Affordable housing and urban politics in Spain, 1924-1937:
Málaga's 'Garden City', from Dictatorship to Republic

Among the 'notable buildings and sites of interest' recommended to visitors by the official guide to urban Málaga in 1930 was the housing development known as Ciudad Jardín. This 'Garden City' was an expansion to the north of the centre, begun early in the dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera, on land reclaimed from the Guadalmedina river following the floods of 1907. In October 1924, Primo's military regime re-activated a government initiative originating in 1911-12 to encourage local authorities to develop planning projects and finance the construction of affordable housing (*casas baratas*).[1] The size of a moderately proportioned village, the Ciudad Jardín consisted of several urban blocks of 'hygienic, cheerful little dwellings, equipped with garden, bathroom, and sundry comforts', according to the 1930 tourist guide.[2] Conceived optimistically as approximately 1,000 modest residences - a fifth of them for rent - the project was sponsored by local figureheads of the industrial nobility, regional pillars of the Restoration state of Alfonso XIII and of General Primo's regime, which had stepped in repressively to suspend parliament and bolster the monarchy in 1923 following several years of social unrest.

The 1914-18 war in Europe had disrupted economies even in neutral states, including Spain, and in its aftermath urban overcrowding intensified and the country's cities saw a surge in public protest emanating from choked working-class districts. Under Primo, housing strategy was therefore inevitably political: provision of 'affordable' living spaces became a microcosm of broader socio-political contention over property ownership, landlord-tenant relations, and social conditions, all provoking campaigns of dissent.[3] Housing was also central to Primo's proclaimed regenerative intention to improve municipal efficiency. His much trumpeted method was to sweep away the corrupt politics of *caciquismo*, the notorious oligarchic clientelism based on rigged elections upon which the Restoration system rested, an aim potentially in tension with the local power of wealthy elite families.[4]

Throughout Spain, municipal politics were fractured, polarised, and often ineffective, especially when applying strategies of resource gathering and allocation in local housing, primary education, and health. Despite their centrality to local conflict amid the emergence of modern public opinion in the 1920s and 30s, tensions over municipal administration during the transitional period between dictatorship and democracy have nonetheless been neglected by historians. While they have begun to explore the symbolic and strategic

'battle for the streets' amid the arrival of mass politics, discord to do with *constructing* streets and the shaping of the civic amenities upon which urban sustainability depended have been much less discussed.[5] Histories of architecture and urban planning in Spain have, moreover, kept warily distant from political history[6], even though housing was a vital socio-political issue. Argument over the social function of subsidised dwellings fed into national politics before and during the Second Republic (1931-36).

One of the key regional notables sponsoring urbanisation in the southern city of Málaga was Rafael Benjumea (Conde de Guadalhorce), civil engineer and grandee, who was ennobled by the king in 1921 and became Primo's supposedly apolitical Minister of Public Works in 1926. Benjumea had married into the city's financial-industrial patriciate - the Heredia-Loring dynasty of iron, steel, banking, shipping, and railway wealth – thereby perpetuating the endogamous familial custom of *caciquismo*. By backing the Ciudad Jardín, the local elite demonstrated the adaptability of its interests to Primo's 'new broom' of dictatorial populism.[7] Any possible friction was allayed by the tax advantages and concessionary contracts offered to investors and developers who were free of public scrutiny in the context of non-democratic municipal authority. Urban planning during the military regime thus became a means by which private investors could deploy capital and accumulate profit to ride out the post-1918 economic crisis.[8] At the same time, the development's sponsors declared incidental social motives: concern about the housing shortage in the city, and a desire to 'protect the humble classes' and promote small property ownership.[9] Málaga's Ciudad Jardín was thus presented as the 'extremely modern face' of the city.[10]

These regenerative aims were shared in certain respects by the Republican professional classes of the city who promoted their own variant of affordable housing programmes in response to overcrowding and recurrent flooding. Not-for-profit housing strategies - rather than lucrative 'top-down' projects - were central to the Republican critique of the monarchical state and its elite supporters. Mutualist and cooperative schemes had been introduced by them several years before, beginning in 1909. As local leaders, these enlightened Republicans were thus regarded as a clear corporate alternative to the entrenched nobility. They viewed 'regeneration' in a distinct way: primarily as development of civil society through political and social reform, seen as the only plausible basis for material progress, ending corruption, and making municipal government more representative.[11]

For Republicans, the health of urban society depended on establishing a robust civil authority to dismantle the Restoration state and the military values and ecclesiastical privilege it relied upon.[12] This social

and cultural emphasis had shaped the 1909 progressive political alliance formed nationally between them and the Socialist Party (PSOE). For a few short years it represented notable reforming promise in Málaga. Although unable to hold onto power - partly because of the factionalist tendency of Republican parties - this reform programme determined how social transformation was projected in political struggles leading up to 1931, when the Second Republic was finally achieved. The struggle regarding municipal authority over local housing went to the heart both of political and social splintering in the era of dictatorship and – with Primo's demise in 1930 – and of the reforms of the Republic in the lead up to Spain's civil war.

Primo's suppression of freedoms further polarised local politics; by the time of his fall rightist authoritarians had become conditioned to rely on non-democratic corporativism as practiced in Italy and later in Germany.[13] At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the social protest of working-class organisations was also shaped by seven years' experience of dictatorship. Primo's regime had epitomised the repressive monarchical state, making the anti-militarist and anti-clerical critique at the heart of Republican press coverage seem more justified than ever; the urban poor were increasingly radicalised in the slipstream of this Republican rhetoric.[14] Young Republican activists among teachers, medical doctors, and lawyers - especially within the Radical-Socialist Party (Partido Republicano Radial Socialista[15]) - formed a significant 'bridge' after 1931 between the paternalist, relatively conservative, Republicanism of twenty years before and the newly enfranchised labouring poor. This 'bridge' was founded on overcoming the social costs of economic crises, uneven development, and lack of planning.[16] The political contest was thus complex, begun during the oligarchic monarchy and intensified under Primo's dictatorship, and is illuminated here by exploring how state strategies over housing interacted with social conditions and the municipal political landscape.[17] Examination of the local press reveals how the shortage of dwellings, unaffordable rents, and working-class evictions moved centre-stage after 1931, not least in Málaga's Ciudad Jardín. The struggle became symbolic of the broader social promise of the Republic, ultimately fought over in the civil war - a bitter conflict begun by a military rebellion to suppress reform - during which Málaga experienced a high level of class-based intra-communal violence.

Although marginalised by research focused on Madrid and Barcelona, Málaga exemplified these complex fractures over urbanisation and housing. When examined, indeed, from this geographically peripheral vantage point – as well as temporally across successive periods – these political antagonisms can be understood anew. They were crucially reflected in newspaper imagery to do with fear and the threat of 'the

other', conjured up in relation to urban space, homelessness, and property. Days before votes were cast amid economic slump in 1931, the main mouthpiece of the local elite lamented how the city's public spaces had become 'tainted' by begging so widespread that it constituted 'a genuine plague'. This alarm was conflated with 'the rise of people of a criminal nature', explained by a political 'red wave', which aimed to establish 'Communism' and 'worker housing' on the Russian model.[18] Despite the alarmist tone, there was no such intention in 1931. It was only later, in the changed world of the civil war's early months, that a formal union of residents of the Ciudad Jardín was organised, whose committee deployed the Republican press to vent years of frustration in support of rent strikes and a push for collectivisation of the housing stock.[19]

Urbanizing Málaga: Society and Politics from the 1880s to the 1930s

The creation of socially marginal neighbourhoods, resulting from general population growth and rapid urban migration in the five decades or so before the 1930s, has been under-explored in accounting for the conflictive path to modernity in Spain. Between 1887 and 1930 the Spanish population increased by 34%, from 17.5 million to 23.5 million, the annual average growth of 0.79% between 1900 and 1930 being over twice the average rate at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the 20 years preceding the arrival of the Second Republic in 1931, a demographic transformation had taken place. During the 1920s alone, Spain's total population increased by 10%, but growth was disproportionate in urban society. The Primo years (1923-30) saw the population of provincial capitals expand by 30 per cent and the demographic influx continued after 1929.[20] The number of Madrid's inhabitants, for example, increased from 540,000 in 1900 to 750,000 in 1920 and over 950,000 in 1930.[21] The problem of physical absorption and social integration in the city of Málaga was aggravated by the vulnerable economy, the relative unresponsiveness of local political structures, and the lack of effective health, education, and welfare provision. Poor urban planning was centred on inadequate housing.

