

Catholic Intellectuals and Transnational Anti-Communism: Pax Romana from the Spanish Civil War to the post-1945 World Order^{*}

When military rebels, including Francisco Franco, rose up against the elected Spanish government in July 1936, the state structures of the Second Republic were destabilised. This allowed leftist revolutionary militias, in response, to target middle-class Catholics with elite political backgrounds or a connection to the military rebellion. Among hundreds imprisoned in Madrid, ostensibly for their protection, was the 23-year-old scholar of canon law and president of Spain's Confederación Nacional de Estudiantes Católicos (CNEC), Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, and his two brothers. The CNEC functioned within the orbit of Catholic Action, the Vatican's main transnational conduit of social Catholicism, allied closely in Spain with the elite intellectual publicists of the Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas (ACNP), founded in 1909. These bodies were vehicles for mobilising Catholic society against the government's social and religious reforms of 1931–3 and for overturning the Republican constitution which separated Church and state. Amid the inchoate revolution which broke out in response to the military coup in 1936, the lives of the Ruiz-Giménez brothers were therefore in peril. Their release was secured only because of the intervention of the Republican wartime Minister of the Interior, Ángel Galarza. After taking refuge in the Panamanian embassy, they departed safely for rebel territory to join up with the insurgent forces, as did large numbers of political Catholics whose unity was sealed by what quickly became Franco's 'crusade'.¹

At virtually the same moment that Ruiz-Giménez was arrested in Madrid, his Catalan contemporary, the literary specialist Ramon Sugranyes de Franch, fled revolutionary Barcelona for Switzerland. The network of student internationalism to which Sugranyes was connected made escape possible. As vice-president since 1929 of the Catalan Catholic student federation, he was invited in August 1936 to the first conference of the World Youth Congress at the League of Nations in Geneva and issued with a safe conduct to travel by the Catalan Republican government. Following the failed military coup in Barcelona, his position as a Catholic student organiser

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1. Almost in its entirety, the ecclesiastical hierarchy in Spain backed the military rebellion against the Popular Front government.

made Sugranyes as vulnerable to attack by criminal elements as Ruiz-Giménez was in Madrid. Incipient Christian Democracy was more vigorous in Catalonia than in most of Spain and the *Federació Catalana d'Estudiants Catòlics* had supported the Republican government when the regime was inaugurated in 1931.² Sugranyes was, moreover, publicly active in the Republican project for an autonomous university in Barcelona, relatively independent of the central state, as an expression of regionalist civic sentiment. But his consequent misgivings about the Spanish military rebellion did not diminish the personal threat to his life in the revolutionary summer of 1936. This ambivalence would later prevent him from returning to Franco's Spain for many years.

This article compares the parallel traumatic experiences of Ruiz-Giménez and Sugranyes de Franch during and after the Spanish Civil War. The biographical comparison reveals a shared cultural conditioning as young activists within a global Church as well as an undercutting of this commonality by fundamental differences. Ruiz-Giménez (1913–2009), a Spaniard from Madrid who fought for Franco, became a professor of civil and religious law in the early 1940s while acting internationally on behalf of the head of state. He was publicly unstinting in his loyalty, never contradicting the myth of Franco as saviour of the Spanish nation-state and defender of 'the Christian West'. Relative to Ruiz-Giménez, the Catalan-speaking Sugranyes de Franch (1911–2011) was a Catholic outsider, as resolutely anti-Communist as his contemporary but unconvinced by the Spanish nationalist claims of the insurgents and the moral force and doctrinal legitimacy of their 'holy war'. He became increasingly doubtful during the civil war years of exile and the broader European conflict of 1939–45. Intensive engagement with humanitarian activity and ideas in France and Switzerland reinforced his commitment to religious and political pluralism.

The essential disparities between Ruiz-Giménez and Sugranyes go to the heart of global Catholic fissures during the trans-war era of the 1930s and 1940s. By exploring the interplay of ideas and events as they affected political Catholics such as them—and by paying close attention to chronology—it is possible to see how connections between successive conflicts were a factor in the origins of Christian Democratic predominance in Western Europe after 1945. This political ascendancy resulted from a blend of the Church's conservatism in the 1930s and the anti-fascist resistance of a minority of Catholics, especially in 1939–45. And yet, the transnational effects of Spain's war of 1936–9, the dictatorship resulting from it, and the emigration of the anti-Franco Catholic diaspora as it interacted with opponents of fascism elsewhere in Europe, have not been explored. They help to delineate important continuities

2. Only in Catalonia and the Basque Country were social reform and pluralism significant motifs for large numbers of political Catholics in the 1930s.

and complexities in the fracturing of the Church between conservative nation-statists and those advocating political and social fraternalism.³

As well as bringing this trans-war chronology into view, an examination of the key roles played by Ruiz-Giménez and Sugranyes in Pax Romana, the international federation of Roman Catholic university students and graduates, opens up a fundamental and neglected aspect of the transnational background to the Christian Democratic political breakthrough. The flow of people and exchange of ideas and symbols across borders during wartime energised individuals in transcending national perspectives. Through their successive leadership of Pax Romana both men travelled intellectually and politically beyond the confined spaces of their previous models of politics and religion.⁴ Pax Romana was founded in Fribourg, Switzerland, in 1921, as an international network for distributing charity, dispensing educative and cultural guidance, and funding foreign scholarships. More importantly, it provided a transnational forum where debate distilled broad trends in Catholic thought at a time when the Church had to respond to the totalitarian challenges of fascism and Communism.⁵ The organisation thus provided access to ideas through which Ruiz-Giménez and Sugranyes made sense of their flight from revolution in 1936 and navigated the material, spiritual and ideological battles that followed.⁶

In the aftermath of the civil war, Ruiz-Giménez became international president of Pax Romana, occupying the role during the tumultuous era until 1946. This proved instrumental in his appointment as Franco's ambassador to the Vatican in 1948–50 and Minister of Education in 1951, from which post he was discharged in 1956 for embarking on liberalising reform.⁷ He later became a figurehead of Christian Democratic opposition in Spain, a trajectory he traced to his border-crossing experiences

3. J. Chappel, *Catholic Modern: The Challenge of Totalitarianism and the Remaking of the Church* (Cambridge, MA, 2018). For the vital transnationality of Christian Democratic political parties, see W. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge, 2007); and for essential post-1945 material and geopolitical context, see M. Conway, 'The Rise and Fall of Western Europe's Democratic Age, 1945–1973', *Contemporary European History*, xiii (2004), pp. 67–88, esp. 81–5.

4. On this transcendent essence of transnationalism, see P.-Y. Saunier, 'Transnational', in A. Iriye and P.-Y. Saunier, eds, *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (New York, 2009), pp. 1049–52.

5. The 1921 founding bodies were the Catholic university associations of wartime neutrals: the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland.

6. In contrast with this focus on the 'molecular' level of individuals, recent scholarship has viewed the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship through the lens of anti-Communist 'internationalisms' driven by the power interests of state and Church; see D. Brydan, *Franco's Internationalists: Social Experts and Spain's Search for Legitimacy* (Oxford, 2019); G. Chamedes, *A Twentieth-Century Crusade: The Vatican's Battle to Remake Christian Europe* (Cambridge, MA, 2019), pp. 178–83, 194–9, 265–70. The current article is based on the unpublished personal papers of Ruiz-Giménez in Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Archivo Ruiz-Giménez [hereafter ARG]; the published letters of Sugranyes (in scattered editions, variously in Catalan, French, Italian and Spanish); and the Archives Pax Romana in Fribourg [hereafter APR].

7. J. Muñoz Soro, 'Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez o el católico total', in *Pasado y Memoria*, v (2006), pp. 259–88.

of the 1940s. Contact with Rome came initially through Pax Romana and subsequently—closer to power—during the Holy See ambassadorship. The city constituted not only Vatican ‘Command Central’, however, but also a hub of ideas. As Ruiz-Giménez later declared, ‘I had lived through the Catholicism of our war, the Catholicism of “crusade” and of the confessional state; in Rome, by contrast, I found myself with men who understood Catholicism in a different way ... the first men of Christian Democracy’, who did not condemn the civil war’s exiles as Francoist state ideology required.⁸

In June 1946, Pax Romana’s world congress was controversially held in Franco’s Spain, thanks largely to the efforts of Ruiz-Giménez. Following the congress he stood down and, as part of a thorough overhaul, a new Pax leadership was elected, including Ramon Sugranyes as Secretary General, a post he held until 1958.⁹ The paths of the itinerant exile and the ostensible Franco loyalist seldom intersected directly. But their parallel lives, and eventual convergence in the early 1960s as forward-thinking lay assessors at the Second Vatican Council, illustrate the contested nature of the post-war resurgence of the intellectual laity and its relation to events both past and present.¹⁰

The 1946 Pax Romana congress in Spain was not primarily about Vatican authority. Rather, it demonstrated the depth of the intellectual breach in the Church and was pivotal to the revival of lay influence. To the Fribourg executive of Pax in 1946, Ruiz-Giménez stood for Franco’s Spain, an inconvenient symbol not only of fascism but also of a brand of Catholicism—with considerable international traction—which obsessed about ‘Bolshevism’ and depended for protection on state centralism and an imposed social order founded on the family as base unit for reproducing the patriarchal and homogeneous nation. Sugranyes, meanwhile, symbolised a new, forward-looking Catholicism, associated with the public rejection of fascism and adaptable to post-war demands. Two key public intellectuals to whom Sugranyes gravitated during the Spanish and European conflicts exemplified this civic pluralism as they condemned the wartime Francoists. The first was Jacques Maritain, the French neo-Thomist philosopher, who in 1937 denounced Franco’s legitimating ‘holy war’ thesis as sacrilege and later served as France’s ambassador to the Vatican between 1945 and 1948. The other was Father Luigi Sturzo, the founder of the Partito Popolare Italiano, who had been exiled from Fascism in 1924, and who (like Maritain) insisted that Spain’s war was inescapably a *social* conflict rather than being about

8. Interview with Ruiz-Giménez in S. Pániker, *Conversaciones en Madrid* (Barcelona, 1969), p. 332. On Ruiz-Giménez as Education Minister, rehabilitating Republicans and exiles: J. Tusell, *Franco y los católicos* (Madrid, 1984), pp. 308–36.

