

Chapter One

It would appear...

Preface to Chapter One

This chapter establishes the central proposition and sources for this practice-led research enquiry through drawing. The project examines how drawing is affected through adaptations of perception; variations that convey as divergent from limitations and expectations of habitual interpretation of vision. Thus drawing's outcome depicts alterations of applications of sight that allow apprehension of more subtle elements available within the perceptual field—then captured into its external record from an interior experience of sight. While it is long established that drawing instruction is encoded into methods that reposition vision—isolating features of the visible into characteristics of perspective, value, and so on—such strategies are generally intended and implemented to the end goal of a visually viable and convincing facsimile of observed objective data. What this project addresses is when or how these adaptive dispositions of seeing—specifically as necessitated by the activity of drawing—can *also* access subtle and unanticipated revelations from the visual field, regardless of whether those revelations are essential or in excess of what is necessary to the representational goal.

Thus drawing can extract additional unanticipated elements and potentials in our sense of sight; noted out of a fuller sweep of embodied experience. The implications of such adaptive vision can surpass the resultant surface semblance of drawing and—in the strategic visual repositioning 'seen' by way of the rules of drawing—can echo more fundamental encounters with what is ephemeral and peripheral—but nevertheless authentic—than what we are conditioned to regard as the central concerns of sight. Because drawing's perceptual adaptations are distinctly different to the orientation of vision brought to ordinary projects of looking, the interior vision of the artist is disclosed into its making, and the resultant drawing then stimulates recognition of the internalised aspects of vision within the subsequent viewer. This occurs because interior imagination filters all vision—thus the work of art *re-cognises* unique imagination, as a feature common to *all*, and to *all* events of cognition.

This initial chapter considers the cognitive bases of variations in perception, which I contend are requisite to the process of drawing, in order to begin to address additional aspects of altered perception which have become apparent (*to me*) through (*my*) drawing practice. Through reference to practice examples—mine and works of others'—I develop my hypothesis as to how drawing comprises as both translation and evidence of private and adapted experiences of visual perception; substantiating my position by citing selected thinkers and theorists, including: Paul Crowther, Anton Ehrenzweig, Richard Wollheim, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and anthropologist David Lewis-Williams. Particularly relevant are recent writings of British philosopher Paul Crowther that address phenomenology and meaning within visual art. In this first section, I employ elements of Crowther's aesthetic terminology to construct and articulate a theoretical basis for this project.

PART I: Drawing and Image/Thinking Perception

If it is said that we use our eyes in drawing, that is true, but there are many things that we do in which we use our eyes. And how our eyes are recruited to the task can vary greatly.¹

The interest and focus in this project deals with drawing's capacity to transcribe into an external artefact, the record of imagery that contains an individualised account from the interior experience of seeing. Specifically, this project establishes that drawing—beyond its representational goals and semblances—will disclose subtle and transient elements of perception, which are over and above the nominal subject-matter intentionally reproduced and/or immediately apparent on its surface. *Within drawing—as both process and enduring artefact – what else is discerned and brought into the visible?*



Figure 1.1



Figure 1.2.²

1. On Picturing

Philosopher Paul Crowther defines pictorial consciousness of visual art within theoretical terminology that helps frame the practice-based concepts examined within this project. He describes, as fundamental cognitive function, one that discloses into imagery, rather than linguistic thought, describing *picturing* as “an activity which embodies at a public, learnable level, factors which inform a key element in the ‘inner life’ of self-consciousness.” Its expressive basis in “imagination...exemplifies...something of the sensible structure of its referent in a way the ordinary uses of language do not.”³

¹ Wollheim, Richard. ‘Why is drawing interesting?’ *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan 2005. p. 6. In this talk from 1998, Wollheim postulates variations within normal applications of sight, in order to stress the distinctive function application of the *eyes* within drawing. The full passage is: “If it is said that we use our eyes in drawing, that is true, but there are many things that we do in which we use our eyes. And how our eyes are recruited to the task can vary greatly. In some cases, such as dressing in the morning, we use our eyes, but only after the fact...to check on what we have already done without our eyes. Next there are cases where the use of the eyes is less minimal. When we drive a car, we couldn’t...without mishap, drive first, and look afterwards. In such cases, we do what we do *with our eyes*. But there are cases that go beyond this, and this is where drawing comes in. When we drive a car, the criterion of success for what we do is laid down independently of the eyes: we have to keep the car on the road. But in the case of drawing, it is the eyes that determine the criterion of success. We do not merely draw with the eyes: we draw *for the eyes*.”

² **Figure 1.1 & 1.2. Self-Portraits. Volume Two: Plate 1 & 2** (Work of the author. Graphite on paper, 2012.) Both self-portraits were drawn from observation, during this research. While one *may* profess and appear as a more expected version of this genre – both portraits are composed from elements and features derived from direct vision.

³ Crowther, Paul. *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame)*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. pp.67-68.

This project documents understandings of drawing-derived knowledge; as disclosed through practice engaged during the research period. These findings also establish a foundation for retrospective acknowledgement of information acquired from a life-long engagement in drawing practice. Insights from historical practice, which yielded my initial research queries, have only become truly visible through following those hunches into new drawings, disclosures, and discoveries during the research. Thus, what now becomes explicit rather than implicit, encompasses both current and historical evidence of anomalous and/or subtle events of vision that have found their way into expression through drawing. The revelations of drawing confer from a wordless zone; one whose affective resolution and comprehension remains situated within imagery. The dedicated attention and analysis, as applied to this project, has allowed for imagery evidence to be deliberately apprehended, and then deliberately articulated into this textual analysis, supported conceptually by selected theorists and their ideas.

As the disposition of perception is adapted, differentiated modes of comprehension become available; as when the artist re-orientates attention away from more routine expectations or functions of vision to engage in drawing activity. To make a drawing with any success of resemblance, it is necessary we suspend habitual decisions regarding data importance, and hold in abeyance customary assumptions of perceptual processing. As a result of this adaptation of perceptual disposition, elements in perception that are usually unconscious – that is, unattended or latent – are disclosed within the composition and context of drawing. Additionally, this modification of seeing for drawing is realised in combination with a manual undertaking—thus overlapping with the sense of touch to bring forth a perceptual outcome that extends its existence in the image artefact. In its fixing of imagery, the drawing enterprise further differentiates itself from routine sight, which yields as momentary fleeting impression.⁴

Where image-based models of cognition are subjected to textual analysis of research process, there may be legitimate concern that such interpretation could contradict or diminish the practice component of the project. However, I find that an opposite effect has occurred here. The opportunity to reflect upon the interior process of drawing—applied after the fact of making—supports an increased understanding of the meaning in the encounter with the

⁴ Even the apparatus of sight – the eye itself— cannot receive unless it retains its saccadic motion. Vision research has established that the eye is always in motion; making roughly 240 movements per minute. The word *saccade* is from the French word for *jolt*, to describe this undetectable motion. (Martinez-Conde, Susana. “Vision is All About Change”, *The New York Times*, May 17, 2013. Accessed: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/opinion/sunday/vision>)

image/artefact⁵, in research advanced through artistic practice and articulated by artistic practitioners. When Paul Crowther acknowledged the “vital aspect of art historical analysis qua historical,” he also stresses that attention to historical aspects alone does “not enable us to negotiate the intrinsic significance of the image”⁶ nor is it adequate for addressing the artwork’s “phenomenological depth”⁷. The value and necessity for practitioner-led interrogations comes in uncovering aspects of this implied depth, and differs from traditional art historical queries.

