**THE BLUE CARD DIRECTIVE: THE EU'S GREEN CARD?**

Highly skilled immigrants are considered to be “sort after” individuals. They provide countries with skilled labour often, if they originate from developing or least developed countries, with significantly less wage demands than similarly skilled domestic workers. Furthermore they provide an attractive solution to skills’ shortages in the labour market of western States. Schemes to encourage this type of immigration have a long history, with the most well known example being the US H-1B visa system for non-immigrant temporary workers. Member States of the European Union have also operated similar schemes but it is only recently that the EU itself has entered this field with the adoption of Directive 2009/50/EC[[1]](#footnote-1), the “Blue Card” Directive. This paper will briefly examine the details of the Directive, its aims and objectives and its interaction with other EU policy areas. It will also investigate the details of the US H-1B scheme. A critique of the Blue Card will be provided by determining whether the aims and objectives can be achieved, comparing it with the position in the US and considering the prospects for the success of the Blue Card.

The Blue Card Directive was adopted on 25 May 2009, with a final Member State transposition date of 19 June 2011. The Directive itself, or at least the concept behind it, has a longer back story. In 1997 the Commission put forward a proposal[[2]](#footnote-2) for a Council Act to adopt a Convention for the first admission and residence of third country nationals (henceforth TCNs) to the Member States under the intergovernmental provisions of the Third Pillar of the TEU, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). With the transfer of much of the JHA provisions into the EC Treaty, the supranational First Pillar, at the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the Commission tried again with another proposal in 2001[[3]](#footnote-3), this time for a Directive. Unfortunately the scope of this proposal covered all TCNs seeking labour and the difficult question as to who had competence to determine first entry to the territory of a Member State went to the heart of the issue of national sovereignty. As such the proposal failed to garner enough support in the Council and was withdrawn in 2006. The Commission rethought its policy, adopted two Directives on the adoption of TCNs for the purposes of study[[4]](#footnote-4) and scientific research[[5]](#footnote-5) and issued a Communication in 2005 outlining a Policy Plan for Legal Migration[[6]](#footnote-6). This Policy Plan split the field covered by the 2001 proposal into sections in an attempt to adopt the legislation required for each section in an incremental manner. The five resulting categories[[7]](#footnote-7) included that of highly qualified migrant workers and the Commission duly issued a proposal[[8]](#footnote-8) for a Directive in this area that culminated in the Blue Card Directive.

**Details of the Blue Card Directive**

Article 1 sets out the purpose of the Directive, being to provide the conditions of entry and residence of highly qualified TCNs and their families for longer than three months into a Member State’s territory and subsequent Member States, and Article 2 provides definitions of terms in the Directive. The key provisions for a TCN to obtain a Blue Card are contained in Articles 3 and 5. The scope outlined in Article 3(1) is straightforward until the derogations in paragraph 2. There are ten exempted classes of individuals, some of which are reasonable, expected and covered by other EU legislation (TCNs migrating to the EU to study[[9]](#footnote-9), conduct scientific research[[10]](#footnote-10), as family members of Union citizens who have exercised their free movement rights[[11]](#footnote-11), posted workers[[12]](#footnote-12) and long-term resident TCNs[[13]](#footnote-13)) whilst others raise concern. These include beneficiaries of international[[14]](#footnote-14) or temporary protection and seasonal workers. It is possible that these individuals could be highly qualified and fulfil the criteria for a Blue Card but the rights associated with having a Blue Card are denied them merely because of their status. The term ‘seasonal workers’ is not defined in Article 2 and therefore the rights associated with the acquisition of a Blue Card can be circumvented by classifying an individual as a ‘seasonal worker’. The third exemption of concern is for TCNs whose expulsion has been suspended because of fact or law. The term ‘suspended’ would appear to indicate the expulsion to be temporary but again the Directive does not provide a definition. Both the terms ‘seasonal worker’ and ‘suspended’ may well require interpretation by the ECJ.