9. By 1946 Sugranyes was teaching at Fribourg’s Catholic University.

10. R. Sugranyes de Franch, *Militant per la justícia: Memòries dialogades amb el pare Hilari Raguer*, ed. H. Raguer (Barcelona, 1998).

redeeming Christian civilisation.¹¹ Their version of the faith as a frame for lived experience derived in part from this critique of nation-statism.

Maritain's philosophy of 'integral humanism' was fundamental. Articulated first amid Nazism's consolidation of power, it focused on the doctrine of 'personalism' which—confronted by the opposing forces of totalitarianism and unchecked liberal individualism—set out a route to a just temporal order through respect for human dignity.¹² These ideas, backed by fellow critics of the Church, drew Catholic attention transnationally towards the potential of political pluralism.¹³ In Maritain's terms, the Spanish rebels' violent action was in effect on a continuum with Nazi extreme nation-statism, an analysis which rapidly filtered through to Sugranyes.¹⁴ Ruiz-Giménez never acknowledged such a position, maintaining that the civil war had simply been a victory won by Catholics, but from the mid-1940s he began hesitantly to absorb Maritainist ideas, largely through the transnational capillaries of Pax Romana.

Whereas for many Catholics globally the Spanish conflict assumed epic significance—condensing centuries of the Church's embattled history—for Maritain and Sturzo it illuminated fundamental problems of the faith. Repositioning the Church meant harnessing the laity's critical faculties. The impact of their proposition needs to be gauged, however, by focusing less on these pre-eminent figures than upon the intellectuals who performed the spadework of international associations dedicated to shaping potential leaders in society's new temporal order. Ruiz-Giménez and Sugranyes represented a wide socio-professional group which encompassed academics, teachers, journalists, lawyers, scientists, doctors, engineers and others.¹⁵ Viewed from the vantage point of this social body—the transnational rank-and-file of Pax Romana—we can see that the organisation's trans-war progressive evolution (as explored in the following sections on the 1930s and 1940s) depended on an active struggle between rivals 'from below'. This was a political and theological struggle initiated by disputing the meaning of the war in Spain. The resulting differences overhung the painful adaptation of Pax Romana—and, by extension, that of the Church—to the world order ushered in by the Second World War.

11. The key Maritain text is J. Maritain, 'De la guerre sainte', *La Nouvelle Revue Française*, 1 July 1937, later published as the preface to A. Mendizábal, *Aux origines d'une tragédie* (Paris, 1937).

12. The seminal philosophy is found in J. Maritain, *Humanisme intégral: Problèmes temporels et spirituels d'une nouvelle chrétienté* (Paris, 1936), first published as lectures delivered in Spain in 1934 as *Problemas espirituales y temporales de una nueva cristiandad* (Madrid, 1935).

13. See also É. Gilson, *Pour un ordre catholique* (Paris, 1934), published in Spanish (with a preface by A. Mendizábal) as *Por un orden católico* (Madrid, 1936); E. Mounier, *Manifeste au service du personalisme* (Paris, 1936).

14. For the continuum, see J. Maritain, *Le crépuscule de la civilisation* (Paris, 1939).

15. See, for example, a letter to the Pax executive from a Catholic medical student from Barcelona—later Catalonia's most important hospital reformer—and enthusiastic response: APR, B.1, Aragó Mitjans to Salat, 24 June 1939; Salat to Aragó, 29 July 1939.

I

Throughout the 1930s, unprecedented levels of foreign travel produced a 'new internationalism of university youth' by which Catholics mixed warily with secular groups.¹⁶ The fracturing experience of Spain's war thus affected Catholic youthful activism internationally. Most of the university branches within each country's Catholic lay structures were affiliated to Pax Romana, gaining access to its international network.¹⁷ In the post-1917 anti-communist struggle, Pius XI bestowed special significance on the university apostolic associations, equivalent to 'military academies', from which it was intended 'a general staff' would emerge.¹⁸ Activists were expected by the Holy See to restrict themselves to tasks specific to the pontificate, but the injunction to keep apart from national politics was severely tested amid the polarisation of Europe in the 1930s.

In Spain, following the fall of the military dictatorship in 1930, the existing political edifice of Throne and Altar appeared to be crumbling. The new mass politics was animated by a youthful generation which, on one side, mobilised to promote change as promised by the egalitarian and secular values of the Second Republic, inaugurated in 1931. On the other, secularism was actively resisted by the mobilised young who were trained by Catholic Action to defend the 'Christian essence of the nation' against what was portrayed as 'Communism', even if not all activists advocated an integrally Catholic state.¹⁹ The Republic's projected law of 1933 to limit the influence of religious orders, by ending their role in education, hardened Catholic rejection of the Republic, though less so in regionalist Catalonia. In common with much of the urban upper-middle classes, both Ruiz-Giménez (the son of a mayor of Madrid during the monarchy) and Sgranyes (whose mother was of the Catalan propertied class and whose father was successor to the architect Antoni Gaudí) were educated in exclusive confessional schools, the purpose of which was to produce active Christian leaders in the professions.²⁰

16. H.J. Parkinson: 'The Growth and Opportunities of Student Travel', *The Tablet*, 14 Apr. 1945, p. 172. 'Youth', in this era of intense mobilisation, meant loosely those aged between 16 and 35.

17. Although Catholic Action branches predominated, Pax's federated bodies included representatives of other lay fellowships, including Marian congregations.

18. Pope Pius XI's 'Discourse to the University Catholic Action of Italy', 22 Dec. 1935, cited in E.J. Kirchner, 'Role of the University in National Catholic Action', *National Catholic Welfare Conference Bulletin*, xxi, no. 2 (1 Feb. 1939).

19. One of Acción Católica's early ecclesiastical tutors, ordained in 1929, recalled this youthful 'providential mobilisation': V. Enrique y Taracón, *Recuerdos de juventud* (Barcelona, 1984), pp. 130–31. See also M. Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 1930–1936* (Oxford, 1996).

20. Ruiz-Giménez boarded with the Augustinians at El Escorial and Sgranyes attended a *colegio* of the Escolapians in the city of Barcelona.

Immersion in student associations followed for both young men, although the implications of Catholic activism in Barcelona were significantly different from Madrid. Catholics in Catalonia were constrained by the inward-looking centralism of both the Spanish state and the ecclesiastical hierarchy. As part of a community which felt culturally and linguistically beleaguered, the Catalan Church during the nationally formative late nineteenth century in the region became a relatively popular and enlightened presence; its intellectuals looked to other parts of Western Europe for a model of Catholic modernity. Cultural difference was thus accentuated by religion. Catalan culture and language were, for example, absent from Ruiz-Giménez's primary, secondary and university education in Madrid, and, he recalled, Catalan claims during the Republic were not tackled by the Church or the state as expressions of legitimate identity but as political and constitutional threats.²¹

Sugranyes had supported the Republican government in 1931 because it recognised this regionalist-national sentiment. Christian Democracy had a significant presence in Catalonia and a Catholic political party, the *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* (UDC), had been founded in 1931 around the young lawyer Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera, in support of social reform and pluralism. Sugranyes had moved away from the conservatism of his father, who supported the Catalanist party of the upper bourgeoisie, the Lliga Regionalista, towards the UDC's civic reforming priorities. The party's leader, Carrasco, was critical of 'Catholics of convenience', for example, who argued against the government's 1933 law to restrict the influence of religious congregations merely because they wished the paternalist state to continue to protect their material privileges. He critiqued the law instead by asserting the rights of Catholics as fraternal citizens of the Republic. In so doing he invoked the regime's own constitutional promise to defer to the universal rights of national minorities.²² This position reinforced the image which Spanish integristas had of Catalan Catholics as a potentially threatening 'other'.

Ruiz-Giménez and Sugranyes thus shared in the formative collective imagination of educated Catholics, while the sources of their wartime divergence were also deeply rooted. Following the Popular Front electoral victory of February 1936, the military rebellion which led to civil war was expected. It was welcomed by Ruiz-Giménez, who was convinced that the Thomist doctrine stating the right of Catholics to rebel against tyranny justified taking up arms against the laicising Republic once a legalist electoral strategy had failed. He was typical of

21. B. Porcel, *Cataluña vista desde fuera* (Barcelona, 1970), pp. 18, 22 (Ruiz-Giménez testimony).

22. *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes*, no. 302, 28 Feb. 1933, available online at https://app.congreso.es/est_sesiones/ (accessed 21 Aug. 2023).