2. Ehrenzweig’s Hidden Order

A true depth-psychological analysis of art form must, by determined effort, reverse the usual approach and look out for the seemingly accidental or insignificant...in which the unconscious creative process of art can unfold itself safe...from the ‘consciously’ composed structure...and watch for the apparently accidental scribbles hidden in the inarticulate forms of artistic ‘handwriting’.⁸

Anton Ehrenzweig’s⁹ analysis of creative practice focused on shifts in the disposition of awareness – between what he defined as *surface* and *depth*¹⁰ perceptions in artistic undertakings. He addressed art practice and product using psychoanalytical terminology, deriving his lexicon from contemporary psychological theorists: William James, Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein. Ehrenzweig proposed that creative endeavour is best approached with a “flexible scattering of attention” or the “full emptiness of attention”.¹¹ This notion of “full emptiness” captures the manner of perception and reception which records directly from and into imagery—as in drawing¹²—without first flattening its revelation under the weight of interpretations of reason. He cautioned against the imposition of (secondary) rational processing during the creation of artwork, as this would only dull the results. Instead, Ehrenzweig espoused a more diffused application of attention in rhythmic alterations between surface and depth perception; a conceptual model that corroborates the adaptive application

⁵ This would be the case of reflection and analysis, which again occurs post-process, when the draughtsman steps back to consider transcription through drawing on complete and/or from works by other artists. Further discussion and analysis of this is found in *Methods/Case Studies* chapter of this thesis.

⁶ Crowther, Paul. *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame)*, p.33.

⁷ In his introduction to *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame)*, Crowther introduces this concept: “*phenomenological depth*—a notion formulated by myself, but arising (loosely) from a convergence of ideas in Merleau-Ponty and Hegel, and, to a lesser extent, Kant. Phenomenological depth centres on the *ontological reciprocity* of subject and object of experience...One aspect of this relation is of particular importance...the fact that most of our perception and cognition has a *pre-reflective character*, i.e., we do and think things without always being explicitly aware of the fact that we are so doing and thinking.” (p.3)

⁸ Ehrenzweig, Anton. *The Psychoanalysis of Artistic Vision and Hearing: An Introduction to a Theory of Unconscious Perception*, London: Sheldon Press, 1975. p. 5.

⁹ Ehrenzweig, Anton. *The Hidden Order of Art*, from 1967, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971 *The Psychoanalysis of Artistic Vision and Hearing: An Introduction to a Theory of Unconscious Perception*, London: Sheldon Press, 1975.

¹⁰ *Surface* and *depth* here indicate two layers of conscious awareness rather than for deciphering or negotiating physical space.

¹¹ Ehrenzweig, Anton. *The Hidden Order of Art*, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. pp. 24-25.

¹² Ehrenzweig also applies these analyses to the composition and reception of music.

of perception as established and demonstrated within this project. Such perceptual adaptation is key to unabridged readings of the visual field, as well as the subsequent detection of more subtle aspects in direct encounters with artistic artefacts. Under certain circumstances, a secondary process of reflection will expedite completion of the cycle of revelation, but only if reasoned reflection follows at a safe distance; that is, occurring once the making of the expressive form is resolved and settled into the perceptual artefact. In such cases, as in this practice-led art investigation—evaluation through written analyses facilitates fuller understandings of what transpires within both the quiet trance of creative practice, and in the reverie of contemplation, which attends ensuing encounters with the artwork itself.

What I cover and uncover from these drawings, which comprise the practice core of my project, also provides a hindsight recognition that altered and/or extra expressions of perception have long been transcribed into my drawings. This evidence reflects peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of perception, which have always inhabited my visual life, and which materialised spontaneously and unconsciously into the marks, shapes, and shadings of drawing. By looking past surface perceptions or representations of my own drawing, in the current research, I can now comprehend how a personal experience of vision prompted early interest and skill in drawing. In considering previous and present practice—within a research inquiry posed through drawing, as both process (activity) and trace (artefact)—I construct an account of drawing's apprehension of subtle and unexpected edges of visual experience. Other traces of the perceived and the perceivable become disclosed within the accumulations of marks, which become applied along the way to—while in addition to—the intended representation and/or subject of the drawing. Drawing transmits sight into insights that can exceed the delineated or obvious likeness or design. My research establishes how and where the practice of drawing thus elicits records of subtleties and anomalies in perception; encompassing inputs of sensory data that seem to appear beyond or outside what we anticipate in normative operations of vision. Drawing itself is a curious enterprise; described by Philip Rawson as “the most fundamentally spiritual—i.e., completely subjective—of all visual artistic activities... a drawing's basic ingredients are strokes or marks which have a symbolic relationship with experience, not a direct overall similarity with anything real.”¹³

Emphasis on anomalous (yet ordinary) visual manifestation provides a useful platform for tracking subtle (but actual) strata of the perceptual, as they are located and disclosed through drawing. Various traces and shades populate the field of perception, and while these may

¹³ Rawson, Phillip. *Drawing: The appreciation of the arts*, Oxford University Press, London, 1969. p. 1.

frequently remain unnoticed, they nevertheless, persist as potentially available in perception. Within this project, practice method has not been applied in the interest of privileging or analysing these anomalies as such, but instead to offer documentation of the perceptual idiosyncrasy that *is* drawing. From this, I extrapolate and demonstrate how perception in drawing accesses more than what we ordinarily attribute as constituent in the visual field, or as the recognisable subject recorded into the drawing. *Within both the process and the enduring artefact of a drawing – what else might be discerned and brought into the visible?*

3. Wollheim's Interesting Drawing

If there are recording angels, they cannot record through drawing. Ethereal creatures, they find the co-ordination of hand and eye too effortless to wring from its objects that we might evaluate as truly interesting.¹⁴

