1 Introduction to the Predicament

I am writing this book in a hostile environment for genuinely theoretical and meta-theoretical investigations in the area of social sciences. More and more articles, conference presentations and discussions in symposiums are sending out one key message: ‘no more abstract theory!’ How did this happen to the broader field which was founded upon the tradition of social philosophy and has as its main areas of investigation relations, tendencies and ‘objects’ that are genuinely unobservable or abstract?

To take just one recent, characteristic example, in one of the most respected journals of *sociological theory*, Besbris and Khan (2017) argue for the need for *less theory* and *more description* if sociology aspires to become a robust science. In order to make their case, they take the example of an allegedly ambiguous concept (cultural capital) in order to point out that its semantic instability and multiple retheorisations by different scholars do not offer a lot to a field that already struggles to offer robust analyses. Interestingly, they are right about this concept; it is a hybrid amalgamation of two antithetical images: culture and capital (the latter of which is quantifiable and commonly used in economic relations). But is it not misleading to focus on one of the most ambiguous concepts in sociology in order to draw the conclusion that we need less theory?

‘Less theory’ is usually thought to be required because the existing state of fragmentation in sociology, which is seen to be attributable to a proliferation of theorisation, confuses and distracts from the empirical focus on data analysis. And ‘more description’ of new empirical evidence is frequently called for in defiance of the possibility of robust empirical investigations which are not in need of unnecessary theorisations. As Besbris and Khan emphasised, ‘science, after all, is largely the generation of novel empirical findings’ (Besbris and Khan, 2017: 152).

‘Unbelievable’, one could whisper, having in mind the lessons of post-positivism (in the sixties and seventies) as regards the role of theory in the natural sciences, and even more so considering that in the examination of the social world we have to tackle unperceivable and holistic macro-entities, where theoretical speculation is the only way to delve deeper in our search for explanation and understanding. Yet, no matter how unintelligible this anti-theoretical tendency in the sociological research might seem to be, the state of affairs in contemporary academia is this: dominant authors in global sociology are advising newcomers to sociology to abandon theoretical work that aims at defending or synthesising well-established traditions (see, for example, Lizardo, 2020).

So, I am writing this book in an epoch in which theoretical investigations, engaging with interdisciplinary efforts to discuss about the metaphysics and philosophy of the social sciences, are thought of as being dominated by unnecessary discussions among a small group of dedicated academics at the edge of the sociological landscape, who prefer to indulge in armchair, abstract analyses, rather than undertaking the kind of substantial empirical investigations that could potentially have an impact on real social issues. As if methodological investigations are not guided by ontological frameworks. As if current empirical investigations are not informed by ‘heavyweight’ theoretical work (with a strong metaphysical flavour), offered by authors like Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens or Bruno Latour. As if we can have clear, pure empirical data *without* (implicitly or explicitly) making theoretical assumptions about the social individual and other abstract ‘objects’. However, instead of further discussing this unintelligible and even embarrassing tendency of modern sociology to reject theoretical approaches, let me start the analysis of this book by explaining some of the key ideas which I will be using.

This book is working on a genuinely theoretical and meta-theoretical level of analysis, focussing on how metaphysics is related to social scientific reasoning.

Metaphysics is a broad area, including many accounts of the meaning or the constitution of the world; it includes theorising about the abstract, holistic or theoretical entities (for a discussion, see Ross et al., 2013) that are posed by scientists and/or philosophers, and the categorising and classification of dimensions, kinds or universals. In this book, I am mainly focusing on the notion of metaphysics as the production of world-views, and I will make it clear if and when I am referring to other notions of metaphysics.

In the first chapters, I will reflect on key debates in the extensive terrain of metaphysics and meta-metaphysics (analyses about the nature of metaphysics). In Chapter 2, I will start the analysis by looking at a classical debate on the nature of ontology and metaphysics that took place between two protagonists working in epistemology and the philosophy of science: Rudolph Carnap and Willard Van Orman Quine. I will examine this debate in order to argue against the linguistic turn in philosophy and the social sciences. Then, in Chapter 3, I will offer a critique of the ideas of truth and objectivity, as key ideas in the debates between realists and anti-realists in the area of meta-metaphysics or meta-ontology. This analysis will allow me, in Chapter 4, to explain what I mean with idea of the *cognitional priority of metaphysical world-imageries*, and also to systematically discuss and summarise some of the hidden and untheorised links between philosophy and the social sciences – links that if adequately discussed can change our understanding of the disciplinary divisions in the humanities and the social sciences. The ultimate aim of these three chapters is to show that social ontology enters into meta-philosophical analyses in ways that contemporary philosophical discussions ignore (primarily as a prerequisite background to what key terms like language, subject and knowledgeability mean).