Article 5 lays out the criteria for admission, with paragraph 1 specifying the necessary documentary evidence. Paragraph 3 outlines a wage threshold for TCNs where the migrant’s gross annual salary must be at least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary as determined and published by that Member State. This salary threshold can be reduced through the derogation in paragraph 5 to 1.2 for employment in professions in particular need of TCN workers and which belong to the major groups 1 and 2 of the International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO-88), those groups consisting of legislators, senior officials and managers, and professionals. This final wording of the salary threshold was half that suggested in the original proposal. Furthermore, the derogation in proposed Article 6 for graduate TCNs less than 30 years of age was completely removed. It should be noted that the Member States retain the right under Article 6 to control the volume of admission of highly qualified TCNs entering its territory.

Chapter III, Articles 7 to 11, concern the procedural elements of issuing the Blue Card, grounds for refusal, withdrawal or non-renewal and procedural safeguards.

The rights that come with the Blue Card are contained in Chapter IV. Access to the labour market is contained in Article 12 with a restrictive approach for the first two years of legal employment that requires the conditions of Article 5 to be met and changes in employment only allowed with the prior authorisation in writing of the competent authorities of the host Member State. After two years the Member State has the discretion to grant equal treatment with nationals for access to highly qualified employment but if it does not the TCN concerned must communicate changes that affect the conditions of Article 5 to the host Member State’s competent authorities, in accordance with domestic procedures. A public service restriction on access to the labour market can be retained by the Member States, as can restrictions reserving employment to nationals, Union citizens or EEA citizens in accordance with national or Community law. Loss of employment cannot automatically lead to withdrawal of the Blue Card, unless unemployment lasts for longer than three months, or if it occurs more than once during the period of validity of the Blue Card (Article 13). Article 14 provides a right of equal treatment for Blue Card holders with nationals of the host Member State in regards to: working conditions; trade union rights; education and vocational training; recognition of qualifications; social security; State pension; access to public goods and services; and, free movement within the host Member State’s territory. Member States can limit this right to equal treatment when it comes to study and maintenance grants and access to further and higher education may be subject to specific prerequisites as specified by domestic law. The Family Reunification Directive[[15]](#footnote-15) provides the appropriate rights for families of Blue Card holders, according to Article 15, with a number of minor amendments and the Long Term Residence Directive is also to apply, but again with derogations set out in Article 16. Importantly the five year continuous residence requirement in the host Member State in Article 4(1) of the LTR TCN Directive is reduced to two years, with five years of continuous legal residence in the territory of the EU as a Blue Card holder.

A limited right to move between Member States is provided for in Chapter V, although the limited nature of this right must be noted, such that there is no right to free movement. After 18 months of legal employment in the first Member State, the Blue Card holder and his family may move to another Member State to take up further highly qualified employment. A full application must be made again to the second Member State’s authorities who determine whether to approve the application or not. Such an application can be made within a month of moving to the second Member State, that can refuse to allow the applicant to work until a decision has been taken, or from the first Member State. If the application is refused, and this can be on the basis of the volumes of admission in accordance with Article 6, the first Member State must immediately readmit the Blue Card holder and family members without formalities.

**Problems**

The aims and objectives of the Directive are set out in the Recitals, but are expanded in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission’s proposal[[16]](#footnote-16) and an Impact Assessment[[17]](#footnote-17) issued by the Commission at the same time as the proposal. The Impact Assessment located the problem[[18]](#footnote-18) that needed to be addressed in the demographic trend across the EU such that by 2050 the working age population would shrink by 48 million and the dependency ratio (OAPs to workers of working age) would double to 51%. Thus when setting this problem in the context of the requirements of the Lisbon Strategy[[19]](#footnote-19) and the Hague Programme[[20]](#footnote-20), the employment of highly qualified TCNs within the EU became an attractive option. As such the Impact Assessment identified[[21]](#footnote-21) that legally resident TCN highly skilled workers (henceforth HSWs) within the EU had much higher rates of unemployment than EU national HSWs and so the first option ought to be to utilise this unused employment potential[[22]](#footnote-22). However, this would be unlikely to cure the principle problem of the demographic trend especially when coupled with the difficulties of geographic mobility to adjust labour demand and supply at relatively short notice, an adjustment better suited to immigrant labour to satisfy[[23]](#footnote-23). When comparing the attractiveness for TCN HSWs of the EU to other developed countries the Impact Assessment, with respect to the average rate of employment, stated “the EU (with a value of 1.72%) definitely lags behind the performance of all the other main immigration countries, such as Australia (9.9%), Canada (7.3%), USA (3.2%) and Switzerland (5.3%)”[[24]](#footnote-24). Finally the legislative framework recognised by the Impact Assessment was fragmented with all Member States having some special schemes for TCN HSWs with enhanced rights but only 10[[25]](#footnote-25) going further than scientists, artists, intra-corporate transferees, researchers and university professors[[26]](#footnote-26). Of these 10 Member States all had different definitions, entry and residence conditions, although all schemes were demand driven.