Since the 1850s, Barcelona and Madrid had witnessed projects for theoretically controlled relief of urban concentration on a much larger scale than anything achieved in Málaga. Their great 'enlargements' (*ensanches*) expanded 'healthy space' exclusively for the well-off middle classes, however, rather than easing working-class zones where infrastructure was deficient and disease commonplace.[22] The benefits of expansion on the scale of the *ensanche*, with wide avenues and new systems of water supply and sewers, were thus restricted and set out to maintain a 'proper' social and physical distance between the wealthy and the proletarian masses.[23] Some large-scale nineteenth-century re-shaping had been sketched out for Málaga, but

the only urban scheme to get off the ground (in the 1880s) owed its existence to bourgeois triumphalism celebrating transitory industrial growth. At a time of population boom caused by labour migration from the countryside, this project turned its back on social reform by opening a grand central thoroughfare, providing luxury housing - whilst clearing 'slums' - and connecting the economic hub of the port to the axis of political power in the Plaza de la Constitución. This grandiose renovation – named in honour of its chief sponsor, the Marqués de Larios, industrialist and landowner – was resolutely enclosed within the old city (rather than expanding the urban space), and reflected elite values and the established social hierarchy.[24] The Larios family was, moreover, notorious chief beneficiary of the provincial *caciquil* political system into which Rafael Benjumea married.[25] Simultaneously, experiments with 'satellite towns', in Madrid and Barcelona, as well as Málaga, could be claimed as radical, but were ultimately also truncated by elite financial objections, municipal instability, and clientelism.[26] Obstacles were perpetuated and intensified in the 1920s beneath the carapace of the dictatorship's corporativism. Dispensation was conferred upon local elites to disregard the rules-based order, in effect, since according to Primo, 'a dictatorship ought never to be accountable for breaches of the law; this would contradict its very essence. It should be accountable for breaches of moral norms'. Thus, the 'dictatorial enterprise' amounted to a populist task of '*saneamiento*' ('draining' or 'cleaning-up') based on 'the national interest' and a particular definition of 'the people's morality'.[27]

The main material problem was the scarcity of housing, which allowed rents to be pushed up to the extent that the urban poor went without food to pay for lodgings. By 1930, as Primo's dictatorship ended, experts in municipal government and social provision were addressing the national problem of overcrowding by reference to Madrid which was officially more than 20,000 homes short of the basic requirement, despite ample accommodation remaining empty for rent at extortionate rates.[28] Growth in urban Barcelona was even more intense, with a concomitant decrease of the active rural population by more than 20%. Political ramifications were manifold and complex, but one key effect was the mass of votes in urban areas for the forces of Republicanism that led to electoral success, the fall of the monarchy in 1931, and a surge in expectations of change.[29]

In the city of Málaga a similar pattern prevailed, the population increasing by 150 per cent between 1800 (c. 50,000) and 1897 (126,000), making it the fifth largest in Spain. The number of inhabitants had doubled during the second half of the nineteenth century and increased by a further 50% by 1930 (188,000), with a notable acceleration during the 1920s, despite there being no appreciable enlargement of the urban

space.[30] By 1915, 'the popular classes' represented some 80% of the urban population.[31] A crisis of production, employment and subsistence in the countryside produced this urban influx, resulting from international competition, outmoded production methods, and the pandemic vine phylloxera at the end of the nineteenth century. The agricultural slump compounded industrial contraction and, after 1870, the metallurgy industry in Málaga gradually collapsed. This was the socio-demographic setting for political mobilisation: in 1871-2 the most powerful federation of the First International in Andalucía was established in Málaga, the city becoming a stronghold of the PSOE. By 1929 the demographic density stood at 302 inhabitants per hectare, compared to 250 in Madrid and 110 in Barcelona.[32]

Peripheral proletarian neighbourhoods in Málaga expanded chaotically and unhealthily, around workshops and factories and at a distance from civic amenities and vital elements of public infrastructure. In this marginal urbanisation, worker housing of dubious quality expanded patchily, rarely through employer initiatives (as in the worker suburb of Huelin) but always with little broad planning or secure rent regulation, and perpetuating socio-spatial segregation.[33] By the turn of the century, Málaga had effectively become two cities: the poor largely clustered together to the west of the Guadalmedina, dependent upon metal industries, railways, textiles, and sugar refining factories **[Insert Image 1 (city map) here]**. When unemployment and hardship struck, sections of these communities crossed the river to protest in the 'bourgeois city' on the eastern side, as during the strike of 2,500 women textile workers in July 1890. Protests became regular thereafter, largely over food prices resulting from the despised consumption taxes, or '*consumos*', levied on basic necessities.[34] Public protest was suppressed by force during the dictatorship after 1923, re-emerging in 1931 in expectation that the Republic signalled a new dawn. When the vote in favour of a Republic appeared to be challenged by monarchists in May 1931, this sense of popular hope was expressed performatively by desecrating the public monument to the Marqués de Larios, whose statue - situated significantly between the entrance to the port and the grand avenue which bore his name - was pulled down and deposited in the river. Five years later, in helping successfully to put down the military rising which sparked the civil war in July 1936, the inhabitants of the poorest neighbourhoods took violent possession again of this symbolic hub of the city.

The most distinctive urban dwelling in working class zones, such as the *barrio* of Trinidad, was the *corralón*, an exploitative form of collective lodging house, often an ancient building used previously as a storehouse or workshop and scandalously overcrowded as a space for living. Lacking even rudimentary

sanitation, the *corralón* consisted of two or three floors arranged around a poorly lit central patio. Accommodating the influx of migratory poor drawn to the commercial and industrialising zones for work in the second half of the nineteenth century, the *corralones* were highly profitable, remaining in large numbers in the 1930s, even though known by reformers as 'the ignominy of the city'.[35] They housed up to 70 or so families, where often eight or more people shared a single dank room for sleeping. At number 28 calle Trinidad, for example, there were 236 inhabitants in 1930 and only one lavatory.[36]

Rent in the *corralones* was collected by the universally resented *casero*, usually an older resident of the building acting as agent of the absent proprietor, with whom tenancy agreements were habitually insecure.[37] Given the crowding and regular inundation of human excrement, disease - especially typhoid, cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, trachoma, and smallpox - made regular appearances. The river represented the central physical feature of social segregation, although by 1900 the demographic patterning of the city had been complicated by pockets of poverty and poor housing to the north of the bourgeois heart of the city, to the east of the river, where *corralones* remained common.[38] It was overwhelmingly in the most populous *barrios* – on both sides of the river - where disease took most lives.[39] In the *corralones*, the boundary between the domestic and the public realm was necessarily transitory since there was little space for privacy or intimacy. Work and the economy of family subsistence occupied most occupants' time, and the street became an extension of the home, a way of life distasteful to the propertied classes.

Residential marginalisation therefore depended on income but was perpetuated by segregated lifestyles. This was compounded by political allegiances and behaviour, and by perceptions of the nature of various collective 'others' who 'belonged' to specific urban spaces. The socio-spatial gulf was deepened by the dearth of basic municipal services, in education, health, and housing. The local illiteracy rate was the highest in Spain, at 80% in the 1920s. Indeed, of the ten urban districts of Spain which had the greatest levels of illiteracy, four were in Málaga.[40] The general mortality rate in the city in 1929 was 30% higher than the national average. While Republican political leaders of the older generation saw future prospects encapsulated by emergence of a cosmopolitan city and tourism, the high infant mortality rate was central to their more radical successors: 300 children died in 1931 before the age of one and 900 per year before reaching five years.[41] The number of maternal deaths in childbirth could only be guessed at, but the enlightened Republican medical doctor, Aurelio Ramos Acosta, declared Málaga 'the capital of Spain for post-partum fever'.[42] Moreover, his surveys showed that more than 500 died each year from tuberculosis. Ramos Acosta (part of the

younger Republican generation of 1931) worked for the municipal public health service in the 1920s, was elected to parliament for the Radical-Socialist Party in the 1930s, and became director of the Hospital Civil in the city in 1936, just three months into the civil war.[43] Driven since his student days in Madrid by a passionate belief in sanitary and social reform, he was a leading expert in diphtheria and its treatment, and dedicated himself to illustrating the relationship between poor housing, illiteracy, and disease in Málaga.[44] He lamented in 1931 that the mortality rate in the central bourgeois district of the city was 12 per 1000 inhabitants while in Trinidad, on the other side of the river, it was four-times as high.[45]

To the benefit of authorities with power, long-standing attitudes critical of working class hygiene threatened to drive a wedge between progressive forces. These attitudes reinforced bourgeois expectations of a germ-free sanitary domestic environment which - because of poverty - were impossible to fulfil.[46] This distancing tended to be maintained by consumerist magazines such as *El Hogar y la Moda* ('Home and Fashion'), focused on the 'ideal home', and on comfort and the model family, aimed at a middle class feminine market. Furnishings and home decor, often based on examples imported from abroad, were widely advertised and could be obtained through hire purchase, separating sections of the aspirational lower middle class from manual labourers and the poor in general.[47] With the dawning of the Second Republic, promotion of a model type of '*casa higiénica*', as devised by Republican architects and other progressives, raised anticipation.[48] Because of these differences, unity of progressive action frequently resorted to reliance on easily identified common enemies perceived to be antithetical to modernity, such as the Church and priests, who were visible public figures. This stratagem aligned with the secularising programme of the first governments of the Republic - articulated quite reasonably to increase educational opportunity by reducing the role of the Church in schools - spilled over into violent anti-clerical 'direct action' in localised public spaces.[49]

Affordable Housing in Málaga: The Ciudad Jardín between Dictatorship and Republic

In Spain, as elsewhere, scattered social housing projects were part of broader processes either of employer paternalism or mutualist schemes combining Republican and Socialist reformism. The latter included the Pablo Iglesias Cooperatives (named after the founder of the PSOE) in Madrid, Bilbao, and Seville. Other isolated alternatives emanated from local government, influenced in part by the housing reforms of 'Red Vienna'.[50] Alongside these 'micro' schemes, the relation between public and private involvement was at the heart of the issue at a macro level, remaining controversial during the first third of the twentieth century and beyond. The monarchist government's pre-1914 plans for affordable and healthy housing were idealistic in

their stated nature and extent of reform, as the 1910 project made clear: 'if property owners do not transform their holdings by making them hygienic, in spite of the concessions that the local authority offers them, (the holdings) will have to go, because the demands of public health, culture, and the necessities of modern life, require it'.[51] Government intentions about clearance of unhealthy housing were frequently watered down, however, in order to reconcile powerful interests. When it came to *new* housing, the same situation applied. Municipal ownership was envisaged - to avoid having to 'coerce' private enterprises, an option 'contrary to the rights of property' - but, in practice, public resources were scarce and municipal politics were entangled in webs of patronage.[52]

