

Bridging the Gaps in Global Ethics: Grounded Cosmopolitan Praxis

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Global ethics as a field of study is a relatively new subject of discussion. When searching for it on the internet, the references to global ethics more often than not refer to a group of people who stand for a particular ethic which they would like to see globalized. Even sites that purport to study global ethics rather than impose them often have a religious motivation. There are, however, increasing numbers of people who engage with global ethics from a secular or a multi-faith perspective. These can either be based in philosophical argument and political thought or in the actions aimed at bringing about social transformation. Running through these two dividing lines 1) of comprehensive versus procedural engagement with Global ethics and 2) theoretical and practical forms of developing a position on global ethics, is a third one, namely 3) the central debate over the right balance between universalism and contextualism within global ethics.

The chapter is divided into several sections. First, I investigate the role of universalist and contextual theories in global ethics and argue for a balance between the two. In the next section, I use the example of the liberal-multicultural debate to show the relevance of looking for a balanced perspective. Finally, I present a method of ethical reflection to illustrate the practical possibilities of this balance between the core concerns of universalism and contextualism. I conclude that the importance of contextualism is in itself a universal value and universal principles always need to be expressed locally and embedded in particular behavior and practices. The dangers of the strong versions of either approach need to be avoided while the core concerns of both need to be preserved.

Universalism and Contextualism in Global Ethics

Universalism is widely regarded as a characteristic of any theory of global ethics, simply because of the focus on the global context in this field. Universalism has its historical roots in the cosmopolitanism of Ancient Greece where it contrasted with the focus on the scope of morality as within one city-state; in Christianity and Judaism there are references to universalism in the Golden Rule of ethics not to do onto others what one doesn't want to have done to oneself and the parable

of the good Samaritan; during the period of the Enlightenment universalism found its most famous expression in Kantian cosmopolitanism.

Contextualist or particularist perspectives on global ethics often developed either from a Realist perspective on power or from a critique of liberalism, specifically criticizing the universalizing project of liberalism that is present in cosmopolitanism. A major question raised in the debates on global ethics is to what extent can the global political context be moral? Longstanding disagreements in International Relations have included major contests between Neo-realism and normative International Relations (Booth, Dunne and Cox 2001). Liberal cosmopolitans hold that the global order is a rightful subject to moral argument, whereas (Neo-)realists emphasize the right and even duty of nation-states to first protect "their own" citizens. Contextualist critiques of universalism have usually held that the appropriate local context of culture, politics and morals was overlooked. Moreover, the calls for global justice were interpreted as hierarchically trumping justice at home. Cosmopolitanism has in particular been criticized for demanding forms of solidarity across borders which are simply not feasible in the current global context (Miller 1995).

In the debate on the possibility of global norms including the justification of human rights, universalism is also frequently criticized by relativism or particularism. (Wilson and Mitchell 2003). These objections to universalism can be found in various forms in a range of approaches. Critical theorists object mainly to abstract impartiality for its implicit support for the dominant power in the status quo; instead, it favors a critical stance for social change which includes support for the powerless (Jones D. 1999). Postmodernism centres mainly on the essentialist nature of universalism, which generalizes a minority experience as if it was applicable to all; it argues instead for deconstructing existing discourses and exposing the role of language in perpetuating power differences (Critchley 1992, 1999). Feminism is critical of universalism as it has left out women's concerns in the past by generalizing male experiences. Feminist proposals for contextualizing emphasize particularity and argue for situating women in their specific social contexts rather than focusing on them as genderless individuals (Hutchings in Dower and Williams 2002). In addition some feminists have proposed to add a concept of care to universalist theories of global justice in order to avoid the disconnected trace of impartiality (Robinson 2006). Post-colonial theory contributes to the debate by being critical of liberal cosmopolitan universalism for its bias towards the West, again taking their own experience as most important, while excluding the perspective of non-Western people(s) as a result of its history of colonialism and later forms of imperialism (Grovgui 1996, 2006). Post-development theory rejects the hierarchical theories of development that use the term as if part of a civilizing mission (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). All these criticisms of universalism have their own specific angle and propose different ways forward. Yet, despite their differences, contextualists have in common that they emphasize the particular, the context, the interrelatedness of people and of people with the non-human environment as well as (in most cases) attention for power relations and structural inequalities. In addition, as will be expanded on in the next section on liberalism and multiculturalism, contextualists aim for

inclusion of minorities which requires recognition of difference beyond liberal toleration.

