

1 What Should Be Automated Next in Developing Construction Smart Contracts? Five  
2 Principles for Guiding Incremental Change

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6  
7 **Abstract**

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9 Existing research on smart contracts in construction primarily concentrates on their  
10 operational stage and the mechanics of their potential operation. Having established  
11 “can we do it?” the next question to answer is “how do we do it?” The answer involves  
12 a consideration around smart contract adoption and its synthesis with the entire  
13 construction process from procurement to in-use. Particular attention is needed for  
14 integration into complimentary and receptive working practices resulting in the  
15 optimum conditions for adoption. The current risk is that smart contract adoption may  
16 suffer from a lack of clear guidance and happens on a piecemeal and ad-hoc basis.  
17 This study proposes a principled approach to counter this risk. This approach has been  
18 seen before in construction law in the form of the Abrahamson Principles, which remain  
19 a seminal reference point in any discussion of construction law. The use of a framework  
20 is therefore proposed based on five key principles to guide the automation of contract  
21 terms, discussing the importance of control, codability, consideration, efficiency, and  
22 data access. This approach uses an interdisciplinary methodology with an applied  
23 professional constituency to promote law reform-based research. The  
24 inductive/deductive approach is aimed at sharing insights into the question with the  
25 hope that the consequent principles aid the incremental implementation of smart  
26 contracts in the industry.

27 **Introduction**

28  
29 The recent completion of the five-year mission of the Centre for Digital Built Britain (Daye,  
30 2022) evidence that the pathway to digital twins in the Built Environment is mapped out and  
31 includes the implementation of smart contracts. Smart contracts are set to take their place  
32 alongside Integrated Project Delivery, Modern Methods of Construction and Design for  
33 Manufacture movements (Sonmez *et al.*, 2022). The standardisation and repeatable  
34 environments of factory construction and regular demand provide ideal test beds for smart  
35 contract staples such as automating payments and real time involvement of delivering goods  
36 and transit arrangements (Di Giuda *et al.*, 2020). The advances made in applying similar  
37 technologies in other industries is starting to gather significant purchase in construction. For

38 example, Tata were reported to be tracking their steel girders via individual barcodes from  
39 foundry to installation as long ago as 2018 (Penzes, 2018). The benefit for construction of  
40 being a late adopter of technology is that, in most cases, it is the appliance of science that is  
41 required rather than its conception.

42 Interest in smart contracts could demonstrably be said to have followed the Gartner hype-  
43 cycle (Fenn and Blosch, 2018). Where new ideas are “hyped” as interest sours before trailing  
44 off into a trough of disillusion. The hype cycle has its critics (Steinert and Leifer, 2010) about  
45 its claims to be scientific. Nevertheless, it is a useful notion and one that many innovation  
46 triggers tend to follow. The good news, for those fearing the sidelining of whichever  
47 technologies one is interested in, is that the disillusion is followed by a slope of enlightenment  
48 and a plateau of productivity. As one commentator put it “*we tend to overestimate the effect of*  
49 *a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the long run.*”( Amara, 2006).

50 Collaboration (formerly partnering) is another construction related phenomenon that has  
51 definitely suffered a Gartner cycle. The plateau of productivity stage has seemed a way off for  
52 its main proponents. The collaboration movement is said to be experiencing a Groundhog Day  
53 (Mosey, 2021) where the resistance and inertia around partnering languishes in a Bermuda  
54 Triangle of idealistic debate, cynical criticism, and unrealised good intentions. Similar  
55 frustrations have long since been visible in the technology camp, Mark Farmer’s (Farmer,  
56 2016) exasperated refrain is “*modernise or die.*”

57 It may have been true that what partnering needed to succeed was Building Information  
58 Modelling (BIM) (Saxon, 2013). Ten years on it may well be the case that what they both need  
59 to succeed are smart contracts. A compelling case can be built when like-minded individuals  
60 working as a team can see the benefits of their collaboration in such things as instantaneous  
61 payments and reduced overheads as facilitated by smart contract adoption. Technology  
62 supports collaboration and vice versa. However, both require a statement of principles  
63 approach to ensure consensus ad idem. The primary purpose of this paper is to give guidance  
64 on how to identify where technology and collaboration come closest together. In these  
65 instances, the principles proposed will help to select those opportunities where the pre-  
66 conditions for automation are present and are therefore where the smart contract automation  
67 process might reasonably start. In adopting this approach the smart contract principles aim to  
68 ensure that smart contracts remain a tool for the sort of positive and progressive change the  
69 industry is crying out for.