Catholics who had never advocated a military or fascist coup but could not stomach a Church cut down to size in the interests of modernity. By 1936 Ruiz-Giménez believed that only the army could protect the Church. He suffered no crisis of conscience in supporting the officers' coup when it came, in contrast to the deeply conflicted Sugranyes.²³

The Vatican was broadly supportive of the rebels' 'holy war' even though they were aided by the Axis states. The murder of priests in the Republican wartime zone was deeply lamented and Pius XI's March 1937 encyclical against Communism (*Divini Redemptoris*) cited this religious persecution, his message avidly disseminated in the rebel zone by Acción Católica and the ACNP.²⁴ Yet the regional dimension of the civil war forced the attention of Catholics globally towards questions about the communion between the Church and the faithful. The Vatican fell short of giving unconditional support to the 'crusade', in large part because Franco's stated aim was to extirpate Basque and Catalan regionalism, despite both being Catholic, either entirely (in the first case) or significantly (in the second).²⁵ The Church was thus confronted by the limits of papal authority when faced with ethno-Catholic statism in Spain which deployed violence in the name of the faith even against Catholics. In April 1938, Manuel Carrasco became the most well-known victim of Francoist brutality against Catalan Catholicism when he was captured and executed, despite Luigi Sturzo's mustering of international Catholic protest, with the help of Alfredo Mendizábal, the Christian Democratic Spanish lawyer, by this time exiled in Paris with Sugranyes.²⁶

All Catalanists were abhorred by the military rebels, even those who favoured the Francoists once war came and mounted propaganda internationally on behalf of the generals' 'crusade', as the elitist Lliga Regionalista did from Geneva and Paris.²⁷ Rebel hostility was particularly scornful, however, towards the forward-thinking archbishop of the Catalan diocese of Tarragona, Francesc Vidal i Barraquer, who like Sugranyes had escaped the revolution in 1936 with the help of the regional Republican government. Barraquer declined to sign the much-publicised July 1937 collective letter of the Spanish bishops

23. S. Vilar, *La oposición a la dictadura* (Barcelona, 1976), p. 565 (Ruiz-Giménez, interview [1967] with Sergio Vilar). By contrast, on integrist Catholics who plotted the Republic's violent downfall from its beginning, see P.C. González Cuevas, *Acción Española* (Madrid, 1998). On justification of 'holy war', see A. Castro Albarán, *El derecho a la rebeldía* (Madrid, 1934).

24. Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas, *Encíclica contra el comunismo; discurso a los españoles refugiados; carta sobre la situación religiosa en Méjico* (Pamplona, 1937).

25. H. Ragner, *El pólvoro y el incienso: La iglesia y la guerra civil española (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 2001).

26. Sturzo put Sugranyes in touch with Mendizábal; see *Luigi Sturzo: Scritti inediti*, II: 1924–1940, ed. F. Rizzi (Rome, 1975) [hereafter *Scritti*], p. 451 (Sturzo to Sugranyes, 13 Mar. 1937). In 1934, it had been Mendizábal who invited Maritain to Spain to present the lectures which later became *Humanisme intégral*.

27. B. de Riquer, *L'últim Cambó (1936–1947): La drete catalanista davant la Guerra Civil i el primer franquisme* (Vic, 1996).

supporting the rebels and his return to Tarragona after Franco's victory was blocked by the new regime. The archbishop was given refuge first in Italy and later in Fribourg, becoming a figurehead for progressive Catholic exiles there.²⁸ They included Sugranyes, who from exile publicised key texts of Catalan Catholic culture as potential exemplars of a single, forward-thinking, national identity.²⁹ Displaced Catalans in Switzerland nonetheless formed two mutually antagonistic networks: the larger (based on the conservative Lliga) supported the generals' rebellion for the sake of order and property; the smaller, loosely associated with the UDC, was condemned by the majority for its scepticism.³⁰ Sugranyes—who had been formally called up *in absentia* by both contending forces in Spain—was refused absolution by a Catalan priest at Geneva's Basilica of Our Lady, in November 1936, because he had not returned to Spain 'to fight for Christ the King'. His confession was taken instead by Maritain's confidant, Father Charles Journet, with whom Sugranyes was put in touch by another Catalan priest, Carles Cardó, who was taught by Journet at the seminary in Fribourg.³¹

The anti-Leftism of Sugranyes—and of Cardó—was nevertheless clear: he considered the Left Republicans in control of the Catalan government (the Generalitat) to be collaborators of the revolution because they 'handed power to the rabble' by agreeing to share power with anarchists after they helped resist the military rebellion of July 1936. He went so far as to discuss a possible counter-revolutionary coup of Catalan exiles against the Generalitat to forestall the region's occupation by Franco.³² Cardó agreed about the need to suppress the 'red Catalans'; when Sugranyes voiced his indecision about returning either to Burgos (HQ of the rebels) or to Barcelona, his mentor advised that the latter was impossible: 'At the orders of Moscow, never!'³³ Sugranyes thus objected strongly to the revolution; but he also rejected 'the lesser evil' of fighting with a violently centralising *españolista* force. The

28. See Sugranyes on Barraquer as prophetic of Vatican II, and commentary on the return of the Cardinal's mortal remains to Catalonia in May 1978: R. Sugranyes, 'El cardenal, la Iglesia y la política', *La Vanguardia*, 13 May 1978.

29. On republishing the pastoral letters of Josep Torras i Bages and translations of the poet Maragall, see J. Giró i Paris, *Dos homes de pau en temps de guerra* (Barcelona, 2001) [hereafter Giró], pp. 47–8, 82 (Sugranyes to Cardó, 2 Jan. 1937, 20 Apr. 1937); Sugranyes, 'Un poète catalan: Joan Maragall', *Nova et Vetera* (Fribourg), xii, no. 4 (1937), pp. 369–76, and 'Poèmes choisis', *ibid.*, pp. 377–88.

30. Giró, pp. 27–9 (Sugranyes to Cardó, 23 Oct. 1936).

31. Sugranyes, *Militant*, p. 59. From 1937, Cardó was a regular correspondent of Sturzo. See also C. Cardó, *Histoire Spirituelle des Espagnes* (Paris, 1946), which defines Franco's 'crusade' as 'imposing the faith by force'.

32. A. González i Vilalta, *La tercera Catalunya (1936–1940)* (Barcelona, 2013), pp. 443–4 (Sugranyes to Estelrich, 27 Nov. 1936).

33. Giró, pp. 30, 35–6 (Cardó to Sugranyes, 3 Nov. 1936). In the early stages, negotiation with triumphant rebels—rather than survival of the Republic—was naively the hope of Cardó: 'if Madrid falls (quickly), Catalunya will be spared many horrors': Giró, pp. 40–41 (Cardó to Sugranyes, 7 Dec. 1936).

thought of supporting the imposition of ‘a forced and artificial religiosity with sacred images draped in Field-Marshal’s robes’ was impossible.³⁴ Crucially, communication with Maritain and, first, Sturzo—to whom he turned for counsel, with Cardó’s encouragement, in early 1937—led Sugranyes to a fusion of his Catalanist objection to the rebels with a broader Catholic humanist analysis.³⁵

Sugranyes began to accept abstention from the conflict and talked in social Catholic terms of ‘self-elevation’ as a means to rising above the contending parties.³⁶ Contact with pro-Franco Catalans had convinced him that they possessed ‘a certain love of the White terror’.³⁷ From Sturzo he sought spiritual and political affirmation as well as help with finding employment, possibly in London.³⁸ His vacillation over entwined religious, political and national allegiances was palpable, as were the limits of his analysis of the Republic:

we Catalans have seen our country treacherously put in the hands of the worst enemies of Christian civilization: communists and anarchists. We were thus obliged to put the destinies of our country in the hands of the rebel generals as the only means of restoring order and peace.

And yet reliance on the generals spelled ‘immense dangers’ because it would mean government established upon ‘a tragic basis of hate and spitefulness’.³⁹ Sturzo’s decisive reply, defining the war as a social conflict, offered a rational critique of the ‘holy war’ myth. As he saw it, anti-clerical workers in Spain ‘became angry with God’ because the Church had failed to back social reform. It then further mortgaged itself by siding with ‘the crusade’. Total victory of one side over the other could not bring genuine peace, he argued, nor overcome the Church’s probable consequent crisis caused by dependence on an authoritarian state.⁴⁰

Sturzo’s advice reflected an emerging fraternalism, which became a framework for Sugranyes by virtue of exiled existence among fellow Catholic outsiders. At its heart was a critique of traditionalist patriarchal sanctities. The fate of Sugranyes’s planned marriage exemplified, indeed, how the political and the personal converged in wartime conditions, creating possibilities for re-imagining the relationship between public and private. Betrothed to a young woman whose

34. Giró, pp. 38–40 (Sugranyes to Cardó, 28 Nov. 1936).

35. Giró, pp. 48, 50, 55–8 (Sugranyes–Cardó correspondence, 2 and 12 Jan. 1937, 22 Feb. 1937).

36. González, *Tercera*, p. 461 (Sugranyes to Estelrich, 31 Dec. 1936).

37. Giró, pp. 55–8 (Sugranyes to Cardó, 22 Feb. 1937). See *La persecution religieuse en Espagne* (Paris, 1937), published anonymously by the Lliga’s head of pro-rebel propaganda, Joan Estelrich, which attacked Maritain, Sturzo and other Catholic critics for signing a manifesto (8 May 1937) calling for cessation of killing non-combatants.

38. *Opera omnia di Luigi Sturzo*, ser. 3, iv, no. 12: *Luigi Sturzo e gli amici spagnoli: Carteggi (1924–1951)*, ed. A. Botti (Soveria Mannelli, 2012) [hereafter *Opera*], pp. 427–8 (Sugranyes to Sturzo, 8 Apr. 1937; Sturzo to Sugranyes, 9 Apr. 1937).

39. *Scritti*, pp. 447–8 (Sugranyes to Sturzo, 15 Feb. 1937).