In this sense, the analysis in Chapters 2, 3 and –4 is preparatory for what follows and outlines the philosophical context within which I will connect and develop two different approaches to the relation between sociology and metaphysics:

(Pa) the idea that in the social sciences we need to formulate and reflect on a social ontology, or what Schmitt has called ‘socialized metaphysics’ (Schmitt, 2003); that is to say, we need to formulate and reflect on theories of what exists (or does not exist) in the social domain

(Pb) the idea that sociology is adequately equipped to examine the socio-genesis of metaphysics, or what Kivinen and Piiroinen have called ‘sociologized metaphysics.’

(Kivinen and Piiroinen, 2007)

These two are distinct ideas, but in this book, I will cast light on their theoretical interrelations and assumed contrast. The first idea (Pa) signifies a well-known field of social theory and social philosophy, in which dominant authors coming from different backgrounds (mainly critical realists, but also a few social constructionists) claim that our social ontologies are epistemically prior to epistemology and methodology in the social sciences. Note that there are authors who adopt the need for (reflection on) a social ontology, without asserting its epistemic priority over epistemology and methodology. The main idea behind the assumed need for reflecting on a social ontology is that our views of ‘what exist’ – of what are the main entities, kinds and universals, or how we can understand or classify structures, institutions, cultures, networks or processes, in social reality – inform our concepts and categories through which we can sociologically analyse a certain phenomenon. To take an example, one could argue that we cannot examine class and inequality without having in mind a certain ontological description of social structure, or that we cannot examine domestic violence and the idea of toxic masculinity without having in mind a certain notion of what culture is, as well as of how culture is related to the discursive formation of subjectivities in a given society.

The second idea (Pb) is related to the sociology of knowledge and, more specifically, the sociology of philosophy, aiming to sociologically examine the emergence, development and impact of philosophical ideas. This tradition utilises ideas of epistemic community in order to describe the socio-cultural origins of certain dominant ideas that emerge within the philosophical discourse. In this tradition, for example, metaphysical theories of the world could be assumed to be the socio-historical product of certain philosophical communities, who locally produce and modify these world-views in micro-contexts (Kivinen and Piiroinen, 2004, 2006, 2007). A similar idea also appears in the Science and Technology Studies (STS), as Lynch has noted: ‘understood as an STS research program, epistemology – and, by extension, ontology, ethics, or aesthetics – does not make up a distinct field of metaphysics, but instead, it reverts to diverse social, historical, political, and cultural conditions under which “knowledges” are established, objectified, moralized, communicated, or dismantled’ (Lynch, 2013: 451).

These two ideas, (Pa) and (Pb), are distinct in the sense that the first constitutes a general tendency in the human sciences to underline the prior and central conceptual and categorical role of ontology and metaphysics in social research, while the second comes along frequently as an ‘answer’ to or even critique of this tendency, by pointing to the shared, intersubjective character of ontological commitments in the social as well as in the natural sciences. This book aims at examining the assumed ‘contrast’ between them, and arguing for a combinatory anti-realist approach that reconciles these two tendencies of social thought.

Readers of this book will possibly be more familiar with the idea of ‘socialising metaphysics’ (Pa) but allow me to offer some introductory remarks for both ‘socialised metaphysics’ (Pa) and ‘sociologised metaphysics’ (Pb) in order to provide some broader sociological context for Chapters 4–8 – with the hope that it might be useful to a philosophical audience of this book.

In his *Poverty of Philosophy* (2008), as well as in *The German Ideology* (Marx and Engels, 1965), Marx reduced metaphysics and philosophical ideas to the historical state of the relations of material production. For Marx, ideas about the (social) world are the determined product of the existing relations of material production: ‘Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking’ (Marx and Engels, 1965: 15, 16).