The leading figure of bourgeois Republicanism in Málaga who promoted affordable housing on a cooperative basis in the first three decades of the twentieth century was Pedro Gómez Chaix, son of a prominent liberal family who emerged through one of the key Republican associative and secular '*círculos'* in the city, founding the progressive daily newspaper *El Popular* in 1903. Gómez Chaix united business and intellectual concerns, defending the fundamental role of education and culture as levers of political change, as well as comprehending that the working classes would play a new, pivotal, role in early twentieth-century politics.[53] Voted a councillor of the city government, he effectively became spokesperson of the successful Republican-Socialist coalition (*Conjunción*) between 1909 and 1919, and was elected to the national parliament for Málaga in the congresses of 1914 and 1916. Gómez Chaix led popular campaigns over many years against the '*consumos'*, the despised consumption taxes, a struggle he reaffirmed with the fall of the Primo regime.[54] He was again elected for the Radical Party in 1931 to the first parliament of the Second Republic.[55] From 1906 until 1926 he was in addition director of the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, the most influential secular cultural association in Málaga, which became a key forum for discussion of Republican ideas and strategies, especially on education, health and housing.[56] By the end of the Primo era, it had become so effective a focus in the city for opposition to the monarchical state that it was instrumental in the political tutelage of future leaders of the all-important Radical-Socialist Party during the Second Republic.[57] In 1926, Gómez Chaix was succeeded as director of the Sociedad Económica by his protégé, the radical lawyer Emilio Baeza Medina, who became Republican mayor of the city in 1931.[58] Together, during 1912-21, the two men represented the Sociedad Económica on the administrative committee of the Board of Construction of Worker Housing (Patronato de Construcción de Casas para Obreros) which sponsored the first affordable housing project for some of the population affected by the 1907 floods and – although heavily

dependent on donations - was an approximate model for future cooperative schemes.[59] **[Insert Image 2 here]**.

The cornerstone of worker housing policy for Gómez Chaix was its charitable and mutualist nature: what he called the 'Sociedad benéfica constructora' ('benevolent building society'), which he distinguished clearly from profit-making enterprises by defining their essential characteristics and calling on government to grant them. These included subsidies within a democratically scrutinised framework and, naturally, rents and/or transfer of ownership set at a reduced level.[60] Crucially, this was part of a broader agenda of social and political reform, including an end to electoral corruption.[61] Cooperative associations were therefore those dedicated solely to building houses for their members provided that the management and administration were in their own charge and that the capital consisted of disbursements from the membership itself, without any right to receive dividends and that the number of partners was not unlimited. For housing programmes to be considered charitable there was a stated obligation that income from rent, subsidies, and/or sale of dwellings had to be re-invested in successive constructions or land acquisition for further affordable housing. This was all a far cry from the process undertaken in relation to the Ciudad Jardín during the Primo era.

It was in this context that the programme adopted in 1924 rested upon tax advantages and concessionary contracts to investors and property developers who (in the context of dictatorship) were immune to the critique of public scrutiny. More broadly, the country - and the city of Málaga - was in the throes of fragile economic modernisation. Later, the process was also shaped by the halting and contested political transition from dictatorship towards a democratic government whose guiding principles aimed to fulfil multiple popular demands amid stalling economic progress and a rural slump which deepened internal migration.[62] Opposition to democratisation and economic redistribution was in turn mounted by the monarchist elite.[63]

The degeneration of the Ciudad Jardín project into a financially speculative opportunity implemented in an uncoordinated way led to its marginalisation as a disconnected nucleus lacking basic facilities and vital contact with the city and the urban economy. It was a far cry from the hopes of liberal critics of the local oligarchy. Republicans understood the Ciudad Jardín conceptually as having multi-functional potential as 're-populator of the deserted countryside', creator of settlements 'uniting the excellent qualities of rural life with the advantages of the urban'.[64] Land expropriated for reasons of 'public utility' would be used for 'humble family dwellings (which would be) impossible to repossess' and thereby have moralising effects enhancing local civic pride. This echoed the principles of Patrick Geddes and Ebenezer Howard, the early twentieth-

century founders of the garden city movement who imagined satellite societies, based on adequate infrastructure, in harmonious relation with nature and keeping workers from the 'brutalising' temptations of the tavern.[65] The housing associations and nascent building societies formed by these Republicans had sought to provide for genuinely needy households, prioritising families encompassing several generations and those with elderly dependents or sick or disabled children. This was consciously encouraged by the Liberal parliament's 1921 law on *casas baratas* – sponsored by the government's own Instituto de Reformas Sociales (ISR) - which reviewed the problem and spoke of benefitting 'workers in general' and the less vulnerable, including those who 'received pensions for services to the state'.[66] The ISR was influenced by transnational ideas of enlightened town planning but was dissolved by the Primo regime in 1924 and replaced by new corporativist institutional schemes suited to its quasi-fascist ethos.

Indeed, the civic idealism of the cooperative movement struggled for air locally beneath the pressure of the Primo regime's hyperactive strategy of populist legitimation. The regenerationist symbolism of 'the surgeon's knife' was claimed as fit to cut away the rottenness of *caciquil* clientelism by publicly declaring an overhaul of municipal political structures. Given the 'dynastic' parliamentary parties (Liberals and Conservatives) had necessarily gone into liquidation following Primo's coup - along with the parliament upon which the system of buying and selling votes was based - the *caciquil* machinery was indeed no more. This was important since it theoretically made a wider social range of interest representation possible, even if only through means which were even less formally democratic than the old system.[67] The belief within government was that with de-politicisation state-funded programmes of urban development would become more technocratic, viable and effective than before. But the political change did not mean that local and regional elites ceased to wield dominant economic and political influence. The dictatorship's 1924 Municipal Statute - justified as 'oxygenating municipal life' - gave autonomy to the municipality in matters of urban planning, but simultaneously relied heavily (as had the Restoration system) on state-imposed Civil Governors as the key link between Madrid and the regions. Moreover, the regime dispatched military 'governmental delegates' to the regions with the intention of forcibly instilling patriotic-scientific rigour to local government, the previous *caciquista* stronghold of the old regime.[68] One task of these military *delegados* was re-activation of the bourgeois militia known as the Somatén as guardian of Catholic patriotism, order, and property; in Málaga, Rafael Benjumea spearheaded this effort, his influential wife becoming the militia's local patroness.[69]

Not only did the *delegado* initiative quickly degenerate into fraudulence and incompetence, but the various commissions of the municipal corporation – including finance, public works, and the legal department - continued to be under the sway of powerful local individuals, many of them closely linked with the *caciquil* past. Municipal functions were therefore prey to politico-economic patronage and too often gave priority to *ad hoc* projects based on profitability rather than social improvement and sustainability.[70] Where there existed in other parts of Europe a strong statist tradition – as in early twentieth-century Germany - municipal independence was a valuable element of public consent to be safeguarded against autocratic reaction.[71] By contrast, in the Spanish state context of 'heavy' presence but weak and fragmented capacity, local administrative autonomy tended to perpetuate clientelist relations between centre and periphery and narrowly based legitimacy.[72]

As part of the 1924 municipal 'plan' of urban improvement in Málaga, the state provided operating capital for construction of the Ciudad Jardín as well as the required land, presented free of charge to the newly created Casas Baratas Company undertaking the project, including the letting and sale of the various types of dwellings therein. This general urban plan was funded by a loan from a Catalan bank to be re-paid (with high-interest) by the future municipality over 23 years, an expensive 'mortgaging' arrangement never discussed at any council session.[73] Both the plan and the loan were prepared by Rafael Benjumea, chief sponsor of the new housing project, who became vice-president of Casas Baratas in 1925 and soon after Primo's technocratic and 'apolitical' Minister of Public Works.[74] The conservative instincts of the company and of the Primo administration were signaled by the latter's amendment decreed in July 1925 to the previous October's legislation on *casas baratas* setting out terms for state aid to developers of superior housing (so-called *casas económicas*) of higher but still limited price specifically for the middle classes [**Place Table 1 here**].[75] Indeed, part of the aim of the municipal authorities in Málaga before 1931 had been to encourage development of an intermediate social class, to whom the housing was offered with the hope of turning 'the greatest number of citizens who are not capitalists into property owners'.[76] A conservative political constituency would thereby coalesce as a social 'buffer' between the elite and the working class; the populist slogan became 'a house for every family', redolent of Italy's contemporary and unrealistic Fascist discourse.[77] The decrees of 1924 and 1925 made state credits, subsidies and tax concessions to private companies the basis of government contracts to build affordable houses. City councils were authorised in addition to issue their own public debts for financing these local projects and to offer land at a knock-down price: 'All apprehensions and doubts over the

protection and inducements to be received (by investors), formerly susceptible to uncertainties, disappeared', according to Primo's Minister of Labour, the corporativist Catholic, Eduardo Aunós.[78] [**Place Table 2 here**].