40. *Scritti*, p. 449 (Sturzo to Sugranyes, 18 Feb. 1937).

pro-Lliga family supported the Spanish generals, he was pressured to return and join the rebels and was accused of being a ‘coward’ and a ‘traitor’.⁴¹ It was his friend, Carles Eugeni Mascarenyes, with whom he had left Barcelona for Geneva in 1936, who offered a reasoned Catholic alternative. Following Maritain—who in 1934 explicitly deprecated the bourgeois paternalist norm of marriage reduced to social convention—Mascarenyes (from his own site of refuge in Toulouse) suggested a model of marriage as an affective coupling based on ‘a communion of political and moral ideas’. Ultimately, his friend insisted, Sugranyes was—or should aspire to be—‘a different kind of man, a humanist, if you like’.⁴² The betrothal was thus ended; within two years Sugranyes met his future wife, Liselotte Bickel, an exiled German convert of Jewish background, while both were working temporarily for the League of Nations in Geneva. For Sugranyes, war sharpened the Catholic fraternalist critique of patriarchal marriage and, it should be added, of antisemitism, both in general and within the Church.⁴³

Sugranyes thus justified abstention through what he perceived as the moral deficiencies of nation-statist Catholics who acquiesced in violence and totalitarianism. To Sturzo, in June 1937, he voiced his revulsion at ‘the wave of uncivilised passions, cruelties and lusts unleashed by the (Spanish) war’, condemning ‘the political immorality, profiteers, and despoilers’ who surfaced in its shadow. These opportunists were ‘hardly less widespread (in the rebel zone) than among the so-called Reds’. Among them were Catholics who cleaved to state power and relished the Church’s sharing of the public sphere alongside the military rebels and falangists. The chances for Maritain’s conjectured ‘civic fraternities’ were being buried by a ‘complete lack of charity in private relationships’; people had ‘made a way of life out of denunciation (of enemies)’. This was ‘morally worse among the “whites” (who belonged) to classes which claim superiority’. The criticism owed something to historic Catalanist claims to supremacy in the task (still pending, as they saw it) of constructing a modern state in Spain. The real cause of the war, Sugranyes declared, was a lack of intelligence, ‘of a cultivated and responsible elite for many decades’, culminating in a war between ‘proletarian masses’ and ‘bourgeois masses’.⁴⁴ His critique was nevertheless

41. Giró, p. 69 (Sugranyes to Cardó, 28 Mar. 1937).

42. González, *Tercera Catalunya*, p. 632 (Mascarenyes to Sugranyes, 9 Oct. 1937). For Maritain’s critique of ‘bourgeois marriage’ and advocacy of women’s personhood in a context of pluralist civil society, see Maritain, *Problemas espirituales*; Maritain, *Humanisme intégral*, pp. 210–13. See also Chappel, *Catholic Modern*, pp. 115–23, 232–9.

43. J. Maritain, ‘L’impossible antisémitisme’, in P. Claudel, ed., *Les Juifs* (Paris, 1937). Maritain, a protestant convert in 1906, was reflexively assumed by Francoists to be Jewish—a Pharisee and a traitor: *ABC*, 21 June 1938 (Interior Minister, Ramón Serrano Suñer). On the significance to Catholic anti-fascism of converts, Jewishness and ‘border-crossers’, see J. Connelly, *From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching on the Jews, 1933–1965* (Cambridge, MA, 2012), pp. 61–4, 290.

44. *Opera*, pp. 429–31 (Sugranyes to Sturzo, 2 June 1937).

fired by the energising transnational experience of fraternalist Catholic theory and practice.

The dialogue with Sturzo was vital as Sugranyes remained materially vulnerable, unable to obtain assistance from Pax Romana's Secretariat, to which he made a request in April 1937.⁴⁵ At a time when the organisation's public position depended on the approval of the pro-rebel Bishop of Fribourg—Pax's honorary president—there was no appetite to engage actively with the Maritainist critique of Franco's war. The organisation's newspaper steered clear of the conflict, indeed, until early 1938. Collecting aid for Catholic students in Spain was all that could be done, apart from disseminating in the Catholic university press the tendentious collective letter of the Spanish bishops.⁴⁶ Despite Pax's official quietism it was nonetheless impossible to suppress all criticism. At the World Congress in Ljubljana in 1938 one delegate ventured that the Church's social failings in Spain had created a barrier to the poor. The workers had burned churches in revolutionary Barcelona at the same time as displaying posters referencing the 1891 social teachings of Leo XIII and pronouncing: 'This is what Catholicism *says*—and this is what we *do*'.⁴⁷ As Sturzo had written to Sugranyes, 'the Spaniard is Catholic in his own way, even when burning churches as a form of protest'.⁴⁸ This social analysis was relatively marginal, however, remaining so during much of the European war, until the opportunity arose to question fundamental assumptions at Pax's momentous 1946 congress in Spain. In 1938 Pax remained publicly conservative, heralding the student branch of Spanish Catholic Action as the engine of future Spanish regeneration, for example.⁴⁹ By 1946, such a position was untenable.

Francoist discourse during the war in Spain was the antithesis of Sturzo's social analysis. The leitmotif was collective martyrdom, based on the killing of priests and lay Catholics in the Republican war zone, especially in the conflict's early months. In recognition, the central theme of Pax's 1938 congress had been 'the Catholic student faced with Communism'. The Primate of Spain, Isidro Gomá, wrote to the organisation's Swiss Secretary General, Father Joseph Gremaud, explaining Spaniards' inevitable absence and affirming that 'our martyred and blood-drenched Spain is firm proof of what Communism brings with it'.⁵⁰ When

45. *Opera*, pp. 428–9 (Sugranyes to Sturzo, 10 May 1937).

46. 'Espagne', *Pax Romana* [hereafter *PR*], iii, no. 3 (Jan. 1938), p. 2; violent destruction was condemned, without discussing responsibilities, as with 'the overwhelming horror' of Guernica. Also, see letters in *Archivo Gomá: Documentos de la guerra civil, X: Abril–Junio 1938*, ed. J. Andrés-Gallego and A.M. Pazos (Madrid, 2007), pp. 101–3, 195, 231–2.

47. *The Tablet*, 3 Sept. 1938. See also 1938 resolutions, in *PR*, iii, no. 9 (Nov. 1938), p. 2, on building 'a new Christian social order which will render Communist revolution inefficacious'.

48. *Scritti*, p. 449 (Sturzo to Sugranyes, 18 Feb. 1937).

49. M. Pobé, Chancellor of the University of Fribourg, 'Les étudiants catholiques d'Espagne ont besoin de nos coeurs!', *PR*, iii, no. 5, Mar. 1938, p. 1.

50. *Archivo Gomá, XI: Julio–Septiembre 1938*, ed. J. Andrés-Gallego and A.M. Pazos (Madrid, 2007), p. 274 (Gomá to Gremaud, 11 Aug. 1938); *PR*, iii, no. 9, Nov. 1938, p. 2.

Ruiz-Giménez was elected president a year later he was thus imbued with symbolic capital as a youthful 'crusader' and survivor of his own personal encounter with 'Communism'. Shortly before, he attended the assembly of the South American Catholic student body in Lima as a man of faith forged in battle 'who had suffered (the war's) tremendous trauma'.⁵¹ The symbolism of sacrifice had been vindicated by the deliberate inclusion among the Spanish delegation of young men visually exhibiting combat wounds.⁵²

The fraternalist counter to the martyrdom narrative depended publicly on the Comité pour la Paix Civile et Religieuse en Espagne, established in Paris and supplemented by Spanish and British equivalents. It relied on Sturzo and Maritain, backed by Cardinal Barraquer, Alfredo Mendizábal and other Catholic exiles.⁵³ This committee became a vehicle for schooling Sugranyes and others in humanitarian organisation. When paid employment dried up in Geneva, he relocated to Paris where the Comité was based, lodging in early 1939 at the same hotel as Mendizábal. In April 1938, he had presented a report on the exchange of prisoners and civilian evacuation to the Committee's conference, undertaking also to establish a Swiss peace committee. Pro-Franco Swiss Catholics made this difficult and Sugranyes commented on the 'provincialism' of the Catholic milieu in Geneva, paralysed by its 'terrible fear of Communism'.⁵⁴ Ultimately, Catholic fraternalism would be boosted by the shifting balance among Catholic intellectuals as a result of Hitler's war in Europe. The laity was strengthened, at the same time, by the growing prominence of its technocratic and professional sections and their active involvement in transnational resistance to occupation and fascism.⁵⁵

II

The war in Spain cast a shadow over Pax Romana during 1940–46 as the organisation manoeuvred intellectually between fascism and resistance. As they joined with others displaced during the European war, border-crossing exiles from Spain helped crystallise Catholic aspirations for post-war Europe. Ambitious ideas were fertilised in a specific geographic

51. A. Monclús Estella, 'El pensamiento cristiano: Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez', in J.L. Abellán and A. Monclús, eds, *El pensamiento español contemporáneo y la idea de América* (2 vols, Barcelona, 1989), i, pp. 299–300.

52. *Archivo Gomá*, XII: *Octubre–Diciembre 1938*, ed. J. Andrés-Gallego and A.M. Pazos (Madrid, 2009), pp. 430–36 (Pareja to Aparici, 28 Nov. 1938). See also M. Vincent, 'The Martyrs and the Saints: Masculinity and the Construction of the Francoist Crusade', *History Workshop Journal*, no. 47 (1999), pp. 69–98.

53. Barraquer proposed to the Holy See, without success, that it organise an international conference behind a negotiated peace.