So far, moving in the direction of contextualism looks pretty attractive as it involves addressing the historical inequalities at least ignored and at worst perpetuated by liberal cosmopolitanism. However, this image of particularism leaves out three important contested elements in the debate between universalism and contextualism. Firstly, it does not recognize that the strongest versions of cultural relativism lead to political inaction and therefore run the risk of perpetuating the status quo instead of challenging power relations. Secondly, where particularism leads to political stances, as in Critical Theory, there is always also a universalist value at the heart of the approach: justice, care or autonomy are universalizing projects whether they are labelled liberal or critical. Thirdly, many critics of liberalism end up viewing their approach as complementary as they still adhere to at least part of the liberal project in terms of freedom, human rights, equality or democracy. To some extent the contextualists have accepted this and some therefore make a move towards pragmatism in response (Rorty, in Shute and Hurley 1993) or postmodernism where the contradiction between holding liberal values while criticizing liberalism for its lack of foundations is overcome by no longer claiming any ultimate justification for a liberal stance. Therefore, shifting all the way into a particularist version of contextualism, has connotations that are potentially as bad or worse than blind and unspecific universalism that pretends the views and experiences of one historically dominant group reflect what is relevant to all of humanity. The best way forward would be to find a balance between the concerns with strong universalism while not giving in to the risks of strong contextualism. There is some evidence in the literature that other people, too, are looking for a middle way to try to include the core concerns of both approaches (Erskine 2000; Beitz in Brock and Moellendorf 2005). This is sometimes viewed as a consensus on a minimum of common values or is presented as a strategic choice in order to create the broadest coalition. However, I view the middle way as an acknowledgment of the importance of the core concerns in both perspectives and not necessarily minimizing these concerns. The precise conceptualization of the middle way is important to debate in more detail. Jack Donnelly's work on universal human rights sketches a universalist approach which allows for contextual interpretation (Donnelly 1989). This may function as an example for the kind of balance that is possible between universalism and contextualism more generally. In order to illustrate the need for contextualizing the universal project of liberal cosmopolitanism, and to develop a more precise picture of the middle way between universalism and contextualism, let me now elaborate on the example of the debate between liberalism and multiculturalism on the question of developing the principles of either approach into global norms.

The Example of Liberalism versus Multiculturalism

To sum up, we saw in the previous section that there is a need in global ethics to find a balance between the core concerns of contextualism and universalism.

Neither are satisfactory without taking into account the other. The debate between liberals and multiculturalists reflects this stand-off on universalism and contextualism in more than one way. Within one society they disagree over the relevance of group identities; on a global scale they each defend a universalist or a contextualist approach to global norms protecting minorities.

First of all, the concept of multiculturalism is used in two very different ways. The descriptive use of the term is relevant for all societies that consist of more than one cultural group; liberals and multiculturalists agree that this circumstance is increasing within societies (Kelly 2003). Due to increased migration, most societies consist now (if not before) of several communities with different values due to either differences in ethnicity, religion, nationality or culture. Multiculturalism meaning the circumstances for intercultural dialogue is also used to refer to the perceived need to communicate peacefully with other cultures as represented by nation-states. Especially the opening up of the Chinese market and the Chinese streams of travellers, students, businesspeople and migrants lead to engagement with this type of concern. The second use of the term is in a normative prescription of how to address these differences through public policy and formal human, minority and citizenship rights. These two meanings will both be relevant in this chapter.

In the discussion on how to treat cultural differences liberals advocate toleration of individual differences as a basic human right to live autonomously and free from (unnecessary) state interference whereas the multiculturalist approach would argue on the one hand for more than that: cultural differences require not simply acceptance as legal, but recognition as of equal value to the mainstream cultural practices of the (local) majority. Yet, on the other hand, multiculturalists may be allowing less individual freedom in cases where group identities lead to strong imposition of values by the group on the individual.

A further dispute between the two approaches relates to how differences in identity should be translated into the law. According to Parekh, acceptance of differences requires changes in the legal arrangements of liberal democracies. Respect for differences also requires changes in attitudes and ways of thought. And sometimes it may mean public affirmation of differences by symbolic or other means (Parekh 2000: 2). This would go against the liberal model of dealing with value pluralism which has been to invoke the public private distinction and to be guided by the liberal theory of toleration. The principle of toleration means that one has to tolerate what is not harmful to others even if one strongly disagrees with it or even if one is deeply upset by it. Toleration, according to multiculturalists, gives the impression that the offending behavior is not valued as much as the typical behavior in the mainstream culture. Therefore, in order to move beyond toleration, multiculturalists argue for public recognition in the form of language rights and public holidays on important days for minority festivals and religious celebrations, for example. This is all in order to recognize differences as positive (Kymlicka and Wayne 2000: 25–9).