When Richard Wollheim posed the question of his title “Why is drawing interesting?”¹⁵, he began by noting shortcomings of traditional aesthetics – with its too narrow purview of truth and beauty. He credited more recent schools of thought with articulating the weakness of such analysis, but also found modernist canons wanting for their own reductive tendencies — that either limit our reading of images to texts or signs, or emphasize a media's formal qualities while neglecting any meaning of expression. He defined this interest as being within drawing in and of itself, and as something distinct from concerns of recognition in regards to a drawing's ostensibly portrayed subject. For Wollheim, a drawing conveys “no overlap between representation and illusion”¹⁶—so that what is sought in making and viewing drawing has more to do with the practice and artefact of drawing itself—rather than any subject image mimicked within its marks. We do, of course, attend the question of accuracy of depiction, in what Wollheim identified as mere check or test, as an effect and affect of how we apply our eyes. This check is, in fact, a modification in vision that reminds us we are not looking “for an object, but for a drawing of an object” because “seeing the object in the drawing differs from seeing the object face-to-face.”¹⁷

This adaptation in the exercise of *sight* is integral to the transformation that drawing brings, by altering and expanding our capacity to witness the sweep of visual detail in our surroundings. Wollheim highlighted another vital component of the sensory engagement essential to drawing's record of the perceptual, in that, “(d)rawing and painting...are not only visual arts: they are manual arts. The material residues of which the eye takes stock have been deposited

¹⁴ Wollheim, Richard. ‘Why is drawing interesting?’, p.10.

¹⁵ Wollheim's essay is taken from a lecture given at Loughborough University in 1998.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.9.

by the movements of the hand...the hand adds value.”¹⁸ Addition of *other* sensory (rather than *extra-sensory*¹⁹) input expands the possibility of what artist or spectator is capable of sensing through drawing. *What else might be brought into the visible—in both process and enduring artefacts of drawing?*

4. Drawing as embodied vision

This awareness of the hand at work comes alive within us...it conveys *images that waken*. It is not the eye alone that follows the lines of the picture, for added to the visual image is the manual image that truly wakens the active element in us. Every hand is an awareness of action.²⁰

Drawing extends the effects of *vision* into the *visible*; its effects accessed and transferred within drawing, as elicited from sensory combination of sight and touch. Drawing yields its documentation with distinctly tactile immediacy. Its outcome manifests readily, as the ease of articulation is aided by the fact that there is only minimal demand placed upon the maker’s attention by the physical materials of drawing itself.²¹ Instead, the process demands a distinctly altered perceptual disposition, one that moves away from ordinary methods for looking. From the alteration of perceptual posture, the attentive artist can track ephemeral elements present in other angles of waking life, which attend beside more dominant inputs. In this state of looking, formulaic assumptions are replaced by more authentic, immediate and idiosyncratic shapes within sight, which—somewhat paradoxically—enable a recognisable representation or figuration to unfold. Such transient emanations comprise the visualisation faculty of imagination—in dreams, memories, reverie—as well as the internalised referents (those iconic assumptions) that confer immediacy of comprehension. There can also exist other embodied perceptual quirks that impact the unique physical faculty of vision, but which generally register at levels below conscious apprehension or acknowledgement. Whenever we apply the sense of sight, we are invariably selective and we overlook. There is always more available to perception than can be extracted from the flash of a temporal moment. Drawing then adjusts, and even slows, the process of looking to create new expanded environments and impressions in perception—to receive and include disclosures of the imaginative sight that are along side the records of exterior description. Even when applied to articulate seemingly

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.9.

¹⁹ In this discussion, the *senses* reference inputs of “special faculties, connected with a bodily organ, by which man and other animals perceive external objects and changes in the condition of their own bodies. Usually reckoned as five—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch”. As the term *extrasensory* connotes something “Of perception: made by other means than those of the known sense-organs...” – it is *not* considered as a constituent of the subtle, but actual, perceptions which occur and facilitate drawing. Definitions accessed at Oxford English Dictionary (OED) Online, 12th February 2014: <http://www.oed.com/>

²⁰ Bachelard, Gaston. “Hand vs. Matter”, *The Right to Dream*, J.A. Underwood, Trans., NY: Orion Press, 1971. pp.57-58.

²¹ With simple tool in hand, eyes and hand engage drawing together. In my experience that— at times—it is difficult to determine whether the recorded mark which notes the perceived object is tracked first by the eye with the hand following or first as embodied response of hand in motion even before being grasped by the eyes.

straightforward objective observation, drawing must always be translated via imagination—as its declarations occur within the gaps and pauses between the outward look and the artist’s re-interpretation into marks onto the page. Thus, in every case, the drawing records a unique reflection of an individually imagined world.

5. Theories of Embodied Vision and the Imaginative Idiom

For Paul Crowther, “*visual representation is an intervention on the visual*” that “makes the world appear differently”; in meanings “achieved through...transformations of the visual appearance of that which is represented.” This assertion counters recent semiotic critical biases, which he assesses as reductive, and instead instructs viewers to “understand these transformations” by engaging “sustained consideration of how pictures...intervene in our general perceptual immersions in the visual world and, indeed, *how they change our relation to Being in the broadest sense.*”²²

Crowther defines imagination as “quasi-sensory mode of thought.” As “specialized idiom”²³ situated within a broader understanding of cognition, imagination deploys as sensory-related impression—of which visual imagery is the most prevalent. Drawing, therefore, is ideal medium for directly accessing such thought; as it can surpass not only linguistic iteration, but even the limitations of the ostensible subject matter that motivates and dominates surface result. This is due to drawing’s capacity to transmit directly from the stuff of imagination, where image discloses into image, without dilutions inherent in secondary translation of vocal or text-based narration or explanation. Ehrenzweig wrote of image expression as “unconscious symbolism” that “calls forth a reaction...on a far grander scale than the secondary dream elaboration, as though the masterpiece had been a dream of the artist which we, the public, perceive with our waking imagination.”²⁴ Crowther reiterates this; declaring the artwork’s “physically independent existence from their creator”,²⁵ once that expression is resolved and existent into the externalised form. There, the artwork continues to acknowledge the individual unique imaginative and cognitive process that brought it into form. In this way, the enduring expression of an artwork, as in a drawing, differs from more habitual workings of imagination, where inner images flicker, mutate and evaporate from moment to moment—in

²² Crowther, Paul. *Phenomenologies of Art and Vision: A Post-Analytic Turn*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. p.2.

²³ Crowther, Paul. “Imagination, Language, and the Perceptual World: A Post-Analytic Phenomenology”, *Continental Philosophy Review*, Volume 46, Issue 1, April 2013. p. 5 (Accessed 24 June, 2013 <http://link.springer.com.ezproxy.uwe.ac.uk/article/10.1007%2Fs11007-013-9247-z/fulltext.html>)

²⁴ Ehrenzweig, Anton. *The Psychoanalysis of Artistic Vision and Hearing: An Introduction to a Theory of Unconscious Perception*. New York: Geo. Braziller, 1965. p. 50.