The ceremonious unveiling of the far from complete Ciudad Jardín in February 1926 symbolised the conservative ethos and the paternalist nature of Primo-style social regeneration. It further demonstrated how the project was co-opted as propaganda in favour of the monarchy and the army despite the controversial recent failings of both in the colonial campaigns in Spanish Morocco. The keys to the first completed house were presented by King Alfonso to the widow of a war hero of the locality, a junior officer killed at the disastrous campaign at Anual in 1921. This was in the presence of the dictator, accompanied by Benjumea, the Archbishop of the diocese, and Queen Victoria Eugenie.[79] The primary reason for the royal presence in Málaga (and that of Primo) had been the unveiling prominently in the central city park (near the Calle Larios) of a statue to the more senior commander also killed in the same 1921 engagement. The ceremony of the keys was propaganda, therefore, belying the less than spectacular achievement of a faltering construction process at the Ciudad Jardín which had been undermined by inefficiency and profiteering. **[Insert Image 3 here]**. According to the government's published accounts for 1927, 31 million pesetas-worth of low-interest loans were made available nationally and 9 million pesetas were provided as subsidies to construction companies and yet relatively little had been built. In Málaga, by further decree in May 1926, a loan of 11 million pesetas was granted to the Casas Baratas Company (at an even more profitable concessionary rate of interest and tax exemption) for construction of the Ciudad Jardín. [**Place Table 3 here**]. The agreement was to create 837 buildings with 1,049 housing units, but the company was granted 40 years to complete the project. Designed to provide modern and healthy housing for the humble classes, in addition to a park and other amenities in return for the subsidies, real progress was slow and uneven.[80] By the late-1920s, the experience of living in the new dwellings, once available, was marked by neglect, exploitation, and isolation, falling short of the project's marketing by the city fathers as a new model, 'as pleasant as can be […] the beginning of the city's expansion'.[81]

Tensions between local elite sectors not only formed the backdrop to the disappointing results but were symptomatic of broader, national, obstacles to reform emanating from Primo's fragmented support base by 1930. The local *haute bourgeoisie* - manufacturing free-traders and real estate owners - baulked at the taxes required to pay for reforms. At the same time, they criticised the consumption taxes which protected agricultural prices but discouraged the lower classes either to purchase or rent property.[82] Critics maintained

that the public economic programmes of the dictatorship pandered to the masses, were expensive, and negatively impacted existing proprietors. It was argued by the urban landlords' organisation (the Cámara Oficial de la Propiedad Urbana) that the state favoured rural land ownership and that its support of housing schemes distorted free competition:

'it suited the disastrous physiocratism [favouring of agricultural wealth] that has been the motto of the government for many years in our nation, to distract and flatter the rebellious and most numerous elements so that it would not disturb public tranquility and it was also more convenient and expedient to subsidise construction companies that for their profit proclaimed the infallibility of the Casas Baratas remedy'.[83]

The Cámara was a consultative body of public administration with the function of supplying municipal, provincial, and national authorities with data for feasibility reports on infrastructural projects. In Málaga it did so from a resentful position on the part of property owners at state rent controls to alleviate evictions because they reduced profits. The equivalent body in Barcelona wrote directly to Primo arguing that rent controls 'denaturalised the essence' of the 'sacred right' of property.[84] New state-supported construction work thus benefited some sectors more than others, meaning that reform was halting and frequently paralysed.

The Primo government further complicated matters by placing a corporative framework on top of the subsidised market system. The corporativist rhetoric claimed that corporations for each economic sector – to include workers' representatives – would 'harmonise' class relations. This extended to the housing sector by decree in October 1927, so that tenants could - in theory – stand up for their interests in the Corporation of Housing. Aunós, the Minister of Labour, visited Fascist Italy in April 1926 to assess similar arrangements, being received by Mussolini who expressed affection for the Spanish dictatorship. In practice, however, the system meant merely that *free* tenants' associations were placed outside the law, just as free trade unions had been banned and the ISR dissolved. While the number of *case popolari* produced under Mussolini's regime - which was more dynamic in sponsoring prestige public displays of architectural patriotism – lent some credence to Fascism's claims, the sum total of affordable dwellings constructed in Spain through the *casas baratas* scheme in the Primo era fell well short of the dream of 'constructing a house for every Spaniard'.[85] By December 1928, some 1,600 families in Spain had been assigned 'cheap houses'. These were not all working-class families, however, because priority for allocation was given to military families. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, those from the lower classes who were re-housed were not necessarily depoliticised by their 'privileged' living conditions, as Málaga's Ciudad Jardín demonstrated. In the repressive atmosphere,

Republican sentiment grew and was nurtured on local social issues (including the *casas baratas*), other long-standing collective resentments, and the underlying discourse of political protest.

A key framing of this discourse was anti-clericalism, and housing protest - and other forms of dissent - were propelled along in the slipstream of anti-Church feeling. This popular rejection was based on the perception that the Church was hypocritical in allying with social elites instead of taking the ascetic life of Christ as a model. Historically, the Church's attitude was that the needs of the labouring classes could be reduced to 'bread and pages from the catechism'.[86] Social demands from below merged with this critique so that language associated with anti-clericalism shaped protest in key political issues, including housing, education, health, and use of the urban space in Málaga. From 1930, frustrated hopes in the Ciudad Jardín drew residents towards protest and, in the freer atmosphere as Primo fell, scepticism about priests' claim to moral hegemony converged with attacks on the Catholic economic elite.[87] This did not mean that non-fulfilment of the developers' promise to construct a church building in the new neighbourhood was left off the list of collective grievances against the Casas Baratas company and its municipal supporters. As popular commentary led by the Republican press showed, poverty did not mean a rejection of religious faith: 'An idea worthy of the greatest praise is *spiritual* bread for the residents of the Ciudad Jardín, at the same time as we are preoccupied with sustenance - *material* bread'.[88]

Allied to poverty, the scarcity of housing in the city allowed the company to act exploitatively. Housing units in the Ciudad Jardín were advertised in the early 1930s because - despite the economic slump - previous residents had been ejected by the company which kept rigidly to conditions and penalties for failing to pay rent instalments. A contractual clause stated that if rent was 30 days late that the rental agreement would be withdrawn, so that at a time of frequent unemployment, the threat of homelessness returned. The task of the old *caseros* (rent collectors) of the notorious *corralones* had been taken over by new '*caseros oficiales*' in the pay of the authorities.[89] The number of evictions set in train in the municipal courts by the company in the autumn of 1930 was considerable and it was reported that more residents were leaving each day.[90] A further contractual problem was the absence of a legal guarantee for families if the head of a household in the *casas baratas* died. In addition, though part of the stated aim had been to relieve urban overcrowding, rooms in the new constructions were by 1928 being rapidly sub-divided to increase the rental income by a factor of three in each collective block.[91] Moreover, although a 'healthier' environment was heralded in publicity surrounding the new housing, poor hygiene quickly became significant. Problems were

frequent with the water supply, damp cellars, and lack of drains and sewage systems, creating a persistent focus for infection.[92] Occupant representatives complained of choking dust because pavements were not in place before residence was taken up, even though the municipality had provided funds for infrastructure.[93] The doors and windows of units were placed too low in relation to the roadway. In addition, no provision of facilities for washing clothes (*lavaderos*) was made even though this had been part of the agreed plan. A breakthrough was achieved in the summer of 1930 when for the first time the leader of the Neighbourhood Association was permitted to attend the meeting of the municipal committee set to discuss the *casas baratas*, even if this was truncated because, so it appeared, the initial plans for the project had gone missing and could not be referred to.[94]

When the dictatorship fell in September 1930 a tense political interregnum preceding the holding of elections followed. At this moment of transition, the political contest over the Ciudad Jardín was symbolised by the nomenclature of streets in the new development. The city council suggested that the principal thoroughfare be named after the former conservative prime minister and Catholic monarchist, Antonio Maura. Empowered by the new political situation, the residents insisted that accepting this be conditional upon another main street being named in honour of the founder of the Socialist Party, Pablo Iglesias.[95] In the more open political situation, these demands were part of a wider civic movement of Málaga tenants' associations, beginning with campaigns to improve unhealthy conditions in the housing in the Larios-owned industrial suburb of Huelín. A workers' commission was dispatched to Madrid, although its reporting in local newspapers was halted by the Civil Governor of the interregnal regime, stating that 'the circumstances require a need not to produce alarm and restlessness within the working class'.[96] With Primo's demise, free associations were nonetheless able to enlist with the national Federation of Citizen Organisations (Federación de Entidades Ciudadanas de España). The Ciudad Jardín association stressed its own 'community spirit' (*civismo*) and activism as an example to other city groups, publicising its telegrams to the Ministries of the Interior and Justice and to the Director General of Health in Madrid, calling for an urgent inspection of the project and its calamitous situation.[97]