For most liberals, this goes against one of their core values and the main principle of liberalism: universality. Brian Barry, for example, holds that “universalistic moral ideas alone make sense of efforts to enforce human rights

and punish violators of them” (Barry 2000: 5). Susan Mendus, too, argues in favor of a liberal model of toleration emphasizing that there is a need to recognize the similarity between people rather than the difference (Mendus 1999: 9). This further illustrates the gap between contextualist multiculturalists and universalist liberals.

In response to the multiculturalist critique of liberalism, liberals have also formulated several criticisms of multiculturalism. They maintain that it holds on to a static understanding of culture and a conservative and essentialist view of the main representation of a culture (Wilson and Mitchell 2003). Some liberals are principally against group rights, and defend only individual rights. Waldron, for example, argues that the aim of protecting existing cultures is equivalent to creating a new Disneyland (Waldron in Kymlicka 1995). However, several liberals incorporate notions of group rights in their approach. Barry, for example, develops a liberal theory of group rights which includes exemptions and special measures like quotas but justified on the basis of individual rights. He accepts that liberal formal rights have not brought equality in the countries that have adopted the liberal model, and therefore accepts the need for affirmative action programmes “to help groups whose members suffer systematic disadvantage,” as long as the “disadvantage” is defined in universal terms—as the lack of things (resources and opportunities) whose possession would generally be agreed to be advantageous” (Barry 2000: 12). In Barry’s view, these group rights for special treatment should only be temporary, for as long as the disadvantage lasts. Caney, too, defends a liberal model of human rights and equality of opportunity. However, he moves on even further and argues for the protection of people’s cultural interests (Caney in Kelly 2003).

The central area of disagreement is therefore not over group rights versus individual rights, but over the grounds on which group rights could be justified and the area in which group rights ought to be established. Most liberals would agree to group rights on the basis of unfair disadvantage in socio-economic terms and do not require all voluntary associations to comply with liberal principles (Barry in Kelly 2003: 232–3). Yet others, like Caney, think they could also be justified on the grounds of cultural difference and therefore apply to the area of cultural rights (Caney in Kelly 2003). Donnelly, too, aims to create a model of universal human rights that takes into account the need for local interpretations (Donnelly 1989, 1997). Moreover, recent textbooks on human rights now include entries on faith-based and regional conceptions of human rights (Smith and van den Anker 2005).

Having set out the major disagreement between liberals and multiculturalists, let us now look into a possible synthesis between liberalism and multiculturalism as an example of a balance between contextualism and universalism. Kymlicka has developed a perspective which he calls liberal multiculturalism. He views multiculturalism as “a response to the pressure that Canada exerts on immigrants to integrate into common institutions” (Kymlicka 1998: 40). He clearly puts the pressure to assimilate at the centre of the debate of multiculturalism. The renegotiation of the terms of integration between minorities and the majority in

order to make them fairer on immigrants is the key focus of multiculturalism, according to Kymlicka.

In conclusion, the debate between liberals and multiculturalists has resulted in the opening up of a space for theorists who aim to bring together what they consider to be the most important elements of both models of minority rights and citizenship. On the one hand, liberals have clarified their position on group rights, acknowledging that trying to ignore cultural and racial differences is paramount to accepting discrimination. Yet, the central role for culture and recognition argued for by liberal multiculturalists is still contested. It invokes critiques from both sides; it is not universalist enough for liberals and not contextual enough for multiculturalists. In addition, politically there is a strong tendency to turn back multiculturalist measures and to insist more on universal compliance with liberal laws. This is partly due to the increased xenophobia in Western societies and partly to relevant concerns with individual human rights being violated within minority communities. Therefore, the most promising position is to adapt a liberal model to include claims of culture with the proviso of individual human rights not being violated by extending group rights. This is a good example of the balance that can be and needs to be found between universalism and contextualism.