²⁵ Crowther, Paul. “Imagination, Language, and the Perceptual World: A Post-Analytic Phenomenology”, *Continental Philosophy Review*, Volume 46, Issue 1. “(I)n the arts, images have a physically independent existence from their creator, once...created. However, they are connected in both... origins and accomplishment, with the imagination as a *mental capacity* that guides the creative process.”

a continual procession of transitory views and private visualizations which lead us along through our lives. What drawing accomplishes—what it was likely first devised to accomplish—comes as a means to fashion and fix as documentation and declaration of the interior view into an external expression, conveyed outwardly and extended through time. As Wollheim stated, once private expression is revealed into public form, its maker joins a process of contemplation as a viewer. Beyond the distinct moment of the active making processes, the artist’s expressive effort and outcome endures as visible documentation of the uniquely experienced event of visual cognition.²⁶

It is the position (and proof) of my research that it is precisely *because* of the immediacy with which drawing reveals pictorial thought—by grasping and recording a fluid notation and fuller sense of what it is to ‘see’—that it is uniquely apropos as a media for exploring subtle sensation within perception. Drawing allows us to track and transcribe idiosyncratic variations of solitary sight (*in-sight*), into outcomes that show dispositional rearrangements of how sight and attention are applied towards its purpose. Therefore, drawing’s comprehension is not rationally derived, but instead comes by loosening the grips of reasoned intentions and expectations on sight. Transient, variable moments and movement in perception become gathered into drawing, as a pictorial record that can then encompass the routine and unknown together. Thus drawing constitutes as a mode of thinking—charting and remarking upon its engagement within the visual. In practice, drawing facilitates the enactment of perceptual curiosity toward objects and arenas of ordinary habituation. In its trace, drawing registers a distinct experience of visual events or stimuli, as filtered through an interior lens and, in this, drawing shares qualities with other pastimes of image generation²⁷. Drawing opens a view onto wonders alongside and inside us, and onto phenomena that are often and routinely overlooked and discounted, within daytime consciousness.

²⁶ “For, though we have from outside, or prior to drawing, a very broad idea of what pictorial unity is, just as we have a very broad idea of what it is for a personality to find expression in the external world, drawing, and the experience of drawing, give a totally new, and unpredictable, spin to these ideas...something that we can learn only from patiently looking at drawings. And, when we do, these achievements turn out to be triumphs of the mind: triumphs, let me stress, of the embodied mind.” (Wollheim, Richard “Why is Drawing Interesting?” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan 2005, p. 10.) With this statement, Wollheim summarises the impact of witnessing the drawing. Here the embodiment of mind of which he speaks corroborates the result of adapted perceptual disposition upon cognition—and thus its extension as embodied cognition.

²⁷ At times, we take to be real the experiences in the visual which are, in fact, products of interior rather than external visual sources—as in dreaming, or hallucinatory neurological events, such as migraine aura.

PART II: Philosophies of Seeing: What else then might be discerned?

1. Image and Percept (Colin McGinn)

I am making a kind of map of the imaginative mind, linking one place to another;
I am not suggesting that every location is an oasis of clarity and theoretical order.²⁸

In *Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning*, philosopher Colin McGinn appraises the phenomenology of vision—placing particular emphasis on properties of imaginative visual faculties, and how this imagery sits in relationship to our primary understanding of sight—as one comprised of received inputs from the external visual world. By definition, visual experience is divided into two broad categories, *percept* and *image*; both being manifestations that comprise how we see.²⁹ Percept and image differ principally in discernment; in whether seeing is the product of the body’s eyes or the mind’s eye. This hypothesis differentiates the two: *image-making* as fundamentally will-driven, even when this will operates at sub-intentional levels, while *percepts* come from passive exposure to external data. McGinn suggests that visualising (*image*) implies action, through application of thought and attention. The act of seeing with body’s eyes (*percept*) is neither voluntary nor dependent on applied effort, apart from adjustments in bodily proximity to make the external source more readily available or discernible for passive viewing.

The factor of attention yields a further significant distinction. Percepts do not demand active attention from the sense of sight, in order to maintain their existence or potential availability to vision. However, imagining requires directed and sustained attention to its image—that is, the assumption of an adapted disposition of perception. Once such attention is withdrawn, internalised imagery will cease to be available to perception, unless it is transposed into external enduring artefacts of expression—as in drawing. McGinn also notes that while the percept discloses out of a densely populated and saturated visual field—imagery is discrete, riddled with informational gaps, and emergent against a blank field. Possibly even more significant, in light of this research, is the fact that despite any incompleteness in imagined visual data, we will, as originators and directors of our internal scenes, always identify the essences of our pictorial inventions. By contrast, interpretations derived from percepts may

²⁸ McGinn, Colin. *Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning*. Cambridge, MA & London, England: Harvard University Press, 2004. p. 112.

²⁹ McGinn cites David Hume’s position that *impressions (percept)* and *ideas (image)* differed only by degree, so defining *image* as “weak percept” (*A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739*.) McGinn argues that Hume’s model cannot account for external perceptions that are unclear or of poor visibility, while images *may* present as vivid—as in certain dream experiences. McGinn refutes Hume’s explanation, and proposes his criteria to support the separation of these as two distinct visual experiences. Citing Wittgenstein and Sartre (*The Psychology of Imagination*) on visual apprehension, in order to present alternatives to Hume, McGinn then identifies and compares fundamental features of these visual classes to conclude that, while each may possess *some* experiential commonality, *image* and *percept* are not the same.

require inquisitive adjustments of positions in body or thought—and may still be misinterpreted or misidentified – as in the case of optical illusions. McGinn offered a simple test for differentiating percept from image. If one is required to adjust the body’s position or proximity, to allow a clearer view of our sensory objective, than what we observe is a percept. To conjure the sights within our imagination, we need not shift our stance (or even move our eyes). The drawing – as curious art object – displays characteristics of both. Its substrate, frame, physical presence is a percept that, in turn, discloses imagery of another moment or experience of imagination—remaining fixed while remote in time from its origin. The percept as artwork thus allows the stuff of image or imagination to become external and enduring.