54. González, *Tercera*, pp. 573–4, 624 (Sugranyes to Mendizábal, 27 May 1937, 29 Sept. 1937); *La paix civile: Bulletin mensuel du Comité espagnol pour la paix civile*, no. 4 (1938), p. 54.

55. C. Toupin-Guyot, *Les intellectuels catholiques dans la société française: Le Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français (1941–1976)* (Rennes, 2002).

space, encompassing France, Italy and ultimately Germany—with neutral Switzerland in-between—from where Christian Democratic hegemony later emerged. Gremaud evoked an intellectual utopia, indeed, in his representation of exile-enriched Fribourg as ‘a little Europe’, an image he extended to the entire country as ‘one vast university’, associating Swiss neutrality with emerging fraternalist ideas.⁵⁶ It was an impression shaped by an environment very different to that of Catholics in Spain, whose anti-Communism fed self-referentially upon triumphalist Francoism after April 1939.

With the fall of Paris, Sugranyes, Mendizábal and José María Semprún—another Spanish critic of nation-statist Catholicism—headed for the main centres of Spanish Republican exile, first Bordeaux, then Toulouse and L’Auche, where diverse strands of anti-fascism coalesced in reaction to the heavy-handed Vichy authorities. When Pétain visited L’Auche in early 1941, Republican refugees and other anti-Vichyites were ‘rounded up’ to avoid protests against the government. Cardó wrote to Sugranyes lamenting the attitude of the French Church hierarchy: the connivance of ‘so many Constantinian dignitaries in this unintelligent, squandered world’.⁵⁷ From Franco’s Spain, Ruiz-Giménez situated himself and the Spanish regime differently, aligned with leading figures of this same French hierarchy. In April 1942 he visited Montpellier to speak at the twentieth anniversary celebration of the Fédération Française des Étudiants Catholiques (FFEC) beside the Archbishop of Lyons, Cardinal Gerlier, an enthusiast for Pétain’s authoritarian ‘regeneration’ of France.⁵⁸ Sugranyes meanwhile was fortunate that a job opportunity arose at Fribourg University in 1941 thanks to the support of Fathers Journet and Cardó, as well as the Italian anti-fascist Gianfranco Contini, chair of Romance Philology there since 1938. Another exile in Switzerland who gave support was the socialist literary scholar Giuliano Bonfante, who had fought for the Spanish Republic.⁵⁹

Among significant opponents of fascism who became leaders of Pax Romana within this milieu was the French mining engineer Roger Millot, a former president of the FFEC and Pax’s vice-president after 1939. Alongside Millot, the internationalism of Sugranyes developed, first in Paris and later in Fribourg, and the two men were ultimately instrumental in formulating the statutes of the renovated organisation in 1946–7.⁶⁰ In

56. Which is not to say that wartime Switzerland opened its doors to all: see, for example, S. Friedländer, *When Memory Comes* (Madison, WI, 2003), esp. pp. 88–92. ARG, 35, 275.03, ‘Pax Roman’s Relief Program’, Circular of the North American Secretariat, Oct. 1945, pp. 2–3.

57. Giró, p. 205 (Cardó to Sugranyes, 5 Feb. 1942).

58. On speech of Gerlier, see *La Croix*, 27 Apr. 1942. On the precarious network in Montpellier of imperilled Catalan Catholics, Sugranyes and Cardinal Barraquer among them, see C.-J. Guardiola, ed., *Cartes de Carles Riba*, II: 1939–1952 (Barcelona, 1991), pp. 151–3.

59. *Opera*, p. 441 (Sugranyes to Sturzo, 16 Jan. 1939).

60. Institut de France, *Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Roger Millot* (Paris, 1977); R. Millot, ‘Présentation du “Mouvement international des Intellectuels catholiques”’, in *Pax Romana, Les intellectuels dans la chrétienté* (Rome, 1948), pp. 11–18.

the pre-war years, Millot worked with the Christian Democratic review *L'Aube* and with Cardinal Verdier, both critics of Action Française and active in combatting antisemitism. In these respects Millot was a disciple of Maritain and, with the fall of France, he joined the 'Rue de Verneuil' resistance group with like-minded Catholics.⁶¹ One of these was Father Michel Riquet, another Pax progressive inspired by Maritain's *Humanisme intégral*, which sustained him in the 1930s and later during his detention in the Nazi camps following deportation.⁶² Millot was active in the progressive Centre Universitaire Catholique, established clandestinely in 1941, becoming its vice-president in 1945.⁶³ From 1944, he supported the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) and organisations advocating reconciliation with Germany, European unity and greater lay participation to equip the Church for a reconstructive effort through flatter Catholic hierarchies.⁶⁴

Public leadership of Pax Romana until 1946 nonetheless remained in the hands of Ruiz-Giménez. As Pax international president and Franco propagandist—funded by the Spanish state—he was given a platform and was able to travel abroad. His aim was to legitimate Franco's anti-Communist regime by playing down former Axis links and diverting attention towards the new peril from the East which he believed had been responsible for Spain's tragedy. For his politicism, indeed, he would be censured by the Pax executive in early 1946.⁶⁵ Such was the pessimism generated from Spain about the West's weakened anti-Communist resolve that a Bolivian delegate to the 1946 Pax congress was moved to react by declaring his rejection of 'Europe's decrepitude'.⁶⁶ The congress would in fact be divided over what the political resurgence of Western Europe really meant and what role Catholics should play.

Despite the UN's condemnation of Franco's regime, the next global assembly of Pax Romana, delayed from 1940, went ahead in June 1946. Fribourg was concerned that holding it in Franco's Spain would appear 'in the eyes of leftists, and even among Catholics', as proof of the 'sympathy' of Catholics and 'even of the Vatican' for 'fascist regimes'.⁶⁷ Such accusations were 'false', according to the Pax executive, but it was only

61. B. Comte, *L'honneur et la conscience: Catholiques français en résistance, 1940–1944* (Paris, 1998), p. 134.

62. S. Bernay, 'Le Père Michel Riquet: Du philo-sémitisme d'action lors des années sombres au dialogue interreligieux', *Archives Juives*, xl, no. 1 (2007), pp. 100–116.

63. The Centre Universitaire Catholique was succeeded by the post-war Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français (CCIF).

64. See Millot and the first post-war elections in *Le Franc-Tireur*, 23 Oct. 1946.

65. ARG 35, sig. 275.01, Millot, Aylward, Florinetti and Gremaud to Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, Apr. 1946.

66. Pax Romana, *XIX Congreso Mundial de Pax Romana* (Madrid, 1946) [hereafter *XIX Congreso*], p. 57.

67. ARG, carp. 35, sig. 275.03, p. 2, Gremaud to Salat, 12 Nov. 1945. Also ARG, carp. 35, sig. 275.03, Gremaud to Domingo Santa María, Pax Secretariat, Santiago de Chile, 30 Nov. 1945.

too aware of criticism from anti-fascists, including Catholic students exiled from the civil war, for holding the 'grand spectacle' in Spain:

Franco, whose pagan Falange wishes to cover itself with a pious veil, always tries to hide behind the screen of a false Catholicism. But true Catholics will not let themselves be trapped. Catholic students of the entire world, who fought with the rest of the youth against the infamous regimes of Hitler and Mussolini, will not play the game of Franco, a temporary vestige of the Axis regimes.⁶⁸

The executive's doubts about the congress were hardly mollified by the manner of its inauguration, held on Corpus Christi in the image of the Constantinian Church that Sugranyes despised. Culminating in the palace of the Cardinal primate in Toledo, the ceremony followed High Mass and a military-escorted public procession of the consecrated Host. Toledo was the medieval heart of Christian Spain, the pinnacle of a historical triangle evoking the Counter-Reformation, with congress sessions also planned at Salamanca and El Escorial.⁶⁹ Some 500 delegates participated, half of them from Spain, supplemented by large contingents from South America and Portugal. The ethno-Catholic emphasis was reinforced by the inaugural session's focus on the Hispanic imperial legacy: spiritual and cultural unity 'born of a great Christian State', an autarkic form of power in the interests of national sovereignty. All attempts at 'exoticism imported from outside', it was argued, 'tended towards abolition of spiritual hierarchy'.⁷⁰ This conservative nation-statism was shared by the dozen or so 'ecclesiastical advisers' from Rome, several of them recently displaced from Eastern Europe. Spanish, Polish and Ukrainian delegates, thus united, declared themselves anti-Communist not only as Catholics but also 'as patriots' because, 'while Catholicism had made the existence of many nations possible, Communism aspires only to their disappearance'. The function of Catholic universities in this 'Christian state' model was to participate in nation-building, reorientating Catholic ideas by counteracting 'modern intellectuals'.⁷¹ Smaller delegations, from Britain, the USA and Italy, were more ideologically diverse, several being sympathetic to delegates representing the progressive Fribourg executive—including Millot—who had embraced Sugranyes and other refugees during the war.

As a civil war exile and disciple of Maritain and Sturzo, there was no question of Sugranyes running the gauntlet of the congress.

68. Fundación Universitaria Española, *Boletín de los Estudiantes Españoles*, May 1946, reproduced as APR, B.6, Pax internal memo.

69. *Pax Romana: Boletín Informativo*, i, no. 6, 15 June 1946.

70. *XIX Congreso*, p. 63 (Corts Grau).

71. Intellectuals ('monstrous beings') were those 'who worked with their heads, as oxen do': *XIX Congreso*, p. 109 (Sepich). On the Franco state's purge of universities during and after the civil war, see L.E. Otero Carvajal, ed., *La destrucción de la ciencia en España: Depuración universitaria en el franquismo* (Madrid, 2006).