**Aims and Objectives of the Blue Card Directive**

The Impact Assessment therefore identified[[27]](#footnote-27) 2 global objectives: to improve the EU’s ability to attract and retain TCN HSWs; and, to effectively and swiftly respond to labour demands for highly qualified labour and offset skill shortages, by encouraging TCN HSW immigration and circulation within the EU. These general objectives were complimented by specific aims: to develop a coherent approach and common immigration policy on TCN HSWs; to increase the numbers of TCN HSWs immigrating to the EU on a needs-based approach; to simplify and harmonise admission procedures for TCN HSWs; to promote TCN HSWs’ social and economic integration; and, to foster intra-EU mobility, remove unnecessary barriers and allow a more efficient allocation of TCN HSWs through the EU.

**Interaction with other EU Policy Areas**

At the same time that the approach behind the Blue Card Directive was being formulated and the objectives being set an alternative consideration was being explored, first generally, and rather tentatively, by the Council in its document Global Approach to Migration[[28]](#footnote-28), and then by the Commission over the concept of Circular Migration[[29]](#footnote-29). In the Communication, the Commission sets out a proposed balancing exercise to fulfil the labour needs of Member States against the effects of “brain drain” in developing countries[[30]](#footnote-30) with the Blue Card Directive placed at the heart of Circular Migration[[31]](#footnote-31). This new concept of Circular Migration was to be augmented by Mobility Partnerships, Return Agreements and dialogue with third countries.

**The US System**

It is often considered that the direct equivalent of the Blue Card in the US is the Green Card but this is a fallacy. The US immigration system identifies two types of entrants into the USA, immigrants and non-immigrants. Immigrants are those individuals seeking permanent residence and naturalisation and these individuals are issued with a Green Card. The system that is equivalent to the EU Blue Card is that dealing with the temporary resident, highly-skilled, non-immigrant – the so called H-1B category of alien[[32]](#footnote-32), named after the type of visa that is issued. The aims and objectives of this category of residence are not set out in the INA but it can be assumed to be similar to those of the Blue Card and it enables employees to employ foreign workers in “speciality occupations” for three years[[33]](#footnote-33) that can be extended to six[[34]](#footnote-34). Speciality occupations are defined as requiring “theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge”[[35]](#footnote-35) and “attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific speciality (or its equivalent) as a minimum”[[36]](#footnote-36). Somewhat confusingly the requirements of a speciality occupation are then restated in slightly different terms as “full state licensure to practice in the occupation, if such licensure is required to practice in the occupation”[[37]](#footnote-37) and “completion of the degree”[[38]](#footnote-38) previously described. The requirement for a degree though can be set aside if the applicant for a visa has “experience in the speciality equivalent to the completion of such degree”[[39]](#footnote-39) and “recognition of expertise in the speciality through progressively responsible positions relating to the speciality”[[40]](#footnote-40). No specific exclusions are detailed, merely the requirements to be satisfied to receive H-1B status.