This materialist notion of ‘reducing’ metaphysics to material/structural relations (as a stance in sociologised metaphysics) should be distinguished from the genuine philosophical-realist notion of real objects, structures or mechanisms which are relatively mind/activity-independent, and more specifically, from the social realist idea that social structures are powerful and relatively independent elements of people’s thoughts and actions (which is a stance in socialised metaphysics). The former refers to the socio-theoretical idea that our position in a social structure of material production or an institution can determine our descriptive and normative orientations towards these structures, while the latter is a frequently discussed idea that we do not choose the conditions of our working and living, since there are social structures that constrain our actions. In this sense, Marx is a great example of how one could identify both a materialist-reductionist and a social realist stance, that is, one can find in Marx a case of a combination of versions of (Pa) and (Pb).

For Marx, social science could uncover latent social structures and powers in a similar way to the uncovering of the *real* structures and mechanisms of the natural world by the natural sciences. Indeed, in this sense, Marx could be seen as an early structural-realist, but the point here is that the expression ‘reduction of metaphysics to existing material relations’ rather means that our images of the world ‘follow the logic’ of economic history, as well as the internal societal divisions within each societal stage in its historical development. Social agents behave and think according to their class position in a certain and given structure of material production, which is relatively *autonomously* developing throughout human history.

While avoiding the teleological element in Marx (the idea that historical necessities are leading us towards a final societal stage), Pierre Bourdieu retained these materialist-reductionist and realist aspects. Specifically, in his account, the formation of our images of the world expresses the necessities of the external structured realities as internalised through the *habitus*. For Bourdieu, our world-views which form the categories of perception and evaluation constitute the habitus, and it is the habitualised legitimisation of the dominant world-views that are the object of the symbolic struggles of the various structurally situated agents who have different views of the social world. This is Bourdieu’s mysterious theoretical move of presenting the discursive negotiation upon the legitimate world-imageries as being the quasi-determined mental shadow of material conditions:

If objective power relations tend to reproduce themselves in views of the social world that contribute to the permanence of these relations, this is therefore because the structuring principles of a world view are rooted in the objective structures of the social world: power relations are also present in people’s minds, in the form of the categories of perception of these relations.

(Bourdieu, 1985: 729)

And I am calling this theoretical move ‘mysterious’ because negotiation and the idea of symbolic struggles for legitimacy, as I will explain, require the ontological possibility of the self-reflective agency (Bouzanis, 2022) – a possibility that is missing in Bourdieu’s thought (Bouzanis and Kemp, 2020). My general point in these paragraphs is that in Bourdieu’s case, as in Marx’s case, a social ontology (socialised metaphysics) can explain the ‘nature’ and the social production of metaphysical ‘views of the social world’ (sociologised metaphysics) as they emerged in different fields. In Chapter 4, I will further explain how (Pa) and (Pb) are linked with each other, and both underlie what I have called the fundamental predicament of meta-analysis.

Are our ‘views of the social world’ merely an imprint of material necessity (forced upon our cognition by the material world and the social structures within which we are placed), or it is rather the case that our creative imagination can ‘escape’ this imprint? Many social constructionists have argued for the idea of the discursive production and modification of our images of the world. This idea frequently implies that there is a *relatively autonomous* factor in the formation of our *conventional* world-views, that is, that instead of them being either a mere co-product or a projection of external necessities, there is a factor of indeterminacy and *conventionality* in our formulation of world-imageries – there are also imagined worlds, as well as imagined properties of them that do not exist, or that do not exist in the form we imagine them. So, can we imagine different sub-worlds which somehow ‘escape’ from the mandates of our class position or our immediate experience? And if we can, is this possibility of imagination efficacious in some way or another? This question of the efficacy of the imagination leads us to the idea that even if we are capable of imagining *other* worlds, institutions, structures or objects, we cannot do whatever we wish with social reality, in that social structures and/or institutions are not as malleable as we might wish. More specifically, social realists have not only pointed to the idea that real structures and/or functions constrain and enable individual agents’ thoughts and actions in various degrees and modes but also to the idea that powerful structures ‘resist’ agents’ transformative interaction. The key idea here is that social forms have powers of their own.