In order to link this argument on the balance between universalism and contextualism to the point on the interdependence of theory and practice in global ethics I will now move onto the discussion of a method of ethical reflection that again involves a mix between contextualism and universalism. Recently I showed that the implementation of the Durban agenda at the level of national laws is usefully complemented by the work of local NGOs towards combating ethnic discrimination. Politicians cannot create sustainable change without supporting NGOs that engage with (young) people in informal settings. I illustrated that the claims of multiculturalism for specific forms of group rights run into difficulties from being a top-down initiative. The groundwork of building different attitudes towards people from different ethnic backgrounds still needs to be done and especially in the region of post-communist Europe, the building of the rule of law and liberal democracy rightly takes precedence over more demanding claims of groups rights, autonomy for minorities and so on. However, there are several ways in which the local work adds the emphasis of respect and recognition for different cultures and also for the importance of preserving languages and cultures (van den Anker 2007).

The implications of this type of work for the global context of multiculturalism are potentially huge. Although this is a micro-political approach, it could influence policy outcomes exponentially once initiated in some of the larger organizations and institutions active globally. Moreover, links between multiculturalism, theories of identity and cosmopolitanism are increasingly important in global political theory, especially in areas of the fair distribution of resources and peaceful relations (Appiah 2005).

Theory and Practice

This chapter presents global ethics both as a theoretical method to debate philosophical positions and as a form of engaged activism for social transformation. In the previous section I showed that a micro-political approach of working with local actors is beneficial to implementing and interpreting universal moral and legal norms like human rights. In this section I want to elaborate on the detail of this methodological component of global ethics by elaborating on the link between an academic approaches and practitioner's engagement in intellectual and emotional reflection. The field of global ethics distinguishes itself from the existing global justice debate, not only that it is multidisciplinary, engaging with wider ethical issues in the context of globalization rather than global poverty and inequality only and in giving relevance to practitioners' and lay people's experiences as ethical reflectors as well as actors. Moreover, in many debates, academic reflection would not be relevant without input from practice and we might even argue that the theoretical and the practical are not as distinct as they are often presented, for example, in the term "applied ethics." Ethics as other theoretical perspectives are developed as a lens on practice and as such are influenced by it. We may usefully employ the term praxis to express this interdependence. Global ethics should therefore engage with practitioners and "life-experts," in order to have relevance and in the processes of ethical reflection and sense-making of a wide range of people. Historically, one form of methodology that has aimed to do this is *Action research* which intertwines community activity and research in order to make research relevant to the communities involved. This involves ensuring that communities have an input into the project so that it researches something useful to the community. Often specific injustices to communities have been the justification for action research projects. It also means that the results need to be fed back into the community in an accessible way, including guidance for action to redress the injustice researched. Action research has been used in education since the early 1970s and has created space for the active involvement of learners in creating social change. Issues of gender inequality and racial or ethnic discrimination have been at the heart of action research. Recently, some advocates of action research have incorporated the notion of a constructed reality into the approach. In a recent project, reflection on how identities are used politically and could be constructed and deconstructed was part of the research and workshop activities proposed (van den Anker 2007). Global ethics can use this approach to build local capacity, to facilitate local empowerment and to ensure relevance of projects to target groups.

A second relevant methodology to bridge the gap between theory and practice in global ethics is the basic theory of *re-evaluation counselling*. Building on an impressive amount of work done by the Re-evaluation Counselling Communities and the recently established NGO United to End Racism, I designed and implemented with a team of colleagues and practitioners a project that aimed to support existing initiatives in combating racism, xenophobia and discrimination by introducing some simple and effective tools to practitioners and others interested

in ending all forms of discrimination (van den Anker 2007). These tools are based on several key insights, developed in the practice of this form of co-counselling. The main idea is that people don't function effectively and authentically when they act on the basis of old hurtful experiences. Their functioning improves dramatically when they have a chance to emotionally release these old hurts. This type of release is greatly helped by a process that starts out as simply taking turns in listening. Through practice and learning from more experienced counsellors and from the Re-evaluation counselling literature this mechanism can be made more complex and people can be even more effective in helping others to work through their emotional barriers to achieve powerful and effective functioning.

The initial process of co-counselling consists simply of taking equal length turns in listening and being listened to in pairs or small groups. If the group gets any larger than about eight people, the group can either split or people can work in pairs. The topic can be left to the speaker or can be set beforehand. Effective listening implies that the listener refrains from commenting, drawing the conversation to his or her own experiences or from asking curious questions. Instead, an attentive listener shows they are pleased with the person talking, encourages the speakers and makes eye contact. Sometimes it is found helpful if the listener touches the speaker or holds hands. This depends on the level of trust that already exists between the participants.