The most prominent leader of the campaign against the company and its allies in the Ayuntamiento was José Muñoz Pugnaire, the railway trade unionist, Republican city councillor (representing the Radical-Socialist Party), and editor of the city's main centre-left daily newspaper, *El Popular*. Muñoz was especially admired amongst *militantes* of the movement's youth section, the Juventud Republicana, and became

councillor for the Ciudad Jardín in 1930. In essence, he articulated the popular view that the litmus test of the new Republic would be its ability to deal with neighbourhood social issues, such as housing, health, and education, which were to be at the forefront of the electoral campaign. A year after the inauguration of the Republic it was estimated that 50,000 people in the city were dependent on the special sanitary assistance of the municipal authorities, though provision was rudimentary.[98] After years of neglect, amid press censorship, tenant associations had become active in solidarity with Republican candidates in the municipal elections of April 1931. Fulfilling the radical promise of the Ciudad Jardín was closely bound up, indeed, with the popular transition from dictatorship to democracy in the city. The enthusiastically received campaign speeches of Muñoz lambasted those who were wealthy at the expense of the humble classes, in part because of corrupt elections.[99] Only a week before the historic vote which brought about the monarchy's fall, a meeting of the neighbourhood discussed strategies against the company and its supporters; leaflets were distributed warning that 'he who sells his vote is a swine, he who pawns it is a slave, he who buys it is a thief'.[100] This was no mere unsophisticated condemnation of *caciquismo*, but signalled a recognition that the dictatorship's claim to have definitively ended the *caciquist* system had been over-stated. Monarchist candidates in Málaga in the 1931 elections reverted, in fact, to being officially called 'Larios Monarchists', tied to the key beneficiary of corrupt politics and the biggest landlord in the city. These elites used their own press to remind their voters of their duty to act against the ever-present 'revolutionary danger'.[101]

The 1931 elections brought a Republican-Socialist coalition back to municipal power and proclamation of the Republic nationally. The city council, led by the mayor, Emilio Baeza (key Gómez Chaix protégé), declared that 'municipal administration (had to) undergo a transformation inspired by social justice with special reference to education and public welfare'.[102] The issue of unhealthy housing was rapidly incorporated with the lamentable state of working class housing generally in the divided city. Two weeks after the epoch-shaping vote, the new Republican Civil Governor of the city visited the still unfinished development to get an update on unrest and certain 'bloody events'. The convulsive reality of the Ciudad Jardín was revealed, belying the marketing image of the official guide.[103] For radical critics, creation of this 'satellite town' amounted to avoidance of the greater issue of social inequality and a 'deception, exploited by the wealthy'.[104] Expectations turned into frustration as the new reforming government found it difficult to make radical legislation work at the local level, becoming vulnerable to accusations of working class betrayal. This included failure to annul the clause in the 1924 *casas baratas* decree which allowed unlimited dividends

to be paid to company shareholders despite the project being 'a social enterprise'.[105] Anti-clerical slogans became more prominent in local political newspapers. On the night of 11 May 1931, a notorious episode of anti-clerical incendiary violence took place in the centre of the city against ecclesiastical buildings and in parts of the working class districts to the west of the river.[106] The perception was that Republican resolve for radical change needed to be symbolised graphically in the face of rumours of monarchist resistance. This was especially the case because the years of dictatorship had been dominated by 'merchants of the faith', those who 'trade for profit in religious belief'.[107] The Civil Governor issued a declaration calling on the people of the city to help him restore order 'for the sake of the health of the Republic' and the council lamented the violence despite comprehending 'the need for a deep social and political transformation'.[108]

In the volatile atmosphere, a level of panic was provoked in the Ciudad Jardín, where the neighbourhood had just voted for radical Republicans. A letter from the president of the Ciudad Jardín's 'Defence Committee' ('Junta de Defensa') to a radical newspaper of the city, alleged that certain monarchists, horrified by the anti-clerical incendiarism, were disseminating a fabrication that the Ciudad Jardín itself was about to be set alight in revenge. The rumours were received with such credulity that a number of citizens of the neighbourhood had taken to the hills. The local councillor, Muñoz Pugnaire, believed the scare to have been a punishment for the people's vote in support of the new regime and because of the culture of dissent in the Ciudad Jardín. He began a round of visits to calm the spirits of the people and reassure them.[109] At the same time, work on the construction of the vital roadway to the community had been halted by the company, adding to the unemployment problem and to tensions. The Socialist-affiliated construction union had intervened in disputes motivated initially by falling wages but also relating to the social utility of housing and legislation to control rents; employers were ready to mount counter offensives by ceasing work projects entirely.[110] **[Insert Image 4 here]**

The course was set for stasis over housing reform because of the economic crisis with which the Republic's birth coincided and elite obstructionism. The second anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic was celebrated in Málaga by inaugurating new public works to relieve the unemployment crisis, although the programme was limited by financial restrictions as the effects of the economic slump cut ever deeper.[111] Little more could be achieved by the reformist government beyond introducing parliamentary bills to restrict rents.[112] Homelessness remained intractable with hundreds of people reported to be sleeping on the insalubrious beaches to the east of the port area and in caves in the hillsides on the outskirts of the city.[113] A

new night-time refuge for homeless children was established by a religious order, the Hermanos de Paz y Caridad, in late 1932. Several other charitable establishments became targets of disturbances.[114] The balance between charity (which was resented as a benefit offered in place of reform), social order, and violence was increasingly fragile. The city was policed by Republican forces of order, but the government stood to gain little by suppressing the workers. In January 1933, an officer of the Civil Guard was apparently attacked in the workers' district of El Perchel and discovered in one of the communal lodging houses (a *corralón*), surrounded by reportedly uncaring residents.[115] Málaga was in a state of 'social decomposition' not, according to Church leaders, because of poverty but because the population had embraced 'licentiousness' and lost all 'instinct for beauty and love for this blessed land', a comment in part on the desecration of religious icons in May 1931. Meanwhile, citizens were exhorted in press advertisements to visit the Ciudad Jardín, which it was claimed was 'the most hygienic *barrio*' of the city, where dwellings could be acquired 'on hire purchase' for 28 pesetas per month.[116]

Epilogue: Civil War, Revolution, and Defeat, 1936-37

In urban Málaga, the military coup which ignited the civil war in July 1936 was successfully resisted. In the aftermath, political authority was shared uneasily between constituted Republican authorities, the activist rank-and-file of left-wing parties, and the lower class populace at large. This situation lasted until the city's 'liberation' by Franco's forces in early February 1937 (in fact, largely by troops supplied by Mussolini). As part of this violent process, Republican officials were targeted for reprisal. The local councillor for the Ciudad Jardín, José Muñoz Pugnaire, was mandatorily arrested because he had several times been elected (legally) as a Republican during the early 1930s, the final occasion being just months before the war, in February 1936. His detention and imprisonment was celebrated by the local press placed under the control of the city's occupiers. Disregarding the complexities of Republican political divisions, the newspaper *ABC* declared that he had been one of the 'principal leaders of the anarcho-communist movement in Málaga' and claimed that his articles for *El Popular* had 'poisoned the workers and all those beyond control'.[117] Following a summary Council of War he was executed for his political 'crimes' on 25 November 1937.[118] His modest flat in the Ciudad Jardín – the neighbourhood nominally collectivised under his guidance following the military coup in July 1936 - had already been confiscated by the occupying authorities.[119] Retribution was protracted, however. Some four years after his execution, a 'political responsibilities' civil suit for damages was opened against him by the Franco authorities.[120]

Another Republican who had supported the housing campaign (because hygienic housing was essential to public health) was the medical doctor Aurelio Ramos Acosta, a mainstay of municipal public health since the 1920s, who helped lead the Radical-Socialist Party in the city in the 1930s, and stepped into the breach to head the city's hospital once the war began in 1936. Ramos Acosta had called publicly for a radical redistribution of wealth under the Republic because he believed that social conditions lay at the root of poor housing, disease, and illiteracy, and produced urban conflict. As a local Republican leader the Francoist forces also apprehended him, exhausted and ill from overwork during the period of the siege by rebel forces. His arrest followed a denunciation, a fact publicly celebrated by General Queipo de Llano, the rebel propagandist who became a repressive 'viceroy' in his fiefdom of Andalucía during the war. According to Queipo's jubilant radio broadcast, Ramos Acosta had been 'one of the most pernicious and most terrible men of the parties of the left in Málaga'.[121] The military court wasted little time in condemning him to the death penalty and he was executed as 'a Marxist' in the cemetery of San Rafael on 9 May 1937.[122]

Conclusions

Study of urban planning can tell us not only about the physical shaping and politics of cities but can be reflected back upon key questions of national political evolution and crisis, providing an alternative angle for viewing them. By the early twentieth century, public provision of basic amenities – including affordable worker housing - was becoming the essential 'ligament' of state-society relations in western Europe. Formation of this connective social tissue was problematic in politically polarised urban settings in Spain, however, coming under intense pressure during the 1920s and 1930s.[123] Incorporation of an international model of affordable housing – embodied in the 'Garden City' - was depicted in Spain as a 'cutting-edge' solution to urban planning. This putative remedy was consciously linked to competing political discourses on economic progress, hygiene, and social equality. The scheme was ultimately undermined by pursuit of socio-economic interests and the intractable political misalignment between central power and municipal-institutional representation. It is against the backdrop of the state's rhetoric of political and social modernisation – and the more genuinely radical and egalitarian cooperative housing projects promoted by local Republicans since 1909 - that popular dissent in Málaga has been assessed here, shifting analysis of urban development beyond conventional description of the city's physical morphology towards the politics of social reform.

