a result, their self-respect is likely to be undermined. Third, individuals – as members of various sorts of collective bodies – are misrecognized if the value of their way of life to society at large is overlooked. Such inattention is likely to harm the self-esteem of members of the collectivities in question.

In sharp contrast to Taylor and Honneth, Fraser's account of recognition is strongly anti-Hegelian, making no reference to individual identity or self-realization. She thinks that justice is a matter of parity of participation, which is achieved when all citizens can participate on a par with their peers in the life of their society. To achieve such parity, it is necessary to attend to three analytically distinct dimensions of the social order which are – or should be – governed by three mutually irreducible principles of justice. First, the cultural dimension of justice pertains to a society's

'status order'.   Here the principle of recognition is realized if there are no status inequalities – such as sexism or racism – which stand in the way of participatory parity. Second, the economic dimension of justice unsurprisingly concerns the 'economic structure' of society.   Here the principle of redistribution is realized if citizens have the resources that they need in order to enjoy parity with their peers.   Third, the political dimension of justice relates to what Fraser calls the 'political constitution' of society. Here the principle of representation is met if political decision rules and political boundaries facilitate parity of participation (2005: 73-76).   It follows from Fraser's analysis that individuals can suffer from three distinctive forms of injustice, although only one of these is properly called misrecognition.   If individuals are unable to participate on a par with their peers since they lack the necessary resources, then they are the victims of maldistribution.   If they are cannot participate on a par since they do not enjoy political voice, then they suffer from misrepresentation.   But individuals only suffer from misrecognition proper if their lack of participatory parity is the result of their poor social standing.

So what are the decisive differences between the three thinkers?   And how do these differences impact upon the theorization of misrecognition?   The first important point to make about these three philosophers is that, contrary to the impression often given of their work, none of them regard identity or difference as the direct object of recognition or misrecognition.   For Taylor, members of a group may justly claim rights or the opportunity to defend what they regard as their culture.   For Honneth, individuals may deserve to be cared for by others, they may justly demand rights, and they may insist that the achievements of their group receive appropriate acknowledgement.   And

for Fraser, individuals enjoy due recognition if no cultural values prevent them from participating on a par with their peers. Hence individuals' vulnerability, their capacity for autonomy, their interests in defending their culture, and their right to parity can all be the basis of a claim to recognition, but their identity per se cannot.

After this point of agreement, however, significant differences between these three thinkers can be seen. The principal dividing line separates the Hegelians Taylor and Honneth from the explicitly anti-Hegelian Fraser. Three differences are worth particular attention. First, both Taylor and Honneth believe that recognition plays a key role in the formation of individual identity – although the former does not think that this fact should play a role in a *politics* of recognition. By contrast, Fraser seeks to drive a wedge between recognition and identity. Second, while both Taylor and Honneth think that rights are one important mode of recognition, Fraser regards rights merely as a means which may be appropriate in the achievement of justice. Third, Taylor and Honneth believe that individuals should have a chance to have the achievements of their cultures acknowledged, while for Fraser culture plays a merely negative role in the sense that patterns of cultural values may undermine particular sets of individuals' parity of participation.

The differences between these three thinkers' views on recognition correspond to differences in their views on misrecognition. For Taylor and Honneth, injuries of

misrecognition can reach deep in the individual psyche. Fraser does not in fact deny that such injuries can occur, but she denies that they are in themselves an injustice. The two Hegelians agree that individuals are misrecognized if they are denied rights to which they have a legitimate claim. By contrast, their anti-Hegelian critic does not regard the granting of rights as the direct expression of a type of recognition, but simply as one way in which aspects of injustice may be rectified. Finally, Taylor thinks that misrecognition may occur if individuals lack the opportunity to defend what they regard as their culture, while Honneth thinks that individuals may be misrecognized if the distinctive contributions of their culture are not acknowledged. Unlike either of them, Fraser gives culture – or more specifically sets of cultural values – an exclusively negative role: it may be an obstacle to parity of participation, but cannot in itself be a reason for recognition.

Summaries of Chapters

As we can see, debates about the politics of recognition have produced a number of distinctive accounts of misrecognition. This book aims to make an original contribution to these debates. It begins with three chapters which suggest different theoretical frameworks in which the politics of misrecognition may be understood. These are followed by four more applied chapters in which the idea of misrecognition is put to work in a variety of contexts and to a variety of ends.