The speaker will, once enough trust has been built, begin to show their deeply felt feelings on the issue at hand; for example in our type of activity, when asked if they have experienced discrimination. Emotions can be expressed through energetic, non-repetitive talking but also through yawning, crying, laughing or shaking. These outwards signs of emotional release all relate to specific areas of feeling, such as sadness or loss, fear, or physical recovery. In many cultures these signs of the emotional healing process will be confused with the actual hurt and therefore interrupted. We have all been told not to cry, not to laugh too loudly, or not to be afraid. By being stopped from expressing our feelings from an early age it becomes more difficult to think clearly in particular areas. As we don't heal from hurts, we experience confusion and may fall into behavior that is not an accurate response to a new situation, which is the definition of intelligence, according to counselling theory. These cases where we react as if we are repeating an old situation are called distress patterns. For example, if someone with particular features has hurt us, we may react scared to new people who look similar to us. Or if we have been upset during a particular type of weather, this weather may make us sad in future. We may also develop behavior that seems positive to try and relive a past experience that left us feeling good. In the context of ethnic discrimination it is very important to recognize that stereotypes are not intelligent behavior, as they are not based on accurate information about the new situation.

Fortunately, we can recover from hurts and reclaim our intelligence completely even long after the initial upset. This is why encouraging people to express and release emotions are the basic approach of re-evaluation counselling. By taking turns listening while appreciating the person speaking, we can all return to our natural healing process and recover our intelligence.

This basic theory shows that some universal principles of human psychology can be used in culturally sensitive ways, as the person using the tool of listening and reflecting brings with them a particular context on which they are reflecting. In order to show that this type of approach is relevant to global ethics, let's look in more detail at the theory of how people get hurt.

In addition to this basic theory of recovering from past hurt through taking turns listening, co-counsellors developed a theory on how this process can be useful in combating oppressions. The first recognition that people did not only have individual, personal hurts, but that they were hurt systematically according to their identities, was in the context of women's oppression. Several counsellors were active in the women's movement in the early 1970s and they started to speak out about the specific ways in which they had been hurt as women. Counsellors then got together in groups based on specific identities, such as men, women, Jews, Black people, and later on owning class, middle class and working class. They discovered that a lot of the areas where they could not think freshly due to past hurt were related to these identities. In order to recover from these hurts, they developed specific questions to ask about identities that were helpful in recovering from these hurts. A specific term developed in co-counselling for the distress patterns people developed due to their identities was internalized oppression. This means that the message from the stereotype starts to be believed to be true of oneself or of others of one's group. In the words of Suzanne Lipsky:

internalized oppression is this turning upon ourselves, upon our families, and upon our own people the distress patterns that result from the racism and oppression of the majority society. (Lipsky 1987: 3)

An example of internalized oppression is for ethnic minority children to believe that majority children are more beautiful, intelligent or attractive than they are. Another example is the criticism of members of a group on each other, which prevents them from collaborating for social change.

Another discovery was that people who acted out stereotypes were also hurt in particular ways. Although everyone has a responsibility to counteract and work towards ending oppression, the majority group that acts out discrimination is not personally to blame. Arrogance and prejudice are not natural characteristics of human beings; these attitudes are learnt behavior. It is well-known that children from families with prejudice will have more stereotypes than children from less discriminatory families. What re-evaluation counselling worked out is that in order to hurt others one must first be hurt oneself. The process of taking on board discriminatory attitudes is painful for the child itself. It means losing friends who are different because parents forbid playing with them. And it means remaining separate from the groups that one discriminates against. This in itself is a loss since the child's social circle is impoverished as a result.

A story told in *Ripples of Hope* (Weissglass 1999: 110) includes the following:

When I was about seven, I made friends with a girl in my class who was African American. I brought her home one day. We were three playing for a while and I gave

her something to drink. After she left, my mother threw the glass away, (crying) She couldn't explain to me (pause, crying) ... Other things I will forgive her for, but that I won't. She said I couldn't play with her anymore. And I guess I just gave in. I was young and didn't know what to do. She tried to say that these people lived in these projects and they had diseases. She went on and on about this kind of stuff. ... It just didn't make sense to me. She was a nice child, she didn't seem any different from me. I was poor, too.