Maritain himself believed Pax profoundly mistaken in holding the event in Franco's Spain and would not set foot there. In protest he went further, declining an invitation later in the year to the organisation's jubilee congress in Fribourg.⁷² He was also aware that the context of Stalinist expansion appeared to favour conservative anti-Communism. Congress discussion about 'peoples in servitude' was indeed framed by Eastern Europe's experience rather than that of recently defeated fascist states or Spain, the only exception being a call—significantly, from a Basque delegate—to support future global jurisdiction for limiting state sovereignty. This view was shared by Sugranyes and the Pax executive, represented in person by the organisation's Swiss Assistant Secretary for Europe, Bernard Ducret, a convinced Maritainist whose open clash with conservatives over anti-Communist strategy became the defining moment of the event.

According to traditionalists, Maritain's 'doctrine of the outstretched hand' was based on 'false optimism', failing to recognise that Communism was 'a form of religion' and thus incapable of evolution. It was 'a work of the devil', not explicable by economic exploitation, but entirely 'passional'. Lust for material rewards and 'intellectualism' were its sustenance.⁷³ Ruiz Giménez did not use such language, preferring only to remind delegates that 'religious liberalism' had been condemned explicitly by the Holy See. In the absence of the French, Maritainist advocacy in favour of workers and the poor came from affiliates of the Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana (FUCI), who affirmed private property to be subordinate to 'the common good'.⁷⁴ There were practical examples of this on the ground, including the Rome-based Istituto Cattolico di Attività Sociali, directed by the anti-fascist lawyer, Vittorino Veronese, a Maritain disciple who became a leader of Pax's progressive restructuring in 1947, alongside Sugranyes and Millot.⁷⁵

When it was announced that some young FUCI affiliates intended to accompany Italian Communist students to the World Student Congress, to be held in Prague in August 1946, tensions were brought to a head, prompting a Spanish delegate to demand that Ruiz-Giménez read aloud from the 1937 encyclical *Divini Redemptoris*, to the effect that Communism was intrinsically perverse and could not be collaborated with under any circumstances.⁷⁶ The counter challenge came from

72. *Journet–Maritain: Correspondance*, III: 1940–1949 (Saint-Maurice, 1998), p. 428 (Maritain to Journet, 17 July 1946).

73. *XIX Congreso*, p. 61 (Ricardo Fuentes, from El Salvador); *ibid.*, p. 87 (Ángel Herrera, congress address). Maritain was aware that his position was 'violently attacked': Maritain to Journet, 17 July 1946, as above.

74. The key Italian was Ivo Murgia, later of the Movimento Federalista Europeo: *XIX Congreso*, p. 62.

75. B. Minvielle, *L'apostolat des laïcs à la veille du Concile* (Fribourg, 2001), p. 74. Pax's war relief work in Italy was through the Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana, the foreign relations secretary of which was Lucia de Gasperi, daughter of Alcide de Gasperi: ARG, carp. 35, sig. 275.03, Gasperi to Ehrhard, 11 Oct. 1945.

76. *XIX Congreso*, p. 62.

Ducret, the Pax executive's Assistant Secretary, in an intervention of some moment which was not printed in Madrid's published congress proceedings.⁷⁷ Voicing the feeling of the Fribourg executive, Ducret appealed for concerted, urgent and critical action on the Church's relation to the temporal world as the post-war dawned. Merely 'repeating constantly that Communism is the greatest enemy of the Catholic Church and of our civilization' was to set the discussion 'on a false and dangerous course' and, although he had no issue with papal declarations, he determined to make a stand '*avec violence*' against the 'method' employed by those assembled:

We have just read a passage from *Divini Redemptoris*. You applaud with vehemence, and you think leaving this congress, with Communism definitively condemned, that you can rest. Well, no! Communism is out there and is watching you all. It will soon be at your home, dear South American friends ... Do not fall asleep. Seek instead during this congress to know why our Catholicism has been left behind by numerous doctrines, and by Communism in particular. (Seek to know) what our weaknesses were, their causes ... If our elders had sought to apply pontifical teachings in the social field, instead of applauding as you have just done, we might not need today to talk of Communism ... You should therefore seek here the practical means to fight in your university, in your country, and, through Pax Romana, on the international level, against all doctrines.

This coda, cautioning against '*all* doctrines', was surely intended to encompass fascism, a warning against alignment with Franco's authoritarian paternalist solution.⁷⁸

The position of the Pax executive was clear, and yet the reading from *Divini Redemptoris* had received a great ovation, as did the testimonies of exiled Eastern delegates to the martyrdom of Ukraine and Poland who blamed 'exaggerated intellectualism' among Catholics for the diffusion of Communism.⁷⁹ Close encounters with perceived existential threats counted in arguing for a Church defended by impregnable nation-states and against 'intellectualising' the mysteries of the faith. The Spanish student, it was declared, 'knows Communism not only because he studies the encyclicals but through our martyrs'.⁸⁰ It was easy enough to believe that Spain had 'saved Europe' through a martyrdom which outshone all others in the 1930s and was on a par with the current suffering of Eastern Europe.⁸¹ Bearing witness was

77. The record can be found in the Pax archives: APR, B.1., B. Ducret, 'Déclaration' (Aug. 1946). Ducret became Pax Secretary General in the 1950s.

78. Later, Ducret was hijacked by two members of the conservative Swiss delegation, reproaching the General Secretariat 'for influencing European federations by spreading false news about Spain': APR, B.6, Ducret to Gremaud, report [July–Aug.?] 1946.

79. *XIX Congreso*, pp. 62–3 (Jan Kazimierz Tarnowski, a former activist of the antisemitic youth party, ONR).

80. *XIX Congreso*, p. 62 (José María Mohedano).

81. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

contrasted with the shortcomings of Catholic nuclei (progressives), 'in specific countries', who 'undervalued Spanish blood' and 'denied the mystery of martyrdom'; they were themselves 'a mystery', obscured and cosseted by intellectual elitism.⁸²

In the aftermath of the congress, both sides used Pax Romana as a channel to attempt to sway the Vatican. Ruiz-Giménez cabled Rome, reaffirming Pax's unyielding adherence and identifying international condemnation of Spain with an alleged 'wholesale assault' on the Church. To confirm Pax's fealty, a papal audience was arranged for Spanish and South American delegates on route to the jubilee congress in Fribourg to be held in August.⁸³ During the visit, mass was held among the sepulchres of the early martyrs in the Roman catacombs, an opportunity for Ruiz-Giménez to extol in the Spanish press the offering made by 'God's soldiers of Spain' in resistance to atheism.⁸⁴ The laying of the lips of these soldier-delegates upon the tombstones of the first Christians situated religious faith symbolically where it belonged: outside of time. It was an act consistent with an ethos of the Church's separateness from the rest of social life, a position that the mentors of Sugranyes had warned against during and after the civil war because of its political implications. In papal audiences between 1939 and 1943, the exiled Catalan archbishop Barraquer had in fact decried state exploitation in Spain of religious pilgrimages, processions and enthronements to legitimise the political charisma of 'men of destiny'.⁸⁵

And yet, at the same moment that Ruiz-Giménez was perpetuating Spain's 'crusade', Ducret was airing concern to the Pax executive about the Church's relation to Spain's 'total state', reinforcing the point that fixation on Soviet atheism had obscured the danger of 'totalitarian states' which *promoted* the Church. The Maritainist concept of personalism, a philosophical motif for Sugranyes since 1937, was at the heart of Ducret's critique of regimes which assumed that God desires order and ideological truth so much that it 'takes precedence over the person'.⁸⁶ Social order in a Europe being reconstructed was a natural priority, but not at the expense of liberty. Ducret—guided by Sugranyes and others—recognised, moreover, that Franco's rule was opposed by the clergy in regions with a strong, separate, national identity.⁸⁷ Appropriation of the faith in the interests of a peculiarly backward-looking sort of modernity thus set Spain apart and constituted an object lesson in what Catholic modernity should *not* mean:

82. E. La Orden Miracle (Uruguay), *Signo*, 29 June 1946, p. 1.

83. ARG 35, sig. 275.03, telegram from Roma, Ciudad Vaticano, Sumo Pontífice, 6 July 1946; APR, B.1, Ilundáin Arregui, Confederación Nacional de Congregaciones Marianas, 7 Aug. 1946.

84. *ABC*, 21 Aug. 1946.

85. J. Benet, *Cataluña bajo el régimen franquista* (Barcelona, 1979), pp. 420–28.

86. APR, B.6, Ducret, 'La situation de l'Eglise en Espagne', Sept./Oct. 1946. 'Christianity', he added, 'is essentially a personal relationship of man to God'.

87. APR, B.6, Ducret, 'La situation'.

The current illusion in Spain is to believe that Christianity is a 'successful' religious revolution: the salvation of man by man, rather than by God (and a very clear nostalgia for good times where the message of Christ accepted by all completely penetrated and informed society, including the state ... Thus the present is lost to the rescue of a past that does not really exist. It is for us to extract ourselves from this illusion.