Do social structures exert causal powers upon us then, or they are *conventional* constructs of our interaction which takes place within a certain linguistic context? In Chapter 5, I will critically draw on the works of prominent critical realists such as Roy Bhaskar (1975, 1979, 2011), Margaret Archer (1995, 1996, 2013) and Dave Elder-Vass (2010, 2012). Critical realism is a variety of ‘mild’ – if you will allow me the expression – social realism that, in general terms, avoids common fallacies of classical social realism (like social determinism and crude materialism). Yet, contra critical realism, in this book, I will argue that instead of having their own powers, social structures are rather crystallisations of the shared imaginary world-views on which social interaction draws. In order to further explain this idea, I will reflect on the anti-naturalist tradition which utilises the notion of the social imaginary.

While emphasising that most critical realists reject social determinism and embrace an idea of the creative social agent, I will criticise critical realists’ tendency to embrace (i) the idea of objective knowledge and (ii) the idea of the emergent powers of social structures. In this analysis, the reader of this book needs to have in mind that the confusing concept of ‘reductionism’ is ‘guilty’ of a huge misunderstanding in contemporary analyses around these ideas. It usually takes two forms: the *socio-theoretical reductionism* I have discussed up to this point, specifically, the *materialist* idea that our world-views are determined by (reduced to) material relations; and *philosophical reductionism,* the idea that the powers and properties of higher-level entities (i.e., social forms) can be explained as the aggregate or the synthetic result of the powers and properties of lower-level entities (i.e., agents, material objects) that are related in some way. And the idea of emergence in critical realism is frequently presented in opposition to this notion of *philosophical reductionism*, holding that the powers and properties of higher-level entities cannot be (ontologically and/or nomologically) *explained* or *inferred* in terms of the properties and powers of lower-level entities (see Elder-Vass, 2010; Sawer, 2005).

And we need to clarify that critical realists are in general opposed to both forms of reductionism. The notion of social emergence, according to key authors in critical realism, *is assumed* to allow for the distinct ontological status of agents (whose thought and action are not *socio-theoretically reduced* to material conditions) while pointing to the idea that agents’ actions and views are more or less constrained by structural properties which are not the mere aggregate effect/result of socio-cultural interaction, but rather the emergence of new social forms which constitute an ‘existential surplus’ in historical creation. I will critically reflect on Elder-Vass’ work (2010, 2012) so as to argue against the idea of social emergence, mainly by claiming that it *paradoxically* assumes the existence of higher-level powerful entities, while a key tenet of critical realism is that agency is the only efficacious particular in social reality. As I will argue, this effort of combining agency and emergence is doomed to failure, as imageries of emergence do not fit well with notions of agency.

In addition, by drawing on Archer (1995) who distinguishes among structure, culture and agency, I distinguish among three levels of macro-sociological analysis: the ideational, the institutional and the material. Agency is placed at the micro-level: agents work on these three analytically distinct spheres/dimensions of ‘theoretical’ macro-level objects of reflection (by ‘objects’ here I do not mean powerful particulars or emergent entities, but theoretically reconstructed abstract objects); agents maintain or transform imaginary schemes that are placed at the ideational level, institutional settings (hierarchies of roles, and matrices of rules) that are thus placed at the meso-level of social systems, and social structures which are placed at the material level. The ideational level constitutes the upper level at which creativity takes place. At this upper level, the analysis points to the idea that our shared world-imageries constitute the ideational background on which agents reflect, in order to make sense of the institutional and structural settings in which they are placed. And I relate this idea to the idea of theory/mind/activity-dependence of social forms, which key critical realists like Bhaskar and Archer have endorsed, without however fully recognising its theoretical consequences.

I will argue that any change at the institutional or structural levels is in congruence with (changes in) dominant or peripheral world-imageries, in so far as interrelated world-imageries set the praxical and ethical limits of the ‘existent’, the ‘doable’ and the ‘expected’, in the everyday agential enactment with institutions and social structures. Consequently, changes at the ideational level constitute changes in the background of agents’ understandings of ‘what exists’ or what is expected – with the result that new possibilities of *construction* emerge at the institutional and structural levels. This analysis suggests that there is an existential proximity between the ideational, the institutional and the structural levels. Existential proximity among structures and cognitive backgrounds is also the case in the work of Pierre Bourdieu, though in his case, objective social structures are the key ontological concept, in the sense that it defines the limits of the habitus as agents’ cognitive structure. Here, I am proposing a kind of opposite path for existential proximity among analytically distinct levels of the constitution of society: ideational backgrounds are the key ‘constructing’ principle in all fields of social life, including the scientific fields.