2. Seeing the ‘Elsewhere’ (Crowther)

*(P)erception is the outcome of a reciprocity between sensory-receptiveness and imagination... To perceive – even in the most rudimentary terms, is to inaugurate a world.*³⁰

While McGinn addressed the differing mechanisms of seeing between *percept* and *image*, Crowther analyses the intrinsic role of imagination to all perceptual understanding. During infancy and early childhood, imagination’s influence is prominent, and later makes possible the verbal language that will dominate adult thought. Crowther sites cognitive development in the “connection between imagination and the acquisition of language”. The child learns the world first through visual perception, and from this evolves an “anticipatory strategy” based in “perceptual attention...some other, innate, pre-linguistic mental power of representation...imagination ...as an innate power of representation.”³¹ Imagination provides the tools to decipher sensory experience, and leads to a developmental understanding that “enables an operative distinction between the spatio-temporal present and...a spatio-temporal elsewhere to open up.” Yet we are acculturated to view offerings of imagination as inferior to what we, as adults, deem irrefutably real. Crowther’s description of the cognitive imagination challenges and contextualises reason’s analysis, by reminding us that “imagination is...a mode of the subject’s consciousness...informed, also, by a world of public meanings. Private experience is intelligible insofar as it is structured in the realm of human sociability and language use.”³² Private perception exists as a collective phenomenon, hence transpositions from internal visual into extended artistic contemplation enhance—and are enhanced by—the shared recognition of our interiority. I would also offer that an impulse to draw originates as response to an interior impression of vision, or in interior response to some quality of external

³⁰ Crowther, Paul. “Imagination, Language, and the Perceptual World: A Post-Analytic Phenomenology”, *Continental Philosophy Review*, Volume 46, Issue 1, April 2013. p. 20. (Accessed 24 June, 2013 <http://link.springer.com.ezproxy.uwe.ac.uk/article/10.1007%2Fs11007-013-9247-z/fulltext.html>)

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

vision. The artist seeks further understanding of the private glimpse; following and fashioning it into an externalised version “completed and manifested *at the level of immediate perception*.”³³ Unlike language-based accounts, which may “communicate sufficiently through bodily expression alone...picturing *always* involves...material...independent of the body’s own organs...in artefacts which, once made, exist outside the body...almost always, independently of it.”³⁴

3. Origins of Images (Historical): David Lewis-Williams’ *The Mind in the Cave*

The state of affairs represented in pictorial space...is not connected to this rigid horizon of actual visual time. It is an interpretation ...that did not exist before the artist makes it.³⁵

Anthropologist David Lewis-Williams, in *The Mind in the Cave*³⁶, advances a plausible account for the origins of image-making. He references consciousness as traversing a continuum of states between wide-awake and dreaming, as based on current cognitive models, in order to consider circumstances and implications of ordinary daily variations within human perception. Citing this framework to decipher expressive response to perception, he constructs an origin story for image-making that commences with modern human, during the Upper Paleolithic transition. Lewis-Williams proposes that image-making—in cave painting or parietal art—began as response to interior vision, to its unique and private manifestations of visual imagery. At that time, such impressions would likely seem inexplicable or even supernatural in source; though we now understand these as normal alterations of consciousness within the individual nervous system. While understanding has evolved, such perceptual alterations continue to present as common events of vision—even if these do not reach the brain’s visual cortex through retinal impression. These events include eidetic images, and hallucinatory neurological events,³⁷ as in materialisations of migraine aura. Even direct non-afflicted vision can confound interpretation, in discrepancies between perception and explanation of optical illusion. But perhaps the most persistent differential within visual experience occurs in sleep states: in dreaming and hypnogogia. What Lewis-Williams suggests is that initial expressive gestures—the beginnings of art—were nothing more or less than a need to fix fleeting internal imagery externally, so the individual artist could contemplate such vision beyond the brief moment of

³³ Crowther, Paul. *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame)*. p. 26

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

³⁵ Crowther, Paul. “Pictorial Space and the Possibility of Art” in *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 48, No.2 (2008) p.184.

³⁶ Lewis-Williams, David. *The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art*. London: Thames & Hudson, 2002.

³⁷ Within this context, the *hallucination* is actual event of vision— a *percept*—originating from neurological cause, rather than in external retinal impression. Hallucinations are neither *imagination* nor *imaginary* – in that its viewer cannot exert will over its manifestation, so that the imposition or *occlusion* upon the visual field is similar to that of the externally-detected object. These include: after-image, migraine aura or other organically-caused *hallucination*.

perception. That these public images were collectively legible indicates that such internal visualisations are universal experience.³⁸

In *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame)*, Crowther also addresses a history of pictorial disclosures; tracking the evolution of artistic formats as defined by the grammar of *picturing*. He follows the progression from those cave surfaces to frescoed walls and then onto free-standing work on easels; evolutionary advancements that became further differentiated (and understood) within the enclosure of the frame. Crowther's model for the development of *pictorial space* echoes his proposition of imagination's centrality to cognitive maturation of the individual, a process that extends out of undifferentiated vision and imagination of childhood. Within this discussion of *picturing*, the place of imagination is writ large into the cultural development of a notion Crowther describes as "circumscribed planarity"³⁹. As with Lewis-Williams construct, Crowther's "parietal artists...did not regard pictorial space as something ontologically different from real space"; instead, early images were likely perceived "as embodiments (or at least markers) of some privileged portal between the real and the spirit worlds."⁴⁰ Over time materials of expression and presentation developed in ways that acknowledged ever-increasing awareness of the factors that drive and define our pictorial inventions. Ordinary vision is a fluid, flickering affair—while *picturing* fixes and contains perception, so that "it suspends our natural attitude towards the visual world."⁴¹ The device of the frame, with its radical separation from ordinary space, signals the invitation and invention of other worlds. In these worlds, possibilities of *imaginal* existence extend beyond the edge of visibility, "demarcating pictorial space, and signifying its difference from ordinary perceptual space...further accentuated through development of media such as paper...where the physical boundaries of individual works—framed or otherwise—are clearly understood as marking out a distinctly pictorial mode of space."⁴²

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 124-25. Part of Lewis-Williams' project here is to question and challenge the dominance of rationalistic bias in the division of perception that "implies 'ordinary consciousness' that is genuine and good" in contrast to "perverted, or 'altered' states" as "all parts of the spectrum are equally 'genuine'." He argues for acknowledgement of what he terms an "intensified trajectory" or secondary momentum within the spectrum which orchestrates fluctuations in awareness as "inherent feature of how our nervous system functions" within "evidence that our normal waking day comprises cycles of 90 to 120 minutes of moving from outward-directed attention to inward-directed states."

³⁹ Crowther, Paul. *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame)*, p. 52. "Circumscribed planarity" reflects an understanding of "the picture's physical edge *per se*...either to define the picture itself, or to indicate where the milieu outside the picture begins."

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

4. The Imaginal

Now, the very fact that imagination takes on a dispositional rather than a stimulus-based character, is of the greatest importance for cognition in general.⁴³

Anomalous and latent sensory traces hover in the margins of our more normal perception, within a habitual disposition of looking that seeks and favours dominant inputs. Nevertheless, other elements are always potentially available for apprehension within or beside ordinary revelations of sight. My research positions drawing, in and of itself, as a modality of sensory disposition that lends itself to discernment of perceptual subtlety. Drawing is taught and accessed through perceptual strategies that intentionally strive to alter postures of looking; thus these alterations can also disclose more than what is strictly necessary to accurate surface representation. My practice project examines how the perceptual is affected in and by drawing because, in order to draw, it is necessary to engage and adapt our sense of sight in ways that acknowledge and embrace different thresholds of perception. Crowther places imagination as the fundamental function for visual recognition and, therefore, to *all* cognition. Through imagination, we interpret new sensory inputs into comprehension—doing so by relating the new event to previous understandings. If not for imagination’s discerning implementation as faculty of visualisation, “cognition would be lost in a disorientating blur of sensory stimuli and images.” To this, I would add that in drawing, with its potential for encounters with other anomalous sensory facets in vision, the imagination is the chief cognitive force driving both drawing’s exercise and expression. Rather than simply clarifying sight, imagination extends the result of visual input into further image-generative processes; so that, in addition to its role in re-cognition, imagination—as accessed in drawing—generates novel cognition.