Ducret added that 'every state Church is a dependent Church'; history showed it had 'never received any temporal support which ultimately did not demonstrate its weakness'.⁸⁸ The experiences of Sugranyes tallied with this analysis and informed his reforming efforts to re-shape Pax Romana, abetted by Ducret and other former anti-fascist activists, including Millot and Veronese. Among the first steps were the devising of new organisational structures, the formation of a secretariat for relations with UNESCO and the celebration of an intensive summer school on the theme of Christian Democracy.⁸⁹ In the summer of 1946, Ruiz-Giménez had continued to laud Franco publicly as a saviour; however, less than a year later, he felt compelled privately to express regret for 'errors' committed during his presidency to the newly formed Pax executive, which by this time had Ramon Sugranyes at its centre.⁹⁰

III

The Fribourg congress in August 1946 became the launch pad of the organisation's reconfiguration, addressing fundamental questions over Nazism and Franco's war which had been avoided by the Church. These questions had been encapsulated by Ducret's courageous statement only weeks before at the congress in Spain. Priorities to address in 1946–8 included the contradictions between confessional states and the modern world, the marking out of a position on universal human rights (and consequent limits upon national sovereignty) and the role of Catholics in a potentially federalised Europe. Intellectuals—and the educated laity in general, conditioned by successive conflicts since 1936—led responses during this denouement of Pax's internal struggle.

Participation in the effusion of ideas at war's end called for a separate intellectual Pax section, alongside the student federation, as proposed first in 1945. By early 1947, a new bipartite structure was thus established: a student body (Mouvement International des Etudiants Catholiques: MIEC) and a section for 'those of the intellectual professions' (Mouvement International des Intellectuels Catholiques: MIIC).⁹¹

88. Ibid.

89. M. Favarger, 'Le congrès jubilaire de Pax Romana', *Nouvelles Etrennes Fribourgeoises*, no. 80/81 (1947–8), pp. 63–9.

90. APR, B.6, Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez to Schneuwly, 12 June 1947.

91. R. Sugranyes de Franch, 'Le Mouvement International des Intellectuels Catholiques', *PR*, iv, no. 1, May 1947, pp. 3–4.

Swiss reformists headed the MIEC. André Florinetti, a member of the executive which had censured Ruiz-Giménez for politicism, became its head. The first president of the MIIC was also Swiss—the chancellor of Fribourg University, Hubert Aepli—and Sugranyes became the intellectual section's first general-secretary (1946–58). A commission was established to draw up new statutes.⁹² Ruiz-Giménez had been superseded, but the commission included another Francoist civil war veteran and Catholic Action activist, Francisco Sintes Obrador, who now sat alongside Sugranyes (the civil war exile), with two other anti-fascist disciples of Maritain: Roger Millot and Vittorino Veronese. When Sintes proposed limiting the reach of the laity by spelling out Pax's subordination to Rome, this was overridden. When he also objected to foregrounding the Maritainist 'requirements of Christian humanism', the wording was diplomatically amended to 'Christian and human values', but the progressive meaning and purpose were beyond doubt.⁹³ The imperative was to align both new branches with the emerging global order, while enabling future critical engagement with competitors—'associations of a materialist character'—as well as resistance to those openly inspired by Communism.⁹⁴

The founding conferences of the two nascent sections were staged simultaneously in Rome at Easter 1947 and hosted by Alcide de Gasperi, by this time Christian Democratic Prime Minister of Italy.⁹⁵ The reformulated Pax statutes received formal papal approval and a high-ranking Cardinal Protector was appointed.⁹⁶ All of this was symbolic of incipient change. In the light of his conspicuous absence from Pax assemblies since 1937, Maritain's key address to the Rome conferences signalled Pax's change of course, as did that of his *confrère*, Étienne Gilson.⁹⁷ The moment of the laity seemed to have arrived and could not be squandered. If Catholicism failed to place itself at the centre of modern society, Gilson declared, the temporal world might anyway appropriate ideas which were fundamentally Christian.⁹⁸ Beyond the rarefied world of the public intellectual, the broader educated laity had a vital technical and educational role in modern life, as well as exercising 'political duties' as citizens. These professionals possessed 'a vocation gifted by God'—educators, doctors, engineers,

92. APR, D.2.1, minutes, 2–4 Jan. 1947.

93. APR, D.2.1, minutes, 3 Jan. 1947, p. 6.

94. APR, B.2, Millot to Aepli, 27 Nov. 1946; APR, A.3.2, Kirchner on Pius XII discourse on peace, 24 Dec. 1945.

95. APR, D.2.1, Sugranyes and Millot to Gasperi, 15 Apr. 1947.

96. APR, D.2.1, Schneuwly to Montini, memorandum, 24 Mar. 1947.

97. J. Maritain, 'Les civilisations humaines et le rôle des chrétiens', in Pax Romana, *Les intellectuels*, pp. 87–105; É. Gilson, 'Les intellectuels dans la chrétienté', *ibid.*, pp. 161–78. Maritain's previous participation, on the eve of Spain's war: R. Millot, 'Avant le XV^e Congrès de Pax Romana', *Sept*, iii, no. 124 (10 July 1936), p. 16.

98. Gilson, 'Les intellectuels', p. 176.

jurists, industrial managers—to lead what was imagined confidently as a ‘spiritual regeneration of mankind’.⁹⁹ And yet the organisation’s ambiguous position between philosophical idealism—theoretically challenging the established social order—and the expediciencies of post-war politics, had not been resolved. In 1942 Maritain had already identified the tension between ‘a constructive peace struggling through time toward man’s emancipation’ and politics as power, in the interests largely of ‘the health of the state’.¹⁰⁰

Once the statutes were approved, Aepli stood aside, and Millot was elected president of the MIIC, alongside his friend Sugranyes. Veronese became vice-president. Millot was in an advantageous position because, through the Pax-affiliated CCIF, he was in Paris to attend the initial meetings of UNESCO, helping establish the Vatican’s UN Coordinating Committee there. The twin sections of Pax were granted UNESCO consultative status as NGOs in July 1948. Like all Catholic bodies, Pax’s charitable and intellectual brief was parallel to disseminating the faith and promoting the interests of the Church. But the aims of UNESCO fitted with papal advocacy of human solidarity on an international scale and Pax aimed to contribute means by which this could be achieved: intellectual and ‘moral’ co-operation, beyond political and economic arrangements.¹⁰¹ Gilson declared that Catholic intellectual co-action would be instrumental in reining in nationalism. Sugranyes echoed this idealism, the proper aim of Pax being ‘to organise within the entire world the fraternity of spirits that places intelligence at the service of God’.¹⁰² Maritain himself became head of the French delegation to UNESCO’s general assembly in Mexico in 1947, urging Catholics to find common ground with others promoting humane reconstruction, regardless of creed.¹⁰³ Veronese later served on the executive committee of UNESCO (1952–6), before becoming its Director General in 1958. Beside him, Pax’s representative in South America between 1939 and 1945, the German Rudolph Salat, became head of the agency’s Department of Cultural Activities, having been attached to Konrad Adenauer’s government, first as head of cultural affairs of the diplomatic service in 1949 and then at the Vatican embassy. Much of this activity happened tangentially to national politics, of course, where Maritain’s ideal ‘civic fraternities’ might

99. For example, *PR*, iii, no. 4, Oct. 1949, p. 1.

100. Maritain, ‘La fin du machiavélisme’, *Nova et Vetera* (Fribourg), xvii, no. 2 (1942), pp. 113–45.

101. ‘UNESCO and Catholic Cooperation’, *PR*, iv, no. 4, (Oct. 1947), p. 7; APR, G.4, memorandum to Third UN Assembly ‘par un groupe d’organisations internationales catholiques’, including Pax Romana, 30 Nov. 1948.

102. Gilson, ‘Les intellectuels’, p. 175; Sugranyes, ‘Le Mouvement International’, p. 4.

103. On the abiding influence of Maritain: R. Sugranyes, ‘Que doivent penser de l’UNESCO les Catholiques?’, *PR*, ii, no. 3 (Apr. 1948), p. 4; J. Gremaud, ‘Chrétiens dans le monde’, *PR*, ii, no. 2 (Mar. 1948), p. 1. On his participation in Rome, see APR, D.2.1, Sugranyes and Millot to Maritain, 16 Apr. 1947 and Sugranyes to Millot, 22 Apr. 1947.

have been realised in concrete terms. But dissemination of personalist ideas transnationally via intellectuals associated with Pax Romana helped confirm Christian Democratic leaders' commitment to parliamentary democracy after 1945 as the only political system compatible with Christian faith.¹⁰⁴ Transnational connectivity had kept a spirit of anti-fascism alive since 1939 which broadened through Pax Romana after 1945 when the need to integrate socially and religiously those who may once have been swayed by extremism was recognised. Salat, for example, was acutely aware how his accumulated experience of wartime 'international lay apostleship' on behalf of Pax contrasted with the majority of male Germans of his generation who 'know nothing of foreign countries except as soldiers of occupation'.¹⁰⁵

In August 1948, the Pax executive produced a commentary on the draft of what became the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although Catholics preferred the personalist term 'dignity' to the vocabulary of 'the rights of man', Sugranyes was convinced after discussion with Father Journet—his mentor and confessor since 1937—that it was natural to seek a 'convergence in practice' of human rights and the Catholic tradition with which he felt imbued. At the same time as Maritain insisted from the embassy at the Holy See that religion must respond to change in the temporal world, Sugranyes argued similarly that 'Natural Law' was adaptable to the movement of history, 'as moral consciousness progresses and society evolves'.¹⁰⁶ The 1948 Pax memorandum on the Declaration had to reconcile the opinions of many federated bodies, but it was predominantly positive, welcoming the emphasis on the human person, even if it lamented lack of specific attention to the right of the family to protection by the state.¹⁰⁷

As a Catalan exile from Franco's Spain, Sugranyes had little cause to argue with support for political rights or the memorandum's call for limits to state sovereignty and advocacy of federalism. To Sugranyes, as an anti-Francoist—and an anti-Communist—some level of 'supranational juridical guarantee of political liberty' was required.¹⁰⁸ It was also desirable that where 'the historical development of a people leads to

104. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy*, p. 170; M. Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age: 1945–1968*, (Princeton, NJ, 2020).