Therefore, the mode of anti-realism that I am proposing in this book critically draws on Margaret Archer’s useful distinction among structure, culture and agency, but also on Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘reflexive realism’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 111) which asserts an inverse materialist-reductionist version of existential proximity that exists among social forms and cognitive backgrounds. Consequently, according to the approach developed in this book, our images of the world are cosmogonic in the social world, in that human imagination and reflectivity are the key, undetermined, constructing factors in the social domain.

As I mentioned above, in order to develop this anti-realist approach, I will be drawing on the key concept of the ‘imaginary’. I understand the idea of the social imaginary as consisting of conflicting, mutually supportive, overlapping world-imageries which constitute the ‘object’ of reflection for imaginative social agents participating in different communities. Interrelated metaphysical world-imageries, in other words, work as principles of ‘ontological security’ (see Giddens, 1984) that organise common reactions, beliefs and expectations. Here, the imaginary constitutes a shared ideational background of interrelated imageries of the world(s) or sub-worlds that inform our categorical and perceptual engagement with events and objects (of different kinds) in the various fields in which we participate, including the scientific and philosophical fields and sub-fields.

And one of the main arguments of this book is that the world-imageries shared in the various scientific and philosophical fields have a central place in the cognition of the epistemic subjectivities that draw on epistemic imaginaries as intersubjective backgrounds so as to re-produce, modify or radically change these world-imageries. The analysis here does not ignore the differences between social and epistemic imaginaries: the latter are complex, sophisticated ‘cosmologies’ which are in a continuous process of modification, while the former are more persisting, pervasive world-imageries. The common line that links these two analyses is that world-imageries are centrally placed in the cognition of participants in every field in which they participate; and that world-imageries are intersubjectively shared. We will return to this point in Chapters 2, 3 and 4–, in which I will investigate traditional and contemporary discussions of the nature of metaphysics, and more specifically, the idea of the a priori status of metaphysics (and at that point I will argue for a certain version of this idea).

But in this way, socialised metaphysics (Pa), with the help of the socio-ontological concept of the imaginary, can cast light on sociologising metaphysics (b), that is, the discursive elaboration of metaphysical world-imageries.

Now, this effort of reconciling (Pa) socialised and (Pb) sociologising metaphysics is an effort to theoretically reconstruct what I call the *fundamental predicament of meta-analysis*, which refers to the under-theorised state of contemporary thought on metaphysics, and which consists of the following dimensions:

(Pa1) the idea that ontological commitments (in the social and natural sciences) are cognitionally (but not necessarily temporarily) prior to epistemological and methodological investigations and choices;

(Pa2) the recognition that dominant authors in social realism utilize naturalist world-imageries in order to propose a naturalised social ontology (see Kaidesoja, 2013) – such as the various theories of emergence (see Elder-Vass, 2010);

(Pa3) the abstract and not well-discussed idea that social ontology cannot be defined *independently* of natural ontologies, because our socio-cultural interactions are dependent upon the materiality of the world, and a large part of these interactions relate somehow to material objects. Most materialist-realists and critical realists would possibly attempt to correct me on this by claiming that, as Elder-Vass has said, ‘social reality is itself fundamentally material’ (Elder-Vass, 2012: 249). I will explain that I do not *fundamentally* disagree with (Pa3), and also that it does not necessarily contradict what I have just said above that ‘our socio-cultural interactions are dependent upon the materiality of the world’.

(Pb1) meta-ontological theories *about* the *nature* of metaphysics and theories of knowledge tacitly ‘assume’ a social ontology having a certain import or implication about the cognitional possibilities of the human mind, the character of mutual understanding as well as the ‘nature’ of shared backgrounds like ‘language’ or ‘common knowledge’;

(Pb2) world-imageries are discursively transformed and reproduced;

(Pb3) world-imageries shape the existential limits and possibilities of socio-genetic processes in the discursive elaboration of institutions and social structures.

I call this state a predicament and not a circularity, since it designates meta-theoretical dilemmas and tricky theoretical overlaps, rather than a circular path through the key assumptions of my account. After all, the analysis makes sense even if one negates the importance of one or more of the above six dimensions. One can accept any or all of (Pa1), (Pa2), (Pa3), (Pb1), (Pb2) and (Pb3), but different authors would lead to a different analysis of them, depending on the content in each step. For example, we can understand the socio-cultural transformation of metaphysics (Pb2), in different ways, and we can always disagree about what we mean by the priority of ontology over epistemology (Pa1), or what the idea that socio-cultural interaction is dependent upon materiality (Pa3) means. Note that there are not many authors reflecting on (Pb1), (Pb2) and (Pb3) and in this book I aspire to do so, after defining the notion of the social imaginary. Also note that adoption of (Pa3) does not necessarily lead to (Pa2).