This project began from looking at sleeping/dreaming life through drawing, but the practice soon shifted its direction and emphasis to an analysis of drawing itself—as its own altering state or element within perception. Thus all drawing encounters—in process or product—became central to analysis in my research proposition. Dream-derived drawings remained significant as a content source; as I find that the choice of a subject matter—itself additionally peripheral, subtle or fanciful—can amplify perceptual sensitivity. However, I discovered that even in drawings oriented toward seemingly objective observation, it is the drawing process itself that constitutes the gateway to and from the *imaginal*. This term ‘imaginal’, as defined in the writings of James Hillman and Henry Corbin, is useful for reclaiming and re-defining the importance of imaginative life. Substituting *imaginal*—for *imagination* or the *imagined*—distinguishes it from pejorative (mis)interpretations that cast imaginary/imagery as mere

⁴³ Crowther, Paul. “Imagination, Language, and the Perceptual World: A Post-Analytic Phenomenology”, p. 16.

child's play, empty fantasy, or false reports from outside of authentic experience. The *imaginal* is the crucial sensory zone where our images invent and reveal themselves. It is genuine event of experience; one best evaluated by measures other than those which provide only material verification. The *imaginal* is falsely positioned as untrue, because it inhabits a zone of experience outside of physical materiality; so it necessitates an adapted position of interpretation, away from expectations of percept, to then locate the image's truth.

We live through moments of perception that elude and evaporate, unless we endeavour to hold them close and fix them through efforts of observation. My interest is in drawing's capacity to apprehend areas of awareness that seem to appear at the peripheries of vision, rather than from more directed concerns of attention. There are certain perceptual manifestations that stand apart from normative operations of vision – mysterious displays unfolding at the edges of the everyday. Henry Corbin, French scholar of creative imagination, identified in the individual a “need not only to surpass given reality, but also to surmount the solitude of the self left to its own resources in this imposed world”.⁴⁴

PART III: (The) Imagining Life

1. The Poetics of (Altering) Perception

Parts One and **Two** outline the conceptual foundation central to this project—as cited sources assist in discussion of drawing's capacity to expand the arena of visual perception. By referencing texts of philosophy, psychology, anthropology and art history/theory, I construct the framework for my exploration of variations in applications of perception—to demonstrate and articulate adaptations and expansions of the perceptible, as accessed through the art practice of drawing. It is important to stress that such alteration and extension of sensory impression and expression is not the exclusive province of drawing nor even visual art. For example, text-based sources can offer their own substantive reflections of adapted views, unlike the theoretical or academic forms of writing already referenced—where a broadened apprehension of the perceptual is cast in the poetic and inventive utterances of literature. **Part Three** offers selected expressions that convey—through creative literary revelation—aspects of perceptual orientation as addressed by this drawing research. Authors, including Virginia Woolf in *On Being Ill*, Gaston Bachelard in *The Right to Dream*, and cultural theorist Hélène Cixous in *Dream I Tell You*, speak out of other corners of embodiment, in ways that parallel and bear witness to the key impulses of my research explorations through drawing.

⁴⁴ Corbin, Henry. *Alone with the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. p. 180.

2. Virginia Woolf: Subverting the Diurnal

Directly the bed is called for, or, sunk deep among pillows in one chair, we raise our feet even an inch above the ground on another, we cease to be soldiers in the army of the upright; we become deserters. They march to battle. We float like sticks on a stream⁴⁵

Using language, Virginia Woolf evokes the perceptual changes engendered by alterations of embodied experience. In states such as an illness, conditions or assumptions of a status of normalcy are diverted away from expectations and progressions of a habitual forward trajectory—measured against the productive public daytime identity. Her 1926 essay, “On Being Ill”, embraced bodily insurrections of anomaly and ailment as vital detours into private corners of consciousness and creativity, from which transpire revelations of the landscapes of prostrate body and solitary repose. Woolf’s meditation echoes Lewis-Williams’ hypothesis that finds that alterations within an individual nervous system can prompt unique or unusual outcomes of creative expression – even while her impressions profess through words.

Both Lewis-Williams and Woolf propose ideas that authenticate how I understand my own roots in drawing; an activity initiated as unconscious response to certain quirks of vision manifesting in my particular sense of sight.⁴⁶ I use the term *unconscious* here to indicate circumstances of embodiment of which I had no direct awareness; coming at a time when I could not comprehend that my apprehension of the visual was neither universal nor the same as how another would see (into) the perceptual field. My experience was based upon how I then believed the world to appear, and, from that experience, I reflexively drew to make sense of what seemed true to (my) vision. I have always been significantly shortsighted, but knowledge of that condition, or my need for corrective lenses, was not yet detected. I can only deduce that I looked onto a field of puzzling spaces, shapes, and unclear definitions of form. The normal habituation of my early years was one of blurred impression and doubled vision, and it might be that such defects in physical sight allowed an easier route for deconstructing and abstracting from the visual,⁴⁷ for mimicking the shifting strategy of sight requisite to drawing. Whatever the causal root, it seems that in my early sensorium (what I hereafter reference as the ‘*sensory*’) I derived an easy facility for drawing—from within my myopic bubble and the child’s innocent arena of solitary play. I assumed my sight to be ‘normal’, and would only later learn otherwise. Thus, I came to drawing as extension of vision, rather than

⁴⁵ Virginia Woolf, *On Being Ill*. (Ashfield, MA: Paris Press, 2002) pp. 11-12.

⁴⁶ Specific events related to my drawing origins are examined in ‘Chapter Three: Methods, PART THREE, 1. Before and After (Images).’