105. APR, D.5, Salat to Carrillo de Albornoz, 31 Dec. 1949. See also J. Gremaud, 'Rudi Salat quitte le Secrétariat Général', *PR*, iii, no. 6 (Dec. 1949), p. 5.

106. R. Sugranyes, 'Sens chrétien d'une Déclaration des droits de l'homme', *PR*, iii, no. 3 (Aug. 1948), p. 3; APR, B.2, Sugranyes to Veronese, 9 Sept. 1948. Also Maritain, 'Les civilisations', pp. 103–4. For an alternative conclusion viewing Catholic human rights as necessarily conservative, see S. Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia, PA, 2015).

107. APR, G.4, Sugranyes, 'Mémoire sur le Projet de Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme', 31 Aug. 1948. See also APR, G.4, memorandum to UN, 30 Nov. 1948.

108. Sugranyes, 'Sens chrétien': on 'making the human person a subject of international law', p. 3. See Maritain's 1942 support, published first in New York and then elsewhere, including Fribourg: 'Devant la crise mondiale: Manifeste de catholiques européens', *Nova et Vetera* (Fribourg), xvii, no. 3 (1942), pp. 336–43.

local self-government', the state should be decentralised.¹⁰⁹ Through Pax Romana, he maintained—with pan-European anti-Communism as a backdrop—the production and exchange of cultural values constituted the basis for 'the political union of Europe'.¹¹⁰ When he visited South American countries as General-Secretary of the MIIC in the summer of 1949, the guiding principle—in contrast to Ruiz-Giménez in 1946—was not bounded by the ethno-imperial values of *Hispanidad*.¹¹¹ Conscience prevented him from delivering such a message. But the purpose was in any case part of something broader and more present, inescapably related to the Cold War: to foster a socio-political programme to forestall the threat of 'totalitarianism' while tempering the 'excessive individualism' of US secular liberalism.¹¹²

IV

This article has investigated the circumstances which motivated transnational connectivity among Catholic intellectuals during wartime. Competing anti-Communist strategies provided the basis of the complex and fractured landscape of the intellectual laity in the 1930s and 1940s. On the one hand, patriarchal conservatism cleaved towards protective nation-states; on the other, fraternalist pluralism was oriented towards civil society and regional identities. To this relatively familiar theme of the production and dissemination of religious and political ideas across boundaries the article adds a narrative about the absorption of such ideas at an intermediate level between the educated faithful in general and the elite of exalted public thinkers in particular. Two complementary approaches have been combined: first, a trans-war chronological framework which explores connections between convulsive events (here, the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War and its aftermath); and second, a spatial corroboration of these temporal connections via the parallel biographies of two significant individuals who crossed boundaries between and within nation states. By analysing the successive periods of Pax Romana's leadership by Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez and Ramon Sugranyes, corporate Catholic transnationalism has been balanced by an individualist 'molecular' focus on Catholicism as a universalist framework for lived experience as well as political commitment. The parameters of both men's responses were set by

109. APR, B.4.2, Institut International des Sciences et Politiques (Fribourg), 'Federalisme et conception chrétienne de l'Etat', 9 Nov. 1947. On Christian Democracy's natural sympathy for sub-state national identities, see P. Pulzer, 'Nationalism and Internationalism in European Christian Democracy', in M. Gehler and W. Kaiser, eds, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, II (London, 2004), pp. 8–20.

110. 'Un autre aspect du travail du MIIC', *PR*, iii, no. 3 (Aug. 1948), p. 7. In 1948, a new journal, *Politeia*, was founded in Fribourg, for transnational discussion of the spiritual bases of a united Europe: *PR*, x, no. 3 (Apr. 1948), p. 2.

111. APR, D.5, Salat to Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, 19 Oct. 1949.

112. 'Un autre aspect du travail'.

overlapping national and global Catholic communities, tangible as well as imagined. Yet their reactions were also necessarily adaptive to events in real time. Amid geopolitical calamities over which they had no control, and the dissemination of philosophical responses from public intellectuals, their previous spatially bounded perceptions and models of politics, cultures and even religion were outstripped.

In 1967, when encouraged to reflect on the 1940s, Ruiz-Giménez pinpointed exchanges across borders during that decade as instrumental in his acquiring 'a much fuller consciousness that Spanish Catholicism was a province within world Catholicism'.¹¹³ This was more than retrospective rationalising. His involvement with Pax Romana represented a dialogue beyond the nation-state, the Francoist 'National-Catholic' ideal. After 1945, the Franco government relied on a shared international Catholic identity as a means to legitimacy and survival. It is possible to interpret this as evidence of foreign acceptance of Francoism, confirming Ruiz-Giménez simply as Franco's representative.¹¹⁴ But this ignores friction among political 'families' within the Spanish dictatorship and tends towards a monolithic view of the Church internationally. At the very moment of Pax Romana's 1946 congress in Spain, its figurehead, Ruiz-Giménez, was being undermined, obliged to defend himself from Catholic critics close to power in Spain who believed he was clandestinely using foreign links to organise a Spanish Christian Democratic party to weaken the government.¹¹⁵ The congress had signalled the widening gulf between Spanish orthodoxy and those who aligned with post-1945 fraternalist modernisation. The Pax event in Spain had therefore only superficially represented the zenith of Francoism's relations with global Catholicism; in reality it marked a low point in the Spanish regime's international standing among Catholic intellectuals. Transnational links with Spanish Catholics subsequently recovered to a degree but only through the endeavours of Ruiz-Giménez and others from an increasingly humanist position which drew them further away from regime orthodoxy. Spanish Catholic intellectuals became more acceptable internationally in direct relation to their cautious departure from the repressive nation-statist essence of Francoism.

By 1949, if not before, Ruiz-Giménez was thinking pluralistically in political and religious terms which converged with those understood by exiles, such as Ramon Sugranyes. While ambassador to the Holy See, he had corresponded with the long-banished former Republican Interior Minister, Ángel Galarza, who in revolutionary Madrid in 1936 had intervened to save his life. The context of their communication on the Spanish political situation was the early Cold War, which from Galarza's point of view called for a 'grand Catholic Party, profoundly oriented

113. Vilar, *La oposición*, p. 404 (Interview with Ruiz-Giménez).

114. Brydan, *Franco's Internationalists*, pp. 140–44.

115. ARG 35, sig. 275.01, 'Memorandum Reservado' (Feb. 1946).

towards social policy and tolerance'.¹¹⁶ More than a decade earlier, Sugranyes had written similarly to Luigi Sturzo during the war in Spain: 'only a profoundly Christian social and political action will be able, after the end of the war, to bring peace'.¹¹⁷ In May 1947, in the wake of consecutive catastrophic wars, he transposed this programme to the global level in addressing the Pax Romana community: 'By knowing each other better, by allowing ourselves to benefit from each other's experiences, we Catholics of the liberal professions from each country will become aware of the mission that awaits us within the modern world, for which we must begin by re-appropriating the very notion of "Christianity"'.¹¹⁸

From 1947, Ruiz-Giménez helped encourage participants from outside Spain—including Sugranyes—to attend the discussion group held each summer in the Basque city of San Sebastián to debate Spanish alignment with Catholics internationally. These 'Conversaciones Católicas Internacionales' were the brainchild of the humanist mathematician Carlos Santamaría, a Maritainist who had campaigned for a Basque university in the 1930s, as Sugranyes had done for Catalonia.¹¹⁹ The progressive nature of the themes discussed—close parallels to those on the agenda of the reconfigured Pax Romana—was unheard of in the context of the early Franco years and provoked preoccupation in Madrid's Foreign Ministry. When Ruiz-Giménez was made Education Minister by Franco in 1951, his attempt to liberalise the university system led to his dismissal. Non-integrist Catholics like him had been useful in government (especially foreign affairs) since 1945 but they had not been able to re-shape the Franco state in their own image. Shortly after the dismissal of Ruiz-Giménez, notice was given by Pope John XXIII of the Second Vatican Council. Sugranyes and Ruiz-Giménez came together among the invited lay assessors. When asked in 1958 what he most hoped would be achieved, Ruiz-Giménez pointedly stated the most basic fundamentals of post-1945 Catholic modernity, as lacking in Spain: revision of Church–state relations ('consonant with present historical circumstances') and greater dialogue between the ecclesiastical sphere and the secular world.¹²⁰ During the 1960s he presided again over Pax Romana and became a leading figure of the barely tolerated intellectual opposition in Spain, bringing together Christian Democrats from Spain and the regions with social democrats.

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116. Tusell, *Franco y los católicos*, p. 448. Civil war hatreds faded slowly; when in 1966 Galarza died in Paris, Ruiz-Giménez publicly criticised the hostile obituaries: 'Respeto a los muertos', *Cuadernos para el diálogo*, No. 35/6 (Aug. 1966).

117. *Scritti*, p. 448 (Sugranyes to Sturzo, 15 Feb. 1937).

118. Sugranyes, 'Le Mouvement International', p. 4.

119. C. Santamaría Ansa, *Política filosofía de Jacques Maritain* (San Sebastián, 1950). In 1950, he became Secretary General of the Christian pacifist movement, Pax Christi.

120. J.M. Pérez Lozano, '¿Qué pediría Vd. al Concilio?', *Vida Nueva*, n.d. [1958].