@article { , title = {A multiple price approach to limiting intra-group transfer pricing negotiations}, abstract = {Various approaches to solving the well-known transfer pricing problem are known. However, none satisfactorily resolve the objective of allowing both divisions to earn a profit in such a way that sub-optimal output levels are avoided. Tomkins (1990) combines a single cost-plus transfer price with a pragmatic process of negotiation. That model is excellent when the source division’s target contribution is ‘small’. However, its practical value is limited if the target contribution is ‘close’ to 50\%, because a disproportionate level of negotiation is required. In certain circumstances a high level of negotiation may be costly, contrary to the organisational culture, or strategic imperatives. In this paper, Tomkins’ model is developed by introducing multiple transfer prices. By using just a few transfer prices, it is possible to guarantee that the proportion of group contribution over which negotiation is required does not exceed 1\%, thereby reducing the risk of managers taking advantage of unequal power.}, issn = {2163-3843}, issue = {2}, journal = {International Journal of Management Accounting}, publicationstatus = {Published}, publisher = {Nova Science Publishers}, url = {https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/974823}, volume = {3}, keyword = {transfer pricing, negotiation, Tomkins’ model, Samuels’ model}, year = {2010}, author = {Luther, Robert and Zverovich, Svetlana} }