There are three stages in the application for an H-1B visa[[41]](#footnote-41). First the employer must submit to the Department of Labor (DOL) a Labor Condition Application (LCA), certified by the DOL. This LCA must certify that the expected wage equals or exceeds the prevailing or actual wage for that occupation[[42]](#footnote-42), that hiring the alien will not adversely affect equivalent US workers[[43]](#footnote-43), that no labor dispute currently exists at the place of employment[[44]](#footnote-44) and the employer has provided notice of the LCA to the local union representative or in a conspicuous position in the alien’s perspective work location[[45]](#footnote-45). Second, after DOL clearance, the employer must submit an application for an alien visa petition, together with the certified LCA, to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), requesting H–1B classification for the foreign worker. If USCIS approves the H–1B classification, the alien may then apply for an H–1B visa abroad at a consular office of the Department of State. A visa will only be issued if the application falls within the quota limit of 65, 000 visas per year[[46]](#footnote-46), unless employed by an institution of higher education (or a related or affiliated non-profit entity), a non-profit or governmental research organization or has earned a post-graduate degree from a US university, up to 20, 000 per year[[47]](#footnote-47).

An H-1B visa holder may move to a new job whilst retaining H-1B status during the reapplication process by his/her new employer as described above (portability of status)[[48]](#footnote-48). The applicant must again fall within the specified visa quota. If the H-1B holder loses his job at any time before the end of the period of authorised residence, the employer is liable for the reasonable return costs of the alien to their home State[[49]](#footnote-49). There is no grace period for the alien to attempt to find alternative employment.

The alien’s spouse and minor children (unmarried and under 21 years of age) may accompany the H-1B visa holder under an H-4 visa and are allowed to study but not to work or able to obtain a social security number. In order to work they must also apply for an H-1B visa or another non-immigrant visa that allows employment.

The rights associated with employment granted to an H-1B visa holder are the equivalent to those of a US employee.

An H-1B visa holder can apply to adjust their status from a non-immigrant temporary resident to an immigrant permanent resident[[50]](#footnote-50) and receive a Green Card.

**Critique**

To evaluate the Blue Card Directive in comparison to the US H-1B visa system the optimum method would be to compare the systems against their objectives. As the US system does not set out aims, the five specific objectives in the Impact Assessment will be considered, before considering the two general objectives and the alternative policy of avoidance of brain drain.

1. Specific Objectives

 a. A coherent approach and common immigration policy on TCN HSWs

By producing a harmonising Directive, even though only minimum harmonisation, there is a minimum standard that Member States must adhere to once the Directive has been transposed into domestic law. Unfortunately that standard is a minimum with considerable amount of discretion left to the Member States over entry and residence requirements, numbers of TCN HSWs admitted and the rights attached to a Blue Card. Significantly during the negotiations for the Blue Card Directive, Member States insisted that national systems for attracting TCN HSWs were to remain in place. Thus although there may be a common minimal approach for granting entry, residence and rights for an EU Blue Card holder the advantages of this approach are negated by maintaining national systems and inviting competition between Member States for these highly regarded immigrants. It should also be noted that through their Schengen opt-out, the UK and Ireland are not included in the scope of the Directive.

In the US there is one system applicable to the whole country.

 b. More TCN HSWs immigrating to the EU on a needs-based approach

This will be difficult to assess without fresh statistical data. However, the deep global recession from 2008 that has badly affected the EU is likely to depress demand for TCN HSWs. It is suggested that this is likely to have a detrimental effect, not just on TCN HSWs but also on the attainment of the Lisbon Strategy. As these immigrants have skills that can drive the knowledge-based economy then it is essential in these difficult economic times to draw them into working in the EU particularly when the EU is competing in a global market place. It should be noted that Article 6 enables Member States to determine the volume of TCN HSWs entering the territory of the host Member State thereby allowing strict quota systems to be applied regardless of demand.

The US has a strict quota system that has often been over-subscribed by a considerable amount.

 c. Simplify and harmonise admission procedures for TCN HSWs

Admission procedures are harmonised by the Blue Card Directive and as such, for the EU Blue Card, these procedures can be found to be simplified. However, national systems can be maintained by the Member States who also retain the right to control the volume of admission of TCN HSWs. The resulting layers of systems are likely to confuse TCN HSWs and discourage them from applying to enter the EU.