The Republican tradition could legitimately claim association with the cosmopolitan housing movement's aim of relieving social misery but was financially limited. Meanwhile, the Primo era schemes received substantial public funds but ultimately were emptied of far-reaching reforming function. The legislation of *casas baratas* had little effect on housing for the working class. Government funding could not compensate for regressive over-arching fiscal policies which cast a shadow over municipal finances. This is borne out by Málaga's Ciudad Jardín, shaped by local clientelism which the Primo dictatorship signally failed to sweep away, becoming the root of the political struggles and frustrations over modernisation which emerged into the open during the years of the Second Republic and, in turn, became a fundamental discursive and material cause of the open conflict to follow. The radical medical doctor, Ramos Acosta, summarised the inequalities of 'the populous city' in 1931 which was caught between 'daily productive labour', on one hand, and 'luxury', on the other, and how this was made sense of: 'motionless, frightened, hesitant, perplexed by its own history: it has lost the street corners, houses, patios, customs which evoked its past without yet bringing out the features of modernity.'[124]

Many of the social and political problems of housing in the Spain of the 1920s were to be exacerbated during the post-civil war Franco years.[125] Similar projects in the 1940s and 1950s favoured particular groups defined ideologically; they achieved little in terms of social levelling. Socio-spatial division remained the essential feature of Málaga's urban composition; political consent from the 'dense, impenetrable worker districts' of the city – as described by the Francoist Civil Governor in 1941 – remained elusive.[126] Ultimately, a solution was found from the 1960s in the intensively occupied high-rise blocks on the urban periphery of cities, when marginalised labour migrants in numbers beyond imagination four decades earlier fuelled Franco's foreign-financed 'economic miracle'.

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[1] Decree, Directorio Militar, 10 October 1924: *Gaceta de Madrid*, 289, 15 October 1924; Cámara Oficial de la Propiedad Urbana de Barcelona, *Las recientes disposiciones del Directorio encaminadas a impulsar la construcción de viviendas económicas*, (Barcelona: n.p, 1924).

[2] *Anuario General de Málaga: Guía Oficial, 1930*, (Málaga: Sur, 1930), 84.

[3] On deficiencies in other cities in Spain: Luis Muñoz Antuñano, *Saneamiento e higienización de España*, (Madrid: n.p, 1921), 260-3.

[4] Deriving from *cacique*, a term for regional and local political bosses retained by elites to 'deliver' the vote. Javier Tusell, *Oligarquía y caciquismo en Andalucía (1890-1923)*, (Madrid: Planeta, 1976); Javier Tusell, *La crisis del caciquismo andaluz (1923-1931)*, (Madrid: Planeta, 1977).

[5] For street politics: Sandra Souto Kustrín, *"Y ¿Madrid? ¿Qué hace Madrid?": Movimiento revolucionario y acción colectiva (1933-1936)*, (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2004). On the symbolic contest in the public space between two images of

'the people' (one Republican and one Catholic): Rafael Cruz, *En el nombre del pueblo: República, rebellion y guerra en la España de 1936*, (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2006).

[6] Eg, Maite Méndez Baiges (ed), *Arquitectura, ciudad y territorio en Málaga (1900-2011)*, (Málaga: Geometría, 2011).

[7] On marriage: Carmen Martín Gaite, *El Conde de Guadalhorce*, (Madrid: Ediciones Turner, 1983), 33-8; and general political effects: Teresa Carnero Arbat, 'Elites gobernantes y democratización inacabada (1890-1923)', *Historia Contemporánea*, 23 (2001), 483-508.

[8] Aurora Gámez Amián, Juan Páez y Páez-Camino, and Francisco Jironda Crespillo, 'Municipio y construcción de viviendas', *VI Congreso de la Asociación de Historia Económica*, (Girona: n.p, 1997), 160-1.

[9] Gonzalo Iglesias Sánchez–Solórzano, *Proyecto y memoria de casas baratas para Málaga*, (Málaga: n.p, 1924).

[10] *Guía Oficial*. The Ciudad Jardín's 'modernity' (as depicted by its promotors) placed it within the transnational Garden City movement which sought to relieve overcrowded and disease-ridden metropolitan centres. María Cristina García González, 'Spain in the International Networks: The Case of César Cort (1893-1978)', *Journal of Urban History*, 48, 1 (2022), 120–141; Santiago de Miguel Salanova, 'Providing the Modern City: Urban Patterns of Socialist Municipal Action in Madrid (1905-1936)', *Journal of Urban History*, online, June 2022; Michel Geertse, 'The International Garden City Campaign: Transnational Negotiations on Town Planning Methods 1913-1926', *Journal of Urban History*, 42, 4 (2016), 733-52.

[11] For the particularly strong Republican tradition in Málaga: Fernando Arcas Cubero, *El republicanismo malagueño durante la Restauración (1875-1923)*, (Córdoba: Ayuntamiento de Córdoba, 1985).

[12] Manuel Morales Muñoz, *El republicanismo malagueño en el siglo XIX*, (Málaga: Asukaría, 1999).

[13] Eduardo Aunós y Pérez, *La reforma corporativa del estado*, (Madrid: Aguilar, 1935); Aunós, *La política social de la dictadura*, (Madrid: n.p, 1944), 39-40.

[14] José Álvarez Junco, 'Los intellectuales: Anticlericalismo y republicanismo', in José Luis García Delgado (ed), *Los orígenes culturales de la II República*, (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1993), 101-25.

[15] Founded in 1929.

[16] Antonio García Sánchez, *La Segunda República en Málaga*, (Córdoba: Ayuntamiento, 1984), 104-6; María Dolores Ramos, *Burgueses y proletarios malagueños: Lucha de clases en la crisis de la Restauración (1914-1923)*, (Córdoba: Ayuntamiento de Córdoba, 1991).

[17] On broad development of relation in Spain between central and local state: Mary Vincent, *Spain, 1833-2002: People and State*, (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 9-44. On the centrality of the municipality to political power in Málaga, see Arcas Cubero, *El republicanism*, 23.

[18] *La Unión Mercantil*, 2 April 1931, 16; 6 April 1931, 12; 7 April 1931, 2; 10 April 1931, 13.

[19] *El Popular*, 27 October 1936, 7.

[20] In the 1930s the total population of towns of over 10,000 inhabitants increased by some 2 million and cities of over 100,000 inhabitants increased by a million. Amando de Miguel, *La pirámide social española*, (Barcelona: Fundación Juan March, 1977), 26; Juan Díez Nicolás, *Tamaño, densidad y crecimiento de la población en España*, (Madrid: CSIC, 1971), 19; Salustiano del Campo, *Análisis de la población de España*, (Barcelona: Ariel, 1975), 18.

[21] Santos Juliá, *Madrid 1931-1934: De la fiesta popular a la lucha de clases*, (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1984).

[22] Eduard Masjuan, *La ecología humana en el anarquismo ibérico*, (Barcelona: Icaria, 2000). On deficiencies and disease in Málaga: Jesús Castellanos et al, *Estudios sobre las condiciones de vida en Málaga de la Restauración: el abastecimiento de agua*, (Málaga: Universidad, 1986). For a critique of the unlimited growth model in relation to Barcelona in the 1930s: Giulio Nicola Soldani, 'Estrategias del ingobernable: Dos experiencias de crítica de la civilización metropólitana en la Europa del Siglo XX', *Quid 16*, 11, (2011), 104-13.

[23] Fernando Vicente Albarrán, 'La modernidad deformada: El imaginario de bajos fondos en el proceso de modernización de Madrid (1860-1930)', *Ayer*, 101 (2016), 213-40.

[24] Rosario Camacho Martínez and María Morente del Monte, 'Málaga: del eclecticismo al movimiento moderno', in Antonio Bravo Nieto (ed), *Arquitecturas y ciudades hispánicas de los siglos XIX y XX en torno al mediterráneo occidental*, (Melilla: UNED, 2005), 102-5. Economically, Málaga was in the power of a few families, most notably the Larios dynasty, with very substantial landholding in the province and city and several dominant industrial enterprises (sugar refining, fruit export, railways, shipping, mining, etc). Antonio Parejo Barranco, *Málaga y los Larios: capitalismo industrial y atraso económico, 1875-1914*, (Málaga: Argúval, 1990).

[25] José A. Jiménez Quintero, 'El triángulo financiero Heredia-Larios-Loring', *Jábega*, 19 (1977), 35-46; Tusell, *Oligarquía y caciquismo*, 203-8, 305; María Antonia Peña Guerrero and María Sierra, 'Andalucía', in José Varela Ortega (ed), *El poder de la influencia: geografía del caciquismo en España (1875-1923)*, (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2001), 17-44.

[26] On the partially completed Ciudad Lineal (Madrid), begun in the 1890s and developed piecemeal over several decades, and the more ecologically radical Ciudad Jardín (Barcelona), much discussed after 1918 but never realised, see Fernando de Terán, *Antecedentes de un urbanismo actual: la Ciudad Lineal*, (Madrid: Ciencia Nueva, 1968); Eduard Masjuan, 'La ciudad jardín o ecológica contra la ciudad lineal', *Ecología Política*, 10 (1996), 127-39.

[27] Cited in Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, 1923-1930*, (Oxford: OUP, 1983), 101-2.

[28] Address to Círculo Liberal (Madrid): Mariano García Cortés, *El gobierno municipal: antecedentes, observaciones y experiencias*, (Madrid: Bermejo, 1930). Failings of municipal and state responsibility were long recognised: eg, Calisto Milla Basallos, *Saneamiento de las poblaciónes urbanas, rurales y policía urbana*, (Madrid, 1914).

[29] Tusell, *Crisis del caciquismo*.