Therefore, the path from (Pa1) to (Pb3) that I just described denotes how I understand a key difficult situation around metaphysics in Western thought, and I am deeply aware that many authors would disagree with the content or even with the necessity of the steps themselves. These six ‘moments’ in combination generate an imagery of meta-theoretical instability that, I think, is under-theorised and requires special attention. If meta-ontological investigations are informed by social theories of knowledge (Pb1), then the way we understand the ‘nature’ of social theories of knowledge must have repercussions in what we mean about the priority of ontology (Pa1) and must also be related to the way we understand discursive elaboration of world-views (Pb2). Or, the way we understand the existential link between the transformation of world-imageries and the transformation of institutions and social structures (Pb3) is intrinsically related to how we understand efforts to transfer naturalist imageries to the understanding of the social world (Pa2). So, these issues are intrinsically related, and I need to clarify that (Pa2) will be negated as an illegitimate effort to impose imageries to a domain which is not characterised by properties that can be explained with the premises of these naturalist imageries – imageries which are thus not fit for the purpose.

I will show that key authors in critical realism accept the importance of (Pa1), (Pa2) and (Pa3) but there would probably be hesitating to go further to accept any of (Pb1), (Pb2) and (Pb3). Some constructionist approaches could perhaps somehow tolerate versions of (Pa1), but would probably emphasise upon (Pb2). So, again, what matters here is how we understand each step. In any case, as I mentioned, (Pb1), (Pb2) and (Pb3) are under-theorised; and in this book, I aim at presenting these six moments and show how they contribute to the fundamental predicament of contemporary philosophy and the social sciences.

Following these lines, in Chapter 5, I will offer a brief critique of critical realism as constituting a sophisticated version of social realism. I will also explain that critical realism straddles two areas, utilising imageries of natural necessity and causality, while at the same time invoking the creativity of agency, an idea which is not in harmony with these imageries. I will also briefly touch upon a recent debate between Tony Lawson, a prominent realist, and John Searle, one of the most important philosophers of today, who has proposed a modest version of constructionism.

In Chapter 6, I will discuss the notion of the shared imaginary, drawing on accounts which pre-date Cornelius Castoriadis’ more well-known discussion of the idea. This analysis will set the context for the presentation of my anti-realist (and anti-naturalist) ontogenetic model of the constitution of social worlds in Chapter 7, where I start with some basic distinctions between ontological dimensions (ideational, institutional and structural) in order to argue for what I will call the existential pervasiveness of the ideational dimension. Finally, in Chapter 8, I will summarise the notion of reflexive social ontology and explain why the ontogenetic model I propose avoids the usual traps into which non-reflexive ontologies fall. Finally, I will show some of the ways in which these traps have become evident in recent efforts to sociologise metaphysics.

Throughout this book, the reader should bear in mind that the account proposed here is *anti-realist* in the sense that it renders the ideational dimension as the ultimate one and takes it to be existentially prior to the material dimension (consisting of the idea of *real* social structures). This also means, as I show in Chapters 7 and 8, that the idea of theory/activity-dependence (which critical realists more or less accept) is explained in relation to this idea of the existential priority of the ideational dimension. The ontogenetic model I have proposed here is able to cast light on what I call the *existential pervasiveness of the ideational dimension* (which includes the possibility that ideas and theories have an effect on the constitution of social forms, in and through their appearance in the metaphysical discourse). Additionally, this analysis ‘relaxes’ the key philosophical tenet of *metaphysical realism*, which is the theory/mind-independence of reality. For there is *at least* one domain in nature, the societal, which is dependent on theorisation and human imagination. Thus, my account is anti-realist in both socio-theoretical and philosophical terms. But it is also *anti-naturalist*, as it stands against the transferring and imposition of imageries of necessity and causality from the natural sciences onto the assumptions of ontic conditions of the social worlds. Yet, as I explained as regards (Pa3), this does not mean that I have denied the relevance or the presence of what we call materiality in the social world (see Chapters 6 and 7).