Fortunately, the counselling process also works on these so-called oppressor patterns. The same natural healing process will lead to recovery if people are effectively listened to and appreciated. This assists them to reclaim their full intelligence and allows them to make good connections to all humans. In counselling workshops we have done a lot of work on relationship building between oppressed and oppressor groups, like men and women, owning class and working class people. Outside counselling, many organizations have discovered the powerful nature of building relationships for example between a rapist and their victim, or between Jews and Germans. This is potentially very powerful in the struggle against ethnic discrimination and xenophobia. It means that when people act on stereotypes they need to be listened to with appreciation and they can be assisted in building successful relationships with the people they thought less off. In one of our workshops we had a powerful example of someone who used to hold strong prejudicial views. Everyone was moved to hear the story of this person when he showed how much better he felt now that he had let those beliefs go.

I have used this model to argue for a specific model of conflict resolution (Global society, October 2000) and for a way to work on overcoming our hesitancy to end capitalism (Globalizations, September 2005). I have also used it to develop work on ending ethnic discrimination, racism and xenophobia in former Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet-Union. Here I worked with local NGO trainers, pupils and teachers.

Questions asked were for example:

- For members of minorities:
 - 1) Who are your people?
 - 2) What is good/are you proud of about being x ...?
 - 3) What is difficult ...?
 - 4) What is difficult about being a woman x ...?
 - 5) What do you never want to hear again?
- For members of the majority:
 - 1) Who are your people?
 - 2) What is good/are you proud of about being x?
 - 3) What is difficult?
 - 4) What do you never want to hear again
 - 5) How did you learn there were other people than x?
 - 6) What prejudices did you learn about these people?

In the case of majority members it is important to emphasize that we are not after guilt and we are not to blame. Everyone has always done the best they can; oppression is learnt behavior and it probably took some bribing and punishing before someone submitted to hurting another human being. Several members of majority groups have reported that their friendships in early life with members of minority groups have been separated forcefully. They also report fighting against the prejudice they learnt but giving in at some point.

My work with these methods is an important illustration of the need to engage with current issues, the need to give space to "altern" voices while bringing in methods and approaches that enable this. It also relates to the discussion on the requirement of a reflective equilibrium to be prepared to change one's viewpoints; the element of learning through hearing others' stories is of key importance in this work.

Global ethics will be greatly helped by people increasingly taking turns listening and being allowed to express hurtful emotions and so free up thinking and action towards creating just societies and a just world. There will be more caring expressed and more respect for difference as a result. This fits in with both contextualism and universalism. These types of practical ethical reflections in global ethics could also be a space for reflecting on what a just world would look like; despite the recent calls for minimalism, I see an important role for holding out what justice requires even if there is currently not the motivation to put it into practice.

Working as Teachers and Trainers for Justice

Our roles as educators working for social change are in itself worth addressing in our work with co-counselling tools. We play an important role in this process and it is useful to take some time to reflect on ourselves from this perspective. Our identities as academics, teachers and activists bring particular prejudice and oppression from society. These come to us through others (school leaders, parents, our families and friends) but we also carry internalized oppression. Some common distress patterns concern criticism and competition: we find it hard to be pleased with what we do, it is never good enough and we criticize others for their approach. We may not take enough rest and get angry and upset with the rest of society for not moving quickly enough. As social change activists we are described as idealistic, naive, utopian and Pollyannas. In many societies social change activists are or have been in the recent past at risk of imprisonment and violence as well as death. This creates fear and hampers our freedom of thought and expression; it puts a toll on our flexible thinking. It is important to discharge, or emotionally release, feelings about ourselves and others in this group. This is in line with Asunción St Clair's call for academic activism (see St Clair's chapter in this volume); the RC approach will prevent us from easy burn out and perpetual disappointment or even cynicism.

In this chapter I reflected on the role in global ethics for universalism and contextualism and held out that they are both important. By looking at the example of liberalism versus multiculturalism, I worked out the ingredients for a useful balance between the two.

In the second part of the chapter I discussed a method of ethical reflection based on re-evaluation counselling. I argued that using this method adds to the aim of global ethics to contribute to healing, self-development and social transformation in the institutional and personal spheres reminiscent of the Stoics' call for philosophy as a force for healing and social transformation.

The recent development of global ethics into a recognized field of study with its own journal and annual conference is hopeful in that awareness can be developed more widely. Yet, the responsibility of Global ethicists in academia is to ensure that their work is engaged, in that it contributes to social change, and reflexive in its awareness of who it excludes. This means that the liberal cosmopolitan agenda needs to engage more with contextualism as well as structural injustice of the current system of global politics and its disciplining discourses on politics, economics and law than it currently does.

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