[30] García Sánchez, *La Segunda República*, 18-19; Camacho and Morente del Monte, 'Málaga: del eclecticismo al movimiento moderno', 99.

[31] José Sánchez Jiménez, 'Málaga, 1890-1930: Las transformaciones sociales de una ciudad en crisis', in José Luis García Delgado (ed), *Las ciudades en la modernización de España*, (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1992), 366.

[32] Damián López Cano, *La población malagueña en el siglo XX*, (Málaga: Universidad, 1985), 51. On this 'anarchic urbanisation' in other regions: Antonio Escudero, Miguel Pérez de Perceval, and Andrés Sánchez Picón, 'Urban environmental degradation and the standard of living: the case of the Spanish mining industry (1870-1930)', *Continuity and Change*, 30, 3 (2015), 395-421.

[33] Francisco José Rodríguez Marín, 'Urbanismo obrero y burgués en Málaga: Los barrios de Huelin y El Limonar', *Jábega*, 66 (1989), 45-56; Alfredo Rubio Díaz, *Viviendas unifamiliares contra corralones: el barrio obrero de Huelín*, (Málaga: Miramar, 1996). For latter-day reluctance to contribute to housing scheme infrastructure, see shared language of developer and UK government about an elected social democratic London council: 'We don't want to give Marxists doe [sic]', *The Guardian*, 24 June 2020.

[34] Tax riots emanating from west of the river occurred as early as the 1850s and 60s, producing death penalties as punishment: Morales Muñoz, *El republicanismo malagueño*, pp. 46-9.

[35] Julián Sesmero Ruiz, *Los barrios de Málaga: origenes e historia*, (Málaga: Edinford, 1993), 401-40.

[36] See *El Mar*, 29 April 1931. See also, eg, *El Mar*, 8 April 1931; 22 April 1931.

[37] Eg, in the Calle Don Iñigo: *Rebelión*, año 1, 10, 15 November 1930.

[38] Being found in zones such as Capuchinos, La Goleta, El Ejido and El Molinillo, as well Perchel and Trinidad, the heart of the proletarian zone west of the Guadalmedina.

[39] Isabel Jiménez Lucena, *El tifus en la Málaga de la postguerra: un estudio históricomédico en torno a una enfermedad colectiva*, (Málaga: Universidad, 1990), 100-1.

[40] The level was even higher for the province of Málaga, including rural areas. See María José González Castillejo, *Mujer, vida cotidiana y esfera pública en Málaga (1931-1936)*, (Málaga: Universidad, 1991), 212-3.

[41] José Dominguez Luque, 'El problema de la mortalidad infantil', *Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de Málaga*, (Málaga, 1927).

[42] Aurelio Ramos Acosta, 'Problemas de enseñanza y de sanidad en Málaga', *Revista Médica de Málaga*, November 1931, 1223-35.

[43] Juan L. Castillo, Jesús Castellanos and María Dolores Ramos, 'Aurelio Ramos Acosta: médico y político malagueño', *Jábega*, 45 (1984), 51.

[44] For example, Ramos Acosta, 'Problemas de enseñanza y de sanidad'; *El Mar*, 2 July 1930, 4.

[45] Ramos Acosta, 'Problemas de enseñanza'.

[46] See, eg, *El Popular*, 30 October 1911.

[47] Ana Aguado and María Dolores Ramos, *La modernización de España, 1917-1939*, (Madrid: Síntesis, 2002), 184-5.

[48] H. Vidal Juárez, 'La habitación higiénica', *Málaga: Revista de Cultura General*, 1 August 1931, 18-19.

[49] For background, albeit focused mainly on Barcelona, see José Álvarez Junco, *El Emperador del Paralelo: Lerroux y la demagogia populista*, (Madrid: Alianza, 1990).

[50] Luis Arias González, *Socialismo y vivienda obrera en España, 1926-1939*, (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 2003), 73-4; Paloma Barreiro Pereira, *Casas baratas: la vivienda social en Madrid 1900-1939*, (Madrid: Colegio Oficial de Arquitectos, 1992); María del Mar Domingo Hernández, *Las 'Casas Baratas' en Vizcaya, 1911-1936*, (Bilbao: BBK, 2008); Ramón Queiró Quijada, *Los Patronatos de Casas Baratas de Sevilla*, (Seville: Ayuntamiento, 2023). Also, Eve Blau, *The Architecture of Red Vienna, 1919–1934*, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1999).

[51] *Bases para la construcción de casas con viviendas higiénicas y económicas, aprobadas por el Excmo. Ayuntamiento en sesión de 8 de abril de 1910, a propuesta de la Comisión de Casas Baratas*, (Madrid: n.p, 1910).

[52] *Bases* (1910).

[53] Arcas, *Republicanismo malagueño*, pp. 242-4.

[54] Pedro Gómez Chaix, *Ensayos de política municipal*, (Madrid: Editorial Hernando, 1930).

[55] After election, he was appointed President of the Tribunal de Cuentas, the supervisory committee overseeing public economic accounts.

[56] The aim of these bodies was to disseminate Enlightenment ideas of social improvement and economic development. Ángela Caballero Cortés, 'La Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de Málaga: Historia de la educación', *Revista Inter-universitaria*, 5 (1986), pp. 339-58. Under Gómez Chaix, the Sociedad Económica held conferences, free evening classes and work training programmes for men and women, and made its library freely available.

[57] García Sánchez, *Segunda República*, pp. 106-7, 132-40.

[58] In their shared Republican vision of the world, there was cross-generational continuity, but by 1931 the significance of the working-class had begun to supersede advocates of bourgeois revolution, such as Gómez Chaix.

[59] This was the Barrio Obrero América, ultimately consisting of 34 dwellings, in working class Trinidad: *Memorias y Balances de la Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de Málaga como entidad constructora de casas baratas en los años 1914 a 1919*, (Málaga, 1919), pp. 13-14, 42. For the 'Reglamento de adjudicación y régimen de las casas construídas para los damnificados por la inundación de 1907', 21 May 1912, see *Memorias y Balances*, p. 73.

[60] Pedro Gómez Chaix, 'Sociedades benéficas constructoras de casas baratas', *Nuestro Tiempo*, March 1923 (based on address to the Primer Congreso Nacional de Higiene y Saneamiento de la Habitación, Barcelona, 1922). In 1912, Chaix's

Sociedad Económica housing project fixed rents modestly at 2.5 pesetas per month. See also *Labor parliamentaria de Pedro Gómez Chaix*, (Málaga: np, 1918), pp. 6-9, 70-2.

[61] Gómez Chaix led the campaign for amnesty of a family convicted by a military court on flimsy evidence after violent disturbances provoked by *caciquista* malpractice at the election of 1914 in the town of Benagalbón: Pedro Gómez Chaix, *Los reos de Benagalbón: indulto reparador*, (Málaga: np, 1919).

[62] Antonio Nadal Sánchez, *Andalucía ante el advenimiento de la República: Coyuntura política y movimientos huelguísticos en la Málaga de 1930*, (Málaga: Universidad, 1981).

[63] On oligarchs in municipal politics, see, eg, Víctor M. Heredia-Flores, 'Municipalización y modernización del servicio de abastecimiento de agua en España: el caso de Málaga (1860-1930)', *Agua y Territorio*, 2013, 1, 103-18.

[64] *Vida Malagueña*, 19 April 1923.

[65] *Vida Malagueña*, 19 April 1923. On the English influence: Carlos Sambricio, 'La política urbana de Primo de Rivera: del plan regional a la política de casas baratas', *Ciudad y Territorio*, 54 (1982), 38-42.

[66] Article 1 of supplementary regulations of Ley de Casas Baratas, May 1921; Pedro Gómez Chaix, *Sociedades benéficas constructoras de casas baratas*, (Madrid: n.p, 1923), 5.

[67] José Luis Gómez Navarro, *El régimen de Primo de Rivera*, (Madrid: Cátedra, 1991), 501-7.

[68] Ben-Ami, *Fascism*, 95. Real Decreto, 'Estatuto Municipal', articles 150 (29), 153, 180, 211, 411, and section 13 ('Del repartimiento general'): *Gaceta de Madrid*, 69, 9 March 1924.

[69] María Dolores Ramos, 'Poder, Oligarquías y Somatenes en Málaga, 1919-1930', *Baética*, 10 (1987), 399-400.

[70] Gámez, Páez, and Jironda, 'Municipio y construcción', 166-9; Richard Gow, 'Patria and Citizenship: Miguel Primo de Rivera, *Caciques* and Military *Delegados*, 1923–1924', in Susana Bayó Belenguer and Nicola Brady (eds), *Pulling Together or Pulling Apart? Perspectives on Nationhood, Identity and Belonging in Europe*, (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2020), 147-175 (for continuity in corruption, even after state-led 'purges', see 157-64; Ben-Ami, *Fascism*, 100).

[71] Anthony McElligott, *Contested City: Municipal Politics and the rise of Nazism in Altona, 1917-1937*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 239-43.

[72] Vincent, *Spain*, 73.

[73] *Ayuntamiento de Málaga*, *Memoria*, (Málaga: np, 1931), 7-10.

[74] Martín Gaite, *Conde*, 27. The Plan General de Mejoras included roads and pavements, and drainage and sewars, etc, but – contrary to statute - work contracts were not awarded competitively and the Republican council elected in 1931 complained of being hamstrung by the debt.