The US has a straightforward and arguably simpler system for admission.

 d. Promote TCN HSWs’ social and economic integration

Again the Blue Card Directive, through the rights granted in Chapter IV, has not only promoted TCN HSWs’ social and economic integration but has also provided the means by which that can take place. Furthermore the requirement of the minimum salary threshold in Article 5(3) suggests that TCNs should be able to integrate with their host society, and indeed as this is a minimum threshold it is open to Member States to set a higher amount. The relaxation of the requirements for LTR TCN status is also likely to assist integration though the ultimate form of integration, permanent residence, is denied TCN HSWs under the Blue Card scheme.

The US also promotes social and economic integration with the LCA requirements and that integration is aimed more directly at the locality of the employee by requiring the employer to give specific assurances, especially on wages, to the DOL. This is far more flexible and relevant to the community in which the alien will live and to the alien, than the Blue Card provisions are. Furthermore, applying for and obtaining permanent residence enables an H-1B visa holder to develop strong solidarity with that community enabling potential total integration.

 e. Increase intra-EU mobility

This last objective essentially deals with geographical mobility of TCN HSWs, the landscape created by the Directive that is difficult to be positive about. Blue Card holders are free to move within the Schengen area for up to three months[[51]](#footnote-51). However, the Directive makes clear that geographical mobility, although a primary mechanism for improving labour market efficiency, preventing skills shortages and offsetting regional imbalances, would be limited for the first two years of legal employment in the host Member State due to the principle of Community preference and possible abuses of the system[[52]](#footnote-52). As such geographical mobility of a Blue Card holder during the first period of legal stay should be controlled and demand-driven[[53]](#footnote-53). The result is that only after 18 months of such legal employment can a TCN HSW, and his family, move to another Member State to take up further highly qualified employment (Article 18). Furthermore the second Member State has to assess another application for Blue Card holder status that it can reject on the basis of Article 6 volumes of admission reasons. This is adequate to deal with long term labour market inefficiencies and regional imbalances but it is in times of short term difficulties where there needs to be flexibility and swift responses. In many high-technology and innovative industries the mobility of personnel is essential to exploit and develop novel discoveries. At times of economic downturn mobility of labour is essential to ensure the maximisation of labour efficiency. The Blue Card Directive stifles such opportunities and as a consequence makes the EU less attractive to TCN HSWs. It could be argued that the derogations from the LTR TCN Directive in Article 16 make the acquisition of LTR TCN status more accessible, thereby increasing the opportunities for geographical mobility. However, the rights of equal treatment in Article 11 of the LTR TCN Directive are very similar to those under the Blue Card Directive and significant discretion[[54]](#footnote-54) is given to Member States over the movement rights of LTR TCNs.

The US allows the portability of the H-1B visa between jobs without restrictions on movement anywhere within the USA and without time or number restrictions.

2. General Objectives

So the two general objectives must now be considered and indeed it can be said that the jury is out on both counts. It is difficult to see that the Blue Card regime, with so much discretion left to the Member States, will encourage immigration of TCN HSWs and their retention, without a possibility of acquiring permanent residence and the status of EU citizen, is likely to depend on the fluctuations in the labour market and the economy. Such flexibility may be the desired result for Member States but the uncertainty created is likely to have a negative impact on their retention, and possibly discourage individuals to consider the EU as an attractive work venue. As for effective and swift responses to labour demands for highly qualified labour and offsetting skill shortages, by encouraging TCN HSW immigration and circulation within the EU, the immigration into the EU of TCN HSWs will depend on the first objective. However, geographical mobility within the EU is unlikely to be effective or swift considering the limitations imposed by the Blue Card Directive.

The US system has been in operation for many years and has proven to be highly popular with TCN HSWs.