In their chapter, Thompson and Hoggett consider a range of cases in which good reasons to recognize do not lead to practical acts of recognition. They focus in particular on cases in which certain psychic structures inhibit individuals' and groups' ability to give others the recognition that is their due. In order to understand this sort of reason for misrecognition, Thompson and Hoggett refer to the work of a number of psychoanalytical thinkers. Drawing on their work, Thompson and Hoggett place the notion of ambivalence at the heart of their account of the psychological reasons for misrecognition. Ambivalence, according to their interpretation, is the constant conjunction of conflicting affects which a subject has toward its object. Put in these terms, their central thesis is that an appreciation of the significance of such ambivalence will make it possible to spell out the circumstances in which psychological factors do not present obstacles to recognition. In order to justify this thesis, Thompson and Hoggett discuss each of Honneth's three modes of recognition in turn. In each case, they suggest how certain affective forces may derail recognition, and how it may be possible for them not to do so. To put it very briefly, they contend that love is hate thwarted, respect is narcissism conquered, and esteem is envy overcome. Their conclusion is that for recognition to succeed, the ambivalence of affect must be taken into account. By doing so, they believe, it will be possible to transform and utilize the energy of negative affects so that misrecognition can be overcome.

In the following chapter, Estelle Ferrarese observes that in Axel Honneth's theory, the motif of recognition rarely appears without that of struggle, implying that my expectations or even my demands for recognition are often resisted. But why, in spite of the fact that Honneth does not see it as the result of any sort of logical constraint, does struggle play such a prominent role in his account? Why is misrecognition to be defeated, as opposed simply to coming to an end? What is lost, on a theoretical level, if we speak of recognition without speaking of struggle? Ferrarese first shows that the Hegelian background from which Honneth extracts the theme of recognition does not suffice to explain the centrality attributed to struggle. She then turns her attention to the attributes which struggle assumes in its material expression, considering three possible effects specific to struggle: it transforms the party which demands recognition; it transforms the party which resists recognition; or else it modifies their interaction and thus the world that gives shape to it. It turns out, Ferrarese contends, that the resistance to demands for recognition is necessary because it is the sign – being defeated during the struggle – of one's ability to alter the world: the status of world-changer can only result from a struggle against an enemy that resists. If instead the enemy anticipates the request or even the demand for recognition, it maintains its monopoly over this status.

Nasar Meer's chapter focuses on the renewed interest in W. E. B. Du Bois' idea of double consciousness. This refers to the paradox of being intimately part of a polity while being excluded from its public culture – or, as Du Bois put it, 'being an outcast and stranger in mine own house'. Meer suggests that there are a number of issues of

misrecognition that inform the idea of double consciousness, which are loosely grouped into two sets, which mediate between agency and structure, individual and society, and between minority and majority subjectivities. He argues that these comprise, firstly, the internalisation by minorities of the contempt majorities may direct toward them. Secondly, the creation of an additional perspective or standpoint, in the form of a 'gifted second sight', which this experience cultivates. Thirdly, a conception of minorities as having fewer civic rights but no fewer duties or responsibilities of an ideal of formal citizenship. Finally, diverging sets of un-reconciled ideals or 'strivings' held by minorities which are objected to by majorities. It is argued that Du Bois' concept of 'double consciousness' provides a schema which becomes progressively thicker in capturing the political dimension in which minority subjectivity may be formed, the nature and form of this subjectivity in and for itself, alongside the transformative potential it heralds for society as a whole. Through an original reading of this concept, Meer presents Du Bois as a precursor to later advocates of 'difference', 'cultural diversity', and especially 'recognition'. Significant here is that if we take 'double consciousness' as a potentially positive resource for enriching society and culture as a whole, then misrecognition is to be welcomes insofar as it fuels the development of such a consciousness. As with Ferrarese's analysis of struggle, Meer's account of double consciousness requires us to rethink misrecognition as a positive potentiality in its own right.

In her chapter, Laura Brace focuses on the status of a slave as an outsider, and on slavery as the ultimate wound inflicted by misrecognition. She draws in particular on the work of Orlando Patterson, and his concepts of social death and natal alienation, to explore the permanent dishonour of slavery. While these dimensions of slavery are important, Brace's chapter brings out the risks of focusing on slavery as a denial of identity and authenticity. Understanding slaves as the prototype of outsiders and others can tempt us to naturalize their status and recognize them only as victims. This in turn can lead to forms of incorporation that reinforce their exploitation and the absence of their liberty. Brace uses the complexities of slavery and the layers of power, adaptability, variety, compromise and struggle within it to explore the possibilities and the limits of a politics of recognition.