[75] Royal Decree, 29 July 1925, *Gaceta de Madrid*, 5 August, 1925.

[76] Aunós, *La política social*, 42.

[77] Enrique Díaz-Retg, *España bajo el nuevo regimen: cinco años de gobierno Primo de Rivera, 1923-1928*, (Madrid: Mercurio, 1928), 390.

[78] Aunós, *La política social*, 40.

[79] *La Ciudad Jardín de Málaga en marzo de 1927*, (Málaga: Sur, 1927); *Vida Gráfica*, 1 March 1926.

[80] *La Construcción Moderna*, 15 June 1926.

[81] *Guía Oficial, 1930*, 84.

[82] On elite resistance to tax reform: Ben-Ami, *Fascism*, 23.

[83] *Memoria de la Cámara Oficial de la Propiedad Urbana de la Provincia de Málaga correspondiente al año 1930*, (Málaga: n.p, 1931), 36.

[84] Cámara Oficial de la Propiedad Urbana de Barcelona to Primo de Rivera, 26 May 1925, cited in Joel Rhys Baker, 'Anti-politics, infrastructure policy and civil society mobilisations in Spain under the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930)', PhD thesis, University of Sheffield, 2021, 95.

[85] Aristotle Kallis, '"Minimum Dwelling" All'italiana: From the Case Popolari to the 1929 "Model Houses" of Garbatella', *Journal of Urban History*, 46, 3 (2020), 603-21; Aunós, *La política social*, 57-8.

[86] *El Avisador Malagueño*, 7 February and 16 March 1892, cited, Antonio Albuera Guirnaldos, *Vida cotidiana en Málaga a fines del siglo XIX*, (Málaga: Agora, 1998), 107.

[87] *Rebelión*, año 1, 5/6, September 1930.

[88] *El Mar*, 17 October 1928; 1 October 1930.

[89] *El Mar*, 14 May 1930.

[90] *El Mar*, 20 August 1930; 11 September 1930; 24 September 1930.

[91] *El Mar*, 28 October 1928.

[92] The aim was modest: to maintain a supply of 50 litres of water per person daily. The healthy recommendation was 200 litres. See also Heredia-Flores, 'Municipalización y modernización'.

[93] *El Mar*, 14 May 1930.

[94] *El Mar*, 30 July 1930, 5; 13 August 1930, 2.

[95] *El Mar*, 11 September 1930.

[96] *El Mar*, 8 October 1930.

[97] See the call to all tenants' associations in *El Mar*, 14 May 1930; also *El Mar*, 13 August 1930; 11 September 1930; 1 October 1930.

[98] *Vida Gráfica*, 11 April 1932, for example.

[99] Eg. *El Mar*, 8 April 1931. Ayuntamiento de Málaga, *Memoria*, 1931, 34.

[100] *El Mar*, 8 April 1931.

[101] *La Unión Mercantil*, 12 April 1931.

[102] Archivo Municipal de Málaga (AMM), Actas del Ayuntamiento de Málaga, vol. 333, December 1929-August 1931, meeting 15 April 1931.

[103] *El Mar*, 29 April 1931.

[104] *Rebeldías*, año 1, no. 14, 31 August 1931.

[105] *Boletín de la Asociación de Vecinos de la Ciudad Jardín*, 3, August 1931.

[106] Juan Escolar García, *Memorables sucesos desarrollados en Málaga*, (Málaga: n.p, 1931).

[107] *Rebeldías*, año 1, no. 7, 24 May 1931; 21 June 1931.

[108] AMM, Actas de Málaga, meeting 15 May 1931.

[109] *El Mar*, 20 May 1931. Also 8 April 1931.

[110] *La Unión Mercantil*, 8 April 1931. On the role of the Sindicato de Construcción in the housing question: *El Popular*, 12 November 1932 and 22 November 1932, 4; 6 December 1932, 15.

[111] *El Popular*, 15 April 1933, 1, 5, 16.

[112] By decrees of 29 December 1931 (364) and 11 March 1932 (72): *Gaceta de Madrid*, 30 December 1931; 12 March 1932, although with no guarantee of enforcement.

[113] Eg. *Amanecer*, 6 January 1933, 3; 7 January 1933, 3.

[114] *Amanecer*, 8 January 1933, 2; *El Popular*, 13 January 1933, 2.

[115] *Amanecer*, 10 January 1933, 5.

[116] For example, *Amanecer*, 4 January 1933, 2. This was in fact the rental for the most basic units, whereas the lowest monthly mortgage repayments were almost twice as high (see table 1); it was alleged, 'sweeteners' also had to be paid.

[117] *ABC* (Seville), 13 February 1937.

[118] Antonio Nadal, *Guerra civil en Málaga*, (Málaga: Argúval, 1988), 228.

[119] *BOE*, Burgos, 252, 30 June 1937.

[120] *BOE*, 246, September 1941.

[121] *ABC* (Seville), 14 February 1937.

[122] Nadal, *Guerra civil*, 226.

[123] For the metaphor: Gneist, cited in H.S., Jones, *The French State in Question: Public Law and Political Argument in the Third Republic*, (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 5.

[124] Ramos Acosta, 'Problemas de enseñanza y de sanidad'.

[125] María del Carmen Ocaña Ocaña, *Atlas social de la ciudad de Málaga*, (Málaga: Universidad, 1984), 21-2.

[126] José Luis Arrese, *Málaga desde el punto de vista urbanístico*, (Málaga: n.p, 1941), 4.

Table 1: The Ciudad Jardín housing project, 1924: stages, typology, occupancy costs, and budget (in pesetas)

stages of construction	units	type of dwelling: purchase/"familial: F rent/"collective": C	number of dwellings	rent / month	mort-gage (20 year)	budget per unit	total budget	budget by stage
1st stage	100	"F" "family" basic	109	28.75	52.6	8,630	940,670	
	11	"F" integral	11	31.50	56.9	9,330	102,630	
	18	"F" complete	18	35.10	60.5	9,920	178,560	
	28	"F" complete II	28	43.75	80.1	13,130	367,640	
	40	"F" complete III	20	42.25	77.3	12,680	253,600	
	21	"F" superior	41	56.20	102	18,860	691,260	
	3	"C" "collective" I	54	28.7-57.4	-	195,580	586,740	
	1	"C" II	34	50.7-65.9	-	323,870	323,870	
	2	"C" III	42	23.90	-	241,370	482,740	3,927,710
2nd stage	101	"F" "family" basic	101	28.50	52.2	8,570	865,370	
	82	"F" integral	82	30.35	55.0	9,115	747,430	
	16	"F" complete	16	32.65	59.8	9,800	156,800	
	20	"F" complete II	20	42.85	78.4	12,860	257,200	
	9	"F" advanced	9	42.00	76.8	12,600	113,400	
	44	"F" superior	44	55.80	102	16,750	737,000	
	1	"C" "collective" I	18	28.7-57.4	-	194,520	194,520	3,071,920
3rd stage	148	"F" "family" basic	148	28.00	51.5	8,450	1,260,600	
	48	"F" integral	48	29.80	54.5	8,940	429,120	
	28	"F" complete	28	32.15	58.8	9,640	268,920	
	24	"F" complete II	24	42.25	77.3	13,660	327,840	
	16	"F" advanced	16	41.25	75.4	12,370	197,920	
	64	"F" superior	34	55.36	101	16,600	1,062,400	
	3	"C" "collective" I	54	28.7-57.4	-	193,570	580,710	4,117,510
Totals	834		1,049					11,117,140
Infrastructure costs								2,017,480
TOTAL								13,134,620
Summary	834 housing units projected = 1,049 dwellings: 222 for rent and 827 for purchase							

Adapted from Gonzalo Iglesias Sánchez–Solórzano, *Proyecto y memoria de casas baratas para Málaga*, (Málaga: np, 1924)

Table 2: Valuation and capital appreciation of land granted for development

stages of construction	size of plot (m²)	projected price (1924) [pesetas]	total projected value (1924)	price decreed, 1926	new total value (1926)	unearned capital appreciation
1st stage	36,512	3	109,537	7.33	267,750	158,213
2nd stage	37,063	2	74,126	5.12	189,862	115,735
3rd stage	43,602	1	43,602	1.9	82,745	39,143
park	176,958	2	353,916	4.7	837,601	483,685
TOTAL	294,135		581,181		1,377,958	796,776

Adapted from Ministerio de Trabajo, Comercio e Industria, Real Decreto, 7 May 1926, *Gaceta de Madrid*, 13 May 1926, pp. 858-63; Gámez Amián, Páez y Páez-Camino, and Jironda Crespillo, 'Municipio y construcción de viviendas', p. 179.

Table 3: Public finance, costs, and capital appreciation of the project

stages of construction	capital appreciation	total public finance	public help as % of appreciated capital	budget for each stage	public help as % of budget
1st stage	5,034	3,875	77	3,927,710	98.7
2nd stage	4,047	3,052	75	3,071,920	99.4
3rd stage	5,144	3,936	76	4,117,510	95.6
TOTAL	14,226,165	10,863,067	76	11,117,140	97.7

(Adapted from Ministerio de Trabajo, Comercio e Industria, Real Decreto, 7 May 1926, *Gaceta de Madrid*, 13 May 1926, pp. 858-63; Gámez Amián, Páez y Páez-Camino, and Jironda Crespillo, 'Municipio y construcción de viviendas', p. 178).