⁴⁷ Trevor-Roper, Patrick. *The World through Blunted Sight: An Inquiry into the Influence of Defective Vision on Art and Character*. London: Souvenir Press, 1997. This text, published in 1970, notes how particular impediments to the physical sense of sight lend themselves to a disposition of character and observation, which, in turn is reflected in creative preference and manifestation. Interest in detail and more bookish pursuits are common as ‘(m)ystics and religious leaders, as well as musicians and artists, are said to be frequently myopic, since a blurred view of the outer world is no impediment to their inner vision...’ (p.23.)

acquired skill. In following strands of practice and interest into this current project, I still circle back to that initial embodied intertwining of drawing and vision. Though I'd long been unaware, I now understand my drawing practice as directed by a remote occasion of perceptual curiosity, which first led me to pick up pencil and converse with perception via drawing. An opportunity to revisit this anomalous effect of vision was provided, quite by chance, during this research period—manifesting as a perceptual event (*Figure 1.3.*) that refreshed and recalled the impact of early perception on image interaction. (*Chapter Three/Part III/2a: Reverie: Palinopsia Redux.*)



*Figure 1.3: Palinopsia Redux*⁴⁸

3. Drawing (toward) Night: *The Illuminated Sleeper*

Waiting and constant at the edge of the body's perceptual arena, there remains the fact of our sleeping life; itself even more dominant in the topography of bodies and beds than Woolf's transitory impositions of illness. Sleep is a curious corner of embodied life, the regular and recurrent detour toward rest, a relaxing of reason's diligence that can open onto richer depths of imagination. Yet we are trained to largely ignore, discredit and diminish its status as integral component in the unfolding of our lives.

Prior to this research, I long used drawing to address sleep states, motivated by an ill-defined curiosity to do with shared visionary opportunities. Sleep states would seem the nearest and most consistent access to shared arenas of subtle or other sensory—the daily (or nightly) encounter with altering perception. This is not dissimilar to the softened disposition of perception engaged when drawing, in perceptions that un-enforce normative expectation and interpretation. For over twenty years I used dream imagery as source for drawing; in effort to mimic or continue the image generation of the dream, rather than to analyse dream content.

⁴⁸ *Volume Two: Plate 3*

Later, during a prolonged period of desperate and dreamless insomnia, I looked to the unmade bed, and drawing became a visualised prayer of longing for this essential and elusive locale of altering comforts—from which I had now found myself banished. This use of drawing as supplication or substitute for elusive rest is also evidenced, for example, in the “*Insomnia Drawings*”⁴⁹ of the late Louise Bourgeois (see: **Chapter 4: Case Studies**⁵⁰).

Drawing out from the dreamscape while awake taught me much about the arcana of drawing itself. Just as images materialise against the blank support of my sleeping mind or the veil of the eyelids⁵¹, drawing marks accrue and forms come to view against the blank support of the page. The dream, as thematic prompt, seems well suited to drawing because—as in dreaming—in order to draw one must be absolutely in the present moment, or it is an impossible accomplishment. Drawing demands attendance to what is truly before us, rather than what we merely assume is apparent there. Similarly, inside the dream, we are absolutely held in the presence of its moment, and cannot be distracted by concerns outside the container of its action, to the extent that we would ignore the dream before us. Outside input is either folded into the dream or it will hasten awakening, so complete is our belief in the veracity of the dream’s strange logic when within its moment. So too, drawing’s essence is a process of imagination *re*-remembered: composed into visualisation from pieces of sight. Even while drawing from observation, we acknowledge the gaps and pauses folded inside the raw data of vision, between the eye’s scrutiny, and the ensuing transcriptions as accretions of marks upon the page.

4. (The) Imagining Life (at Night)

We do not know our own souls, let alone the souls of others. Human beings do not go hand in hand the whole stretch of the way. There is a virgin forest in each... Here we go alone and like it better so. Always to have sympathy, always to be accompanied, always to be understood would be intolerable.⁵²

The disposition of sight, within ordinary projects of perception, orients toward expectation—a visual regime that reinforces ‘what meets the eye’ (or the ‘I’). The view to drawing allows for reception of other currents of visual data. Drawing is constructed as an imagined world and, like the dream, is fanciful and unreal—its own species of living data. McGinn’s discussion of

⁴⁹ Bernadac, Marie-Laure & Bronfmen, Elisabeth, *Louise Bourgeois: The Insomnia Drawings, 1994-1995, 2 Vol.* New York & Zurich: Peter Blum Editions & Scalo, 2001.

⁵⁰ See: Chapter Four: Praxis/Case Studies, Part Two: Louise Bourgeois: Drawing the Entoptic/Drawing to Sleep.

⁵¹ Gaston Bachelard, in his reverie on “Oneiric Space”, speaks of the eyelid as both veil and portal enclosing the dreamer as ‘the starting point for an understanding of oneiric space...(o)ur eyes, then, themselves possess a will to sleep, a heavy, irrational, Schopenhaurian will.’ (Bachelard, Gaston. “Oneiric Space,” *The Right to Dream.* trans. from French by J.A. Underwood, New York: Orion Press/Grossman Publishers, 1971.)

⁵² Woolf, *On Being Ill*, pp. 11-12.

percept and image classifies the dream as image; an image status further qualified and defined by the unique added cognitive complexity of *dream belief*. By day, we easily differentiate evidence of perception from manifestations of imagination; in dreaming, we wholeheartedly trust its stranger truths. Dream belief occurs as sleep cuts the dreamer off from direct sensation of the physical body. Enclosed within the space of sleep, sensory awareness of exterior circumstance becomes unavailable—this is a central phenomenological attribute of sleep states. Here, and in addition, I must position drawing along this inferred spectrum of awareness—between concrete perception and the hermetic image enclosure of dreams. This conceptual continuum is referenced by Lewis-Williams, in *The Mind in the Cave*, and in Wollheim’s analysis of the spectator’s shifting cognition when deciphering the encounter with a drawing.⁵³ In this project, I affirm this interpretation within drawing’s evidence of imagined or re-imagined space, where both artist and spectator interact with what is *re*-cognised as a new reality of wholly invented image world disclosed onto the page. While the drawing’s world does not constitute the complete cognitive immersion that occurs within the dream, it does share a degree of the dream’s characteristic of *imaginal* suspension.

5. Cixous’s Dreams

I used to feel guilty at night. I live in...two countries, the diurnal one and the continuous discontinuous very tempestuous nocturnal one... I had but one visa for both... I could not have said which was the main...I went to the one that was perhaps the other with the surreptitious joy that gives the soul wings on its way to love...What delight to head off with high hopes to night’s court, without any knowledge of what might happen! Where shall I be taken tonight? Into which country? Into which country of countries?⁵⁴



Figures 1.4, 1.5, 1.6 .⁵⁵ Hypno Glossary” 2012/2013

⁵³ Wollheim, Richard. “Why is Drawing Interesting?” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan 2005.

⁵⁴ Cixous, Hélène. *Dream I Tell You*. trans. Beverley Bie Brahic, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006, p. 4.

⁵⁵ **Volume Two: Plates 4, 5 & 6** (work of the author)

In a diary of her dreams, feminist writer and critic H  l  ne Cixous' visa implies adventure, her permit to cross beyond frontiers of the safely known. We generally identify ourselves only as citizens of our waking territories. *Day* is the homeland, the native character we return to each time we throw off the bedclothes, to rise and return from the provinces of the night. The same person—a day later. What percentage of who we are, in the fullness of our consciousness, can be linked to travelogues of imagination revealed from sleep—or—when, instead of sleep, we suffer the solitary dark failures of being stopped at sleep's borders?