3. Brain Drain

The Impact Assessment makes clear that the majority of TCN HSWs already legally resident in the EU in 2005 come from States where there are dangers of brain drain[[55]](#footnote-55). Thus as Peers[[56]](#footnote-56) suggests these figures suggest that concerns of a brain drain exacerbated by the Blue Card scheme could be *prima facie* valid. Recital 22 encourages Member States, when implementing the Directive, not to pursue active recruitment in developing countries in sectors suffering from a lack of personnel. The development of ethical recruitment policies and principles in key sectors is suggested. However, as Peers notes[[57]](#footnote-57), encouragement in the Recitals of the Directive is not the same as an obligation to pursue ethical recruitment policies, which the Impact Assessment[[58]](#footnote-58) had suggested was a possibility. The Impact Assessment[[59]](#footnote-59) does make the suggestion though that as so many TCN HSWs have already decided to move away from the home country to pursue employment in developed countries such as the USA and Canada, inducing them to come to the EU would not increase the total number migrating, and thus increase brain drain, but merely change the destination of migration. Peers[[60]](#footnote-60) points out that this is a disingenuous argument and one similar to that traditionally employed by defenders of tobacco advertising. Furthermore the Impact Assessment disappointingly makes no use of the burgeoning literature, particularly economic, on the effects of the movement of HSWs from least developed and developing countries to developed countries. Such writing, based on empirical evidence, tends to offset brain drain by various elements of brain gain for the home State.

4. Final difficulties

The final problems with the Blue Card scheme are alluded to by Guild[[61]](#footnote-61) when she considers the international obligations that already bind Member States. These obligations are contained in two conventions: the International Labour Organisation Convention 97 of 1949[[62]](#footnote-62); and, the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers 1977[[63]](#footnote-63). Article 13(1) provides a grace period for unemployment of 3 months whilst the European Convention sets a minimum period of 5 months. Article 6(1)(b) of the ILO97, and Article 18 of the European Convention (although not so precisely), require equal treatment as own nationals for social security that includes sickness cover. This would appear to contradict one of the Blue Card Directive’s criteria for admission, namely the requirement of sickness insurance. The Directive also requires sickness insurance to cover family members, a requirement not included in Article 12 of the European Convention. Finally Article 8(2) of the European Convention ensures that a worker cannot be bound to one employer within a territory, or to that territory, for more than a year. This again appears to contradict the Blue Card Directive’s requirements, particularly the necessary authorisation by the domestic competent authority for any change in employment for the first two years of residence (Article 12(2)) and the ability to move to another Member State to work only after 18 months (Article 18(1)).

The result of these contradictions means that the Member State concerned must ensure that the higher standards specified by international legal commitments are satisfied thereby nullifying those elements of the Blue Card Directive.

**Conclusion**

Is the Blue Card Directive likely to achieve its objectives? It’s too early to tell as of yet. However, there are concerns. First the harmonisation is minimum and so Member States can set higher standards. This means that the elimination of competition between Member States to attract TCN HSWs could well be accentuated rather than relieved. Second harmonisation is not achieved with the UK and Ireland opting out. Third there appears to be a cavalier attitude towards other policy areas, in particularly the elements supporting the idea of Circular Migration and the Brain Drain from developing and least developed countries. Fourth international commitments for Member States already set higher standards than those outlined in the Blue Card Directive. Fifth the inclusion of beneficiaries for international protection in the classes of exempted individuals is troublesome. This is because it appears to contradict with the identification by the Impact Assessment of legally resident TCNs as the first class of people who could help to solve the problem with the demographic trend. It also appears to contradict the findings of the Impact Assessment that those who have already proven their mobility by immigrating are those most likely to solve the problem of geographical mobility. The failure to utilise the skills of these individuals, some of whom can be very highly qualified, is a major concern that could have been, at least partially, resolved by including them in the scope of the Directive.

In most aspects of analysis in this paper the US H-1B system appears to be considerably more attractive than that of the EU Blue Card. However, it should be noted that the emergence of new, more powerful economies in home States, especially India and China, and the global recession that has struck western countries hard could eventually see significant reverse migration from developed countries to these emerging markets.

The result of the EU Blue Card is likely to be disappointing and this area may well need revisiting in the short rather than the long term if the objectives set out in the Impact Assessment are to be achieved. It must also be mentioned that the interlocking of the Blue Card with Circular Migration could see the return of a failed system of labour migration, that of the 1950s guest worker. The hand of national sovereignty weighs heavy on the Blue Card and it is suggested this will require lifting for it to succeed.

1. Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ 2009 L155/17 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Commission proposal for a Council Act establishing the Convention on rules for the admission of third-country nationals to the Member States, COM(1997) 387 final [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Commission proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities, COM(2001) 386 final [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Council Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, OJ 2004 L375/12 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Council Directive 2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research, OJ 2005 L289/15 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Commission Communication on a Policy Plan on Legal Migration, COM(2005) 669 final [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Ibid. at 6 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Commission proposal on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM(2007) 637 final [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Op. Cit. n.4 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Op. Cit. n.5 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004 L158/77 (corrected OJ 2004 L229/35) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. European Parliament and Council Directive 1996/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ 1997 L18/1 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ 2004 L16/44 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, OJ 2004 L304/12 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, OJ 2003 L251/12 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Op. Cit. n.3 at 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Commission Staff Working Document (impact assessment) accompanying Commission proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities, SEC(2007) 1403 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid. at 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of 22-23 March 2000 – see Recitals 3 and 6 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, OJ 2005 C53/1 – see Recital 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Op. Cit. n.17 at 12 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See S Peers, ‘EC Immigration and Asylum Law Attracting and Deterring Labour Migration: The Blue Card and Employer Sanctions Directives’ (2009) 11 EJML 387 at 404 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Op. Cit. n.17 at 12 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid. at 14 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. The Czech Republic set up a pilot project on the admission of TCN HSWs in 2003 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Op. Cit. n.17 at 16 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Ibid. at 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Council of the European Union, Global Approach to Migration, Council Document 15744/05 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Commission Communication on circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries, COM(2007) 248 final [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid. at 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Ibid. at 10 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. US Immigration and Nationality Act 1952 s 101(INA). This has been codified in Title 8 of the US Code and is referred to as 8 USC s 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) – the US Code will be used as reference in the remainder of this paper [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. 8 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) s 214.2(h)(9)(iii)(A)(i) [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. 8 CFR s 214.2(h)(13)(iii) and 8 USC s 1184(g)(4) – once six years has elapsed the alien must leave the territory of the USA and one year before reapplying for another H-1B visa [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. 8 USC s 1184(i)(1)(A) [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. 8 USC s 1184(i)(1)(B) [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. 8 USC s 1184(i)(2)(A) [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. 8 USC s 1184(i)(2)(B) [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. 8 USC s 1184(i)(2)(C)(i) [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. 8 USC s 1184(i)(2)(C)(ii) [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. 20 CFR 655.700(b) [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. 20 CFR 655.731 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. 20 CFR 655.732 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. 8 USC s 1184(j)(2) and 20 CFR 655.733 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. 20 CFR 655.734 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. 8 USC s 1184(g)(1)(A)(vii) and 20 CFR 655.700(a)(1)(iv) [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. 8 USC s 1184(g)(5) [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. 8 USC s 1184(n) [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. 8 USC s 1184(c)(5)(A) [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. 8 USC s 1255 [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Recital 14 [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Recital 15 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Recital 20 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. See in particular Article 14(3) & (4) Op. Cit. n.13 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Op. Cit. n.17 at 11 – 45.59% from “Other Africa” (excluding Northern Africa), 25.89% from South America, 15.59% from Southern and South Eastern Asia and 8.54% from Central America and the Caribbean [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Op. Cit. n.22 at 403 [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Ibid. at 407 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Op. Cit. n.17 at 65 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Ibid. at 36 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Op. Cit. n.22 at 406 [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. E Guild, ‘EU Policy on Labour Migration: A First look at the Commission’s Blue Card Initiative’ CEPS Policy Brief 145/2007 accessed on 10 December 2008 at <http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_blueCard.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Ratified by Belgium (1953), Cyprus (1960), France (1954), Germany (1959), Italy (1952), the Netherlands (1952), Portugal (1978), Spain (1967), UK (1951) [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Signed by Belgium (1978), Germany (1977), Greece (1977) and Luxembourg (1977). Signed, ratified and entered into force in France (1983), Italy (1995), the Netherlands (1983), Portugal (1983), Spain (1983) and Sweden (1983) [↑](#footnote-ref-63)