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## 73 Literature Review

74

75 Smart contracts have great potential for fixing the causes of poor construction contract  
76 administration and through that can seek to eliminate some of the claims and disputes that  
77 plague the industry. A smart contract is the name given to any attempt to automate contract  
78 administration considering events encountered. A smart contract is a recording of a legal  
79 agreement between parties written in a language that is both human-intelligible and machine-  
80 readable, whose text incorporates an algorithm which automates some or all the performance  
81 of the agreement (McNamara and Sepasgozar, 2021). For example, an event occurs – an  
82 expiration date is reached, and the contract executes the protocols that have been coded.  
83 One advantage is there is little need for intermediaries.

84 Two separate phenomena appear realisable in the context of smart contracts. It may be a case  
85 of either/or in their development or a hybrid that may eventually proliferate. There is the simple  
86 transaction type of smart contract which was the original notion developed by the founder of  
87 smart contracts (Szabo, 1997). The transactional swap of goods for money represents a  
88 completed contract. The project bank account is another, more sophisticated version of this  
89 where the supply side agree their relevant shares from the currency deposited by the client in  
90 the bank account and agree to unlock the box and make the money flow to each other. The  
91 smart contract is the same idea without the box and without the currency and permissions –  
92 they can all be automated to an extent (Al Khalil *et al.*, 2017). For the foreseeable future, the  
93 authorisation for releasing substantial sums of money is likely to remain a human action. This  
94 is consistent with the idea that the future of the professions (Susskind and Susskind, 2022) is  
95 for human's to retain those elements of their role where they continue to add value – in the  
96 case of construction smart contracts this may amount to auditing the data and performing the  
97 oracle role. Put another way, we are still going to want humans to sign the big cheques.

98 The second possibility for smart contracts is the contract which is smart in the true sense.  
99 Settling for the simple transaction-based solution or the focus on readable language might be  
100 to hold back the machine learning aspects and the ability to innovate beyond the limited terms  
101 of references mentioned above. This other definition of a smart contract involves the facility to  
102 detect and resolve competing contract clauses. The example in the case of *MT Hojgaard A/S*  
103 *v E.ON*<sup>1</sup> where the Judge deemed the contract one of “multiple authorship” where each set of  
104 lawyers were adjudged to have been more interested in incorporating their one-sided terms  
105 rather than producing a contract to capture the bargain. The resulting mess, and judicial

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<sup>1</sup> [2017] UKSC 59 BLR 477

106 exasperation, might may have been avoided had a smart contract writing programme been  
107 used to highlight and remove the uncertainties. On the other hand, the resulting uncertainties  
108 might have been an acceptable trade-off against the value of arguing down one side or other  
109 of the drafting argument.

110 In part this “smart” approach would be to recognise the importance of the BIM clash detection  
111 approach and apply the logic more widely (Sonmez *et al.*, 2022). Clash detection has hitherto  
112 been restricted to solely design information but could equally apply to clash detection of  
113 information or contract clauses or terms. Although there is no specific example of this to relate,  
114 it is straightforward to imagine how that it could apply if, say, a construction material becomes  
115 outlawed in the United Kingdom and joins the list of deleterious materials. A smart contract  
116 would be able to detect the “clash” and identify and resolve all mentions of the material in  
117 contract documents and replace with a substitute without the harmful properties.

118 This alternative yet potentially complimentary version of what a smart contract can do –  
119 interrogate data and apply its machine learning, in similar projects and extrapolating the  
120 answers - is a more forward-looking version of a smart contract which has emerged in the  
121 intervening years since my original paper on Szabo-like transactions in 2016 (Mason, 2017).  
122 Thus, although the heralded changes have been slow to emerge the signs of their uptake and  
123 preconditions needed for their development are evident, particularly involving blockchain  
124 solutions (Msawil *et al.*, 2022) and its potential in preventing or reducing construction related  
125 problems, including those related to contract administration.