In the following chapter, Andrew Sayer argues that in the context of enduring, structural inequalities such as those of class, attempts at recognition between individuals or groups who are differently placed are likely to be unsatisfactory or tokenistic, inviting suspicions of condescension or disrespect and resentment. To appreciate why, Sayer argues, we need to look beyond inequalities of distribution to inequalities of contribution, particularly in terms of the kinds of work that individuals are allowed or required to do. An unequal social division of labour which concentrates the best quality kinds of work into a subset of jobs, leaving low quality work concentrated in other jobs, prevents some individuals from being able to do the kinds of work that tend to bring respect and esteem. The resulting inequalities tend to be passed on to the next

generation through socialisation. In the course of his argument, Sayer shows that 'misrecognition' actually covers a number of different possible cases, some well-intentioned, some not. Acknowledgement of class may be avoided for 'ethical' reasons (to avoid humiliating the subordinate classes) or instrumental ones (to hide the privilege of the dominant), but such evasions may be mutually supportive and allow an individualistic explanation of class inequalities.

Gideon Calder's chapter relates the politics of disability to wider questions about the nature and scope of misrecognition. The influence of the disability rights movement has led, in the UK and elsewhere, to formal acknowledgement that disablement arises from social environments, rather than simply from individual deficits or failings. Yet rather glaringly, disability is not addressed at any length (indeed, hardly at all) in the mainstream of the literature on recognition itself. Calder explores the extent to which disability highlights strengths and weaknesses of recognition politics –- and specifically, the location of mis- or non-recognition at the heart of injustice. He argues that the 'social model' of disability can indeed be seen as a critique of misrecognition. But the model itself raises sticking points, particularly around the relative roles of (physical) impairments and social factors as barriers. These provide a kind of parallel with the debates among recognition theorists – and particularly around Nancy Fraser's work – on the place of recognition vis-a-vis other conditions of social justice. Looking at Fraser's notion of 'participatory parity', Calder suggests that the implications of recent disability politics support Fraser's well-known contention that when it comes to social justice,

misrecognition is not the only game in town. Exclusive attention to it risks an overemphasis on culture at the expense of other dimensions of oppression and disadvantage. But departing from Fraser, he argues that 'participatory parity' is less well equipped than a capabilities-based approach to tackle the particular political-theoretical challenges which emerge with the new politics of disability.

In the following chapter, Majid Yar focuses on criminology. He begins from Honneth's account of moral development that links the formative experience of love to the acquisition of moral capacities enabling relations of recognition in the political sphere. Yar attempts, firstly, to offer an analytical reconstruction of this developmental hypothesis by drawing upon psychoanalytic theory. He goes on to offer empirical support for an 'ontogenetic' link between love, rights and solidarity by drawing upon a range of criminological research, especially recent contributions from the psychosocial perspective. Specifically, Yar seeks to demonstrate how the absence of 'love' (through neglect, abuse, and other similar harms) manifests itself in later dispositions to harm others, thereby empirically connecting non-recognition across the spheres of love, solidarity and rights. He therefore argues that misrecognition reproduces itself socially and temporally, with the misrecognised themselves becoming agents of further acts of misrecognition.

The penultimate chapter, by Ricardo Fabrino Mendonca, considers the dynamics of misrecognition as experienced by sufferers of Hanson's Disease (leprosy) in contemporary Brazil. His focus falls upon the struggle for social esteem amongst a

group of persons who continue to suffer from symbolic as well as economic marginalisation arising from societal stigmatisation. In addition to empirically uncovering the importance of social esteem for self-realisation amongst sufferers of the disease, Mendonca uses his case study to defend Honneth's theorisation of esteem-oriented struggles against some of its critics. In particular, he takes issue with suggestions that endorsing such struggles entails either the reification of collective identities and difference, or fosters a social competition in which some assert their claims for esteem at the expense of others (see in particular the critiques offered by Markell 2003, Fraser 2003 and Seglow 2009). Such problematic outcomes are not, he argues, an inevitable corollary of esteem-oriented responses to misrecognition, and in the case of Hansen's patients he aims to show how their own struggles are in fact compatible with the societal pursuit of a reciprocal and inclusive form of solidarity.

In a brief conclusion, our aim is to draw the main threads together. We highlight themes common to the preceding chapters, and then use these themes to reach some conclusions about how best to understand the idea of misrecognition, and how to deploy the idea of a politics of misrecognition to illuminate a range of important issues, from the tension between individual freedom and equality in multicultural societies, to the intersections between the multiple inequalities by which such societies are scarred. In this way, our hope is to set the agenda for further investigations of the politics of misrecognition.

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