6. Bachelard's Oneiric Space



Figure 1.7. Louise Bourgeois/Insomnia Drawing⁵⁶

The space in which we shall spend our nocturnal hours has no perspective, no distance. It is the immediate synthesis of things and ourselves...(w)e remain the center of oneiric experience⁵⁷

In the essay "Oneiric Space", Gaston Bachelard conjured a geography of nocturnal life as expansive celestial orb; one paradoxically and wholly contained within the discrete borders of the body. The eyelid becomes distinguished as substrate against which we project and compose the perceptual life of night. This eyelid is a peculiar accessory of inhabited flesh and, once considered through Bachelard's definition, it becomes difficult to conjure an alternate purpose than as the waiting screen for sleep's nocturnal cinema. It constitutes as "a veil...cast not upon the world but upon ourselves by the bounty of sight...how dense are the paradoxes conjured by the thought that this eyelid, this terminal veil belongs as much to the night as to ourselves...Our eyes then themselves possess a will to sleep.'⁵⁸ In applying this will to sleep, vision strives for deeper insights than the *what-meets-the-eye* of daytime. Bachelard's "sleeping space" is attended by "the autonomy of our retina where minute chemical processes raise up whole worlds." Across science and the arts are numerous accounts of discovery and inspiration prompted by cognitions particular to the life at night: from dreams, hypnogogia⁵⁹, deep sleep, or even the contradictory *otherworld* of insomnia.

⁵⁶ **Volume Two: Plate 42**

⁵⁷ Gaston Bachelard, "Oneiric Space" in *The Right to Dream*, trans. J.A. Underwood (New York: Orion Press, 1971.) p. 172.

⁵⁸ Bachelard, *The Right to Dream*, pp. 172-173.

⁵⁹ Other interesting visual states exist in and around sleep for some people, who have the ability to conjure up visual scenes during drowsiness and light sleep. This reverie is called "hypnagogic" imagery when it occurs around

In contemporary science, sleep has become a significant area of study; though largely addressed within the context of its physiology and effects on waking health and stamina. Even when sleep's mystery is acknowledged, it is not assessed as participant or constituent of identity. Who are we as sleeper, and what of the whisperings of "the continuous discontinuous very tempestuous nocturnal"⁶⁰? How do night's reports inform who or how we become by day? Imagination seems to find freer inflection and inclusion within the adapted dispositions shaped by night. To say we 'fall asleep' denotes a movement down, and thus out of sight, from the visibility of daytime. We may even report sensations of falling as sleep's threshold approaches, though, as I age, this presents more as the unanticipated step off an unseen curb, a wobbling footfall as I lay in the bed. Alterations in expectation, reason and knowledge of the self are so complete during sleep; yet we dispute its bearing on identity unless we find ourselves diminished from the denial of access to its rest. If we are thus diminished by its absence, then what part of that self is attributable to sleep? It is this notion of *subtle sensory* or *other* (rather than *extra*) *sensory*, that I seek through drawing. To draw is to locate, from the textures and frames of vision, a reference point for states of perception and awareness that do not solely reinforce the biases of orderly daytime thinking, and keep us dutifully identified among Woolf's "soldiers in the army of the upright".⁶¹ With states like sleep and dreams, I also include drawing—as all reconfigure vision in ways that exceed rules and limits of factual physicality—seeing beyond, while simultaneously inside, limits of experience assumed by the ordinary understandings of inhabited existence.

7. Hillman: *The Dream and the Underworld*

The fantasy of 'the raw and the cooked'...begins in the psyche's dream, which is not mere nature but elaborated nature.. This cooking of psychic stuff that goes on in the night... is a soul-making... as fundamental to culture as are the other forms of cooking and crafting that anthropology upholds.⁶²



Figure 1.8. Internal Ordnance (2013)⁶³

sleep onset and "hypnopompic " imagery during morning awakening.' From: Jim Horne, *Sleepfaring: A Journey through the Science of Sleep* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). p. 159.

⁶⁰ Cixous, Helene. *Dream I Tell You*. p. 4.

⁶¹ Woolf, *On Being Ill*, p. 12.

⁶² Hillman, James. *The Dream and the Underworld*. New York: Harper & Row, 1979, p. 135

Psychologist James Hillman encouraged a disposition toward dreaming that would invite the poetry of its imagery to expand its views within the day-world, rather than inhibiting or subordinating oneiric sights and sounds in service to daytime identity. The perimeters of interest for this project have shifted from a dedicated sleep arena to a broadened consideration of how our perceptual systems for vision and imagination combine and disclose the curious edges of perception through and into drawing. Appreciation of sleep as a content source remains, in that it is exemplar of the stranger subtleties and realities of these embodied states and spaces where we live, imagine, rest, and grow into our own depths. Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote “(f)or man to live is not simply to be constantly conferring meaning on things but to continue a vortex of experience which was set up at birth...(S)leep is not an act, the operation, the thought, or the consciousness of sleeping; sleep is a modality of perceptual experience.”⁶⁴ It is my position that in engaging reflective processes, like drawing, we echo the image detection and generation operations first encountered in sleep and dreams. In drawing, we may also cross certain thresholds of awareness into elements and experiences located at the heart of existence, but that remain hidden to plain sight. In looking beyond the expected view, we encounter and decipher more than we were trained to believe. We can conjure such vision within drawing, but we can never look directly upon our sleeping self. That is a sight we can only imagine.



Figures 1.9, 1.10 & 1.11. Bed Degradations. Silverpoint on panel (2011)⁶⁵

⁶³ **Volume Two: Plate 60** (work of author)

⁶⁴ Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. ‘The Problem of Passivity: Sleep, the Unconscious, Memory’ in *In praise of Philosophy and Other Essays* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963) p. 115.

⁶⁵ **Volume Two: Plate 7** (work of author)

Summary for *Chapter One: It would appear...*

In this chapter, I introduced the central concepts for this practice-based research into adaptations of perception, as found in and through drawing—while also establishing the key theoretical foundation to support these positions. Citing various thinkers, including Paul Crowther, Anton Ehrenzweig, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Colin McGinn and James Hillman, I presented philosophical models to examine the following aspects: the mechanisms of perception, the centrality of visual imagination to cognition, and how phenomenology of sight is expanded—in both application and understanding—through drawing. I have offered examples of how subtleties of the perceptual are *also* recorded in literary creation: referencing writings by Virginia Woolf, Gaston Bachelard and Hélène Cixous. I applied these poetic illustrations to advance the discussion of drawing as altered and adapted perception; particularly in relation to sleep and dream states. I briefly referred Louise Bourgeois' *Insomnia Drawings*, and examples from my own drawing practice—and will elaborate on these in later chapters. This introductory chapter establishes the basis for a continued and detailed development and explanation of my research methodologies, as discussed in the next chapter: ***Chapter Two: It would appear (to me).***