126 The present and near future of smart contracts appears to be the stack approach – the  
127 automation of those terms will centre firstly on those which involve algorithms which are easily  
128 codable and manageable. The first of these “low hanging fruit” are weather delay events as  
129 demonstrated by the EHAB weather ledger (Lamb, 2018). The ledger ascertains automatically  
130 whether the rain or wind (or both) experienced on a project is better or worse than a 1 in 10-  
131 year event. It does this by checking itself against data from the Meteorological Office. If the  
132 weather event is worse than a 1 in 10-year event, then the compensation event procedure of  
133 the New Engineering Contract is triggered. This is an interesting development but at one level  
134 nothing more than primary school children collecting rainfall in an empty yoghurt pot and  
135 measuring it. The real issue – the ramifications and forecasted consequences of the  
136 compensation event and the measure of its accompanying loss and/or expense dependent on  
137 it were wrangled with in the usual manner and not addressed by the ledger. The progress  
138 made was that at least there would have been a verifiable record of what happened. The  
139 argument goes that the greater the granularity and reliability of the data, the fewer places there

140 are for disputes to reside as there is less margin for disputes and different interpretations of  
141 the data to lie.

## 142 Research Gap

143

144 The risk for any siloed industry is that work is carried out without the wider terms of reference  
145 being appreciated or considered. Smart contract academics have been too focused on  
146 intricate workings and platform discussions and not cognisant of the prevailing conditions or  
147 environment required to see smart contracts flourish. One reason for the false estimations  
148 resulting in hype is not having a clear enough purpose in applying the technology once it is  
149 available. Smart contracts are no different. Insufficient work has been done to date on  
150 cementing the contribution of smart contracts within the wider procurement initiatives (Ozkan  
151 *et al.*, 2021). The focus for smart contracts has centred on its operational contribution, notably  
152 the means of delivery via the blockchain. The movement has largely stalled in the proof of  
153 concept phase where the main question is “can we do it?” The answer, from the research  
154 community at least, has been a resounding yes (McNamara and Sepasgozar, 2021). The “how  
155 do we do it?” question is the one which has yet to be answered and where the research gap  
156 exists. Legal risk management theory was at a similar crossroads in its early development  
157 when Max Abrahamson set out his seminal principles in 1983. It is the author’s hope that the  
158 principles set out herein can be useful in developing the application of smart contracts to the  
159 construction industry. The question that arises is why have the valuable initiatives either  
160 stalled, in the case of collaboration, or are at risk of stalling, in the case of technology? The  
161 answer may be that insufficient attention has been given to the principles of how progress  
162 might be achieved and where efforts are best marshalled. This paper seeks to address this  
163 deficit and proposes guidance in the form of the principles set out herein.

## 164 Research Method

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166 Legal research styles were split into four approaches representing law reform, fundamental,  
167 expository and legal theory research (Arthurs, 1983) The interdisciplinary methodology, in  
168 which this work is positioned, relies on the professional constituency of the researcher. One  
169 of the priorities for the “new academic community” of legal scholars (Chynoweth, 2007) is to  
170 communicate its purpose, norms, values and methodologies to the wider built environment  
171 research community in which it resides. The socio-legal approach seeks to investigate law  
172 from the perspective of the social sciences (Tebbit, 2005). This tradition analyses the inter-  
173 relation of law with its stakeholders.

174 The selected researcher role in this investigative study is that of empathetic observer (Blaikie,  
175 2000). The risk of bias within this approach is real and present and is duly acknowledged. This  
176 was addressed in the Abrahamson paper with the statement “I realise the danger of  
177 preaching...Nevertheless we must have a starting point (Abrahamson, 1983).” Through this  
178 starting point it is hoped that the principles will allow progress towards market adoption and  
179 saturation. The diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers, 1962) informs that communication of  
180 new ideas over time can lead to mass adoption provided a sound footing is provided for the  
181 take-up.

182 The author has relied on deductive and inductive approaches (Azungah, 2018) in deciding on  
183 the principles featured here. The inductive research approach involves formulating a theory  
184 based on specific observations and aims to draw general conclusions about the investigated  
185 phenomenon. The deductive research approach starts with an existing theory or  
186 generalisation and aims to test its applicability to a specific scenario, in this case the  
187 construction industry (Azungah, 2018). This study examines the influence of knowledge-  
188 infused human behaviour and introduces five guiding principles to facilitate gradual progress  
189 in smart contracts. These principles, inspired by the existing framework of the Abrahamson  
190 principles, are adapted to the context of smart contracts in the construction industry.

191 The methodological socio-legal assumption on which this paper is based is that recognition  
192 should be made that before laws or legal vehicles come principles. The classic example in  
193 construction law is the afore-mentioned Abrahamson’s principles (Abrahamson, 1983) from  
194 which the risk profile of standard form contracts was based. Another is the Latham report  
195 (Latham, 1994) whose principles (recommendations) lead to the Housing Grants Construction  
196 and Regeneration Act of 1996. The Hackitt review (Hackitt, 2018) and its golden thread of data  
197 principle as hopefully to be enacted further in the Building Safety Act 2022 is the latest in the  
198 line of examples of the best place to start – with the “why”.

199 The starting point for this discussion is therefore that if we already have available the  
200 collaboration imperative and the technological infrastructure which are required for smart  
201 contracts. What is required are the principles around the guidance of what terms to automate,  
202 on the premise that smart contract adoption will be incremental. The basic question is “what  
203 should guide our hand in deciding which clauses should be automated next?” The requirement  
204 of validation of the principles will be required following their dissemination and is an eagerly  
205 anticipated piece of research in itself.

206

207

208 Findings - The Old and New Principles

209 Abrahamson's five principles (see Figure 1) can be summarised as follows: a party should  
210 take the risk if that party is:

- 211 i. In one party's control
- 212 ii. able to insure it
- 213 iii. the most efficient party to take the risk.
- 214 iv. accrues the economic benefit if the priced risk does not eventuate.
- 215 v. is more effected if the risk eventuates.

216 The application of both sets of principles is based on a majority outcome. Most risks give a  
217 clear outcome, for example, design risk sitting with the client on a traditionally procured project.  
218 Other risks are more nuanced, such as ground conditions where a careful weighing up on the  
219 risk principles are required. The author maintains that this risk should rest with the client as it  
220 is in their control for longer (i), insurance products are available (ii) and it results in efficiencies  
221 (iii). This is more persuasive that the contractor running the risk of gaining an economic benefit  
222 (iv) and being most impacted (v). In either case, the risk can be mitigated by proper site  
223 investigations. Abrahamson was self-effacing in terms of the cogency of the risks and the  
224 potential for them to give conflicting outcomes. Nevertheless, he recognised that it was "better  
225 to start from a position of principle than of unspoken bias" (Abrahamson, 1983).

226 Taking the Abrahamson approach, this paper proposes five new principles to guide the  
227 construction sector towards automation (see Figure 2). The recommendation to automate is  
228 again based on a majority outcome whether in favour or cautioning against the selection of  
229 the term. Automate a contractual term, where:

- 230 i) it is in the parties' control and/or insurable.
- 231 ii) the contract logic is codable and substantiates what preceded.
- 232 iii) Efficiencies for project management accrue for the benefit of the supply community  
233 and there is a time/cost/quality benefit for the client
- 234 iv) Extraneous events are reasonably predictable and manageable.
- 235 v) The data/records of all that has transpired are permanently available to both parties  
236 and interested third parties.



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238



239 Figure 1: Abrahamson's Principles on when a party to a construction contract should be  
240 allocated a risk

241 Figure 2: Principles for selecting terms for automation via smart contracts

242

243 Taking these in turn:

244 i) It is in the parties' control and is insurable.

245

246 The Weather Ledger referred to earlier also took important steps relating to insurance.  
247 Exponents of risk theory (as set out in Abrahamson's principles) know that insuring a risk is  
248 one way to manage it. Clyde and Co, a leading firm in insurance and construction law, worked  
249 with the other partners on the Weather Ledger project and see the potential for parametric  
250 insurance type arrangements where the worst-case scenarios based on experience inform the  
251 pay out in the anticipation or actuality of an event occurring (Brook, 2018). This approach  
252 could well be the key to bottoming out risk considerations around smart contracts and is worth  
253 exploring further in another paper.

254 Having control is key to managing risk. In the absence of control, we have insurance, possibly  
255 of the parametric type mentioned above. The more standardised, reliable, and repeatable the  
256 processes then the greater the control of the risk. Modern methods of construction and factory-  
257 built settings provide these in some measure and reach out towards the tipping point where  
258 everyone is comfortable with the simple transactional version of the smart contract .

259 ii) The contract logic is codable and substantiates what preceded.

260

261 The ability to turn contractual obligations into computer code via the use of algorithms appears  
262 increasingly straightforward. "If this, then this" is the simple transactional formula mentioned  
263 earlier. Contract logic ought to be codable allowing for either machine approval of completed  
264 tasks or human or by a combination of the two. Of course, it is rarely as simple as a single test  
265 for completion of a stage. However, whereas human users may balk at too many pre-  
266 conditions attached or links in the chain/network of a processes being fulfilled, computers are  
267 adept at handling complication. The processing power and memory of computers to have the  
268 pre-conditions in place for the completion of a multi-faceted task is a key strength of the brute  
269 force of computer programming. Another key strength is the substantiation of what has  
270 preceded in an incremental approach to completion. Essentially, the ratification and visibility  
271 of previous compliant actions overlays planned obligations with tangible fulfilled obligations.

272 iii) Extraneous events are kept to a minimum

273 Smart contract design using the stack approach (Mason, 2022) sets a course for partial  
274 automation retaining the need for oracles to deal with unforeseen or unpredictable situations  
275 as well as giving value judgments or reckoning. This has been the role of the Contract  
276 Administrator throughout the history of standard form construction contract development. The  
277 benefits of automation can be simplified to the statement that all things should run smoothly  
278 and there should be as little departure as possible from the as-planned to the as-built. One of  
279 the areas holding back smart contract development is the unique nature and environment of  
280 each building site. From its site conditions to its constraints on the use of resources and the  
281 lack of data capture infrastructure all combine to make the site very different from the  
282 controlled conditions of a factory, for example. This is a challenge which is being overcome  
283 through the use of technology such as drones and even robot dogs (Takaya et al, 2016). The  
284 technology will incrementally provide acceptable solutions and pair back the requirement for  
285 human checks and input. The terms of the contract to be automated as a priority will be those  
286 ones which are light on extraneous events and on those sites where a higher degree of  
287 predictability of outcomes is possible.

288 iv) Are Time/Cost/Quality benefits delivered for the whole Project?

289 Obviously, businesses require incentives to pursue new innovations— there needs to be  
290 consideration and an answer to the question – “what is in it for me?” The party/teams who  
291 took the steps to use the smart contract term should see the financial benefit of making the  
292 investment. Happily, for the contract parties this should benefit both. This principle should  
293 allow the supply chain to push back on the imposition of automation for the sake of it and  
294 facilitate discussion against excessive computation. The start-up investment in the technology  
295 can be prohibitively expensive and the client has to be comfortable with some of these costs  
296 coming back to its own long term improvement plan. Unfortunately, the construction sector is  
297 not known for its clarity of long-term vision.

298 v) Are the data and are the records available to all parties concerned?

299 Blockchain is one solution allowing the means to achieve availability of data and records. The  
300 blockchain takes the access to the data and its security out of the hands of the private ledger  
301 (and therefore the client’s sole grasp) and provides transparent and verifiable evidence of what  
302 transpired to interested third parties, such as funders. Blockchain remains as a credible  
303 solution, despite having endured its own hypecycle.

304 Increasing the sharing, granularity, accuracy and auditing of recording and predicting data  
305 should result in fewer issues with disputed facts. Sadly, to date, disputes endure  
306 notwithstanding the improvements in records. Disputes around such new issues as access to

307 data are just as likely to feature in the courts of the future. The case of *Trant v Mott MacDonald*<sup>2</sup>  
308 demonstrated that progress towards a technologically enhanced reduction in disputes may yet  
309 be a way-off.

## 310 Conclusion

311

312 It would be as well to issue an Abrahamson-type proviso to these principles for automation to  
313 state that there may be some tensions or inconsistencies in-built into the five broad  
314 suggestions made. However, the advantage the author has is that unlike with risk  
315 management between two parties whose interests can never fully overlap – who are, after all  
316 beholden to their shareholders and to return profits – is that here, they can. Technological  
317 advancement, done strategically, can benefit the whole industry. In the case of smart contracts,  
318 the strategy involves the careful selection of the terms which should be automated as a priority.  
319 It is hoped that these principles are useful in guiding the debates towards those areas most  
320 receptive to the advancement of technology.

## 321 Data Availability Statement

322

323 No data, models, or code were generated or used during the study.

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325

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396 Figure Captions List

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398 Figure 1: Abrahamson's Principles on when a party to a construction contract should be  
399 allocated a risk (line 237)

400 Figure 2: Principles for selecting terms for automation via smart contracts